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ASSUMPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY: AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION
HOLLIN K. DICKERSON'
I. INTRODUCTION
In his 2000 Millennium Declaration, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated that the United Nations is "the only global institution with the legitimacy
and scope that derive from universal membership, and a mandate that encompasses
development, security and human rights as well as the environment. In this sense,
the United Nations is unique in world affairs." 2 In the same address, Annan also
emphasized that "[w]eak states are one of the main impediments to effective
governance today, at national and international levels alike."3 Indeed, the post-
Cold War phenomenon of an increasingly active United Nations portrays the
Organization as one both willing and able to act upon its Charter-endowed powers
of securing international peace and security to provide such governance, even if
doing so involves the administration of an independent territory.
The role that international organizations, and in particular the United Nations,
play in response to the problem of "weak states" is the very subject of international
territorial administration (ITA). Since the colonial era, the administration of
territory by outside actors has become a well-established practice.4 The first
instance, however, of international territorial administration was the League of
Nations' partial governance of the Free City of Danzig after World War 1.
5
Subsequent missions have included the League's administration of the Saar
territory and Leticia; United Nations operations in places such as the Congo, West
Irian, Cambodia, Somalia, Eastern Slavonia and, most recently, Kosovo and East
Timor; the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia; and the European
Union (EU) in Mostar.6 These projects stand in contrast to other instances of
1. J.D. 2005, The University of Texas School of Law. I would like to thank Sarah Cleveland,
Karen Engle, and Ralph Wilde for their helpful comments and Steven Ratner and David Hutchinson for
their continued support. This paper was first presented at Yale Law School as part of the Yale Journal
of International Law's 2005 Young Scholars Conference, and more recently at the American Society of
International Law's 2006 Annual Meeting.
2. The Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, at
49, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (2000) [hereinafter Millennium Declaration].
3. Id. at 7.
4. Ralph Wilde, TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2004)
[hereinafter WILDE, ADMINISTRATION] (manuscript on file with author).
5. Ralph Wilde, Representing International Territorial Administration: A Critique of Some
Approaches, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 71, 76 (2004). [hereinafter Wilde, Critique].
6. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 29, for a chart illustrating the dates of each
administration, its location, the administering actor, and the type of governance.
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foreign territorial administration that involve individual states as the administrative
actors (as seen during the age of colonialism and under both the Mandate and
Trusteeship systems). While ITA has been ongoing for decades at the level of both
plenary and partial administration, some have taken to calling the post-Cold War
missions as exceptional in the practice's overall history. This in turn has raised
concerns by some as to whether or not this practice has given rise to a new form
colonialism, albeit one conducted by international organizations in lieu of states.8
Others, however, offer these operations as examples of international liberalism at
its best.
Commentators often differentiate administration projects by the identity of the
actor conducting the operations. Some have remarked that ITA projects are "so
exceptionally difficult and politically sensitive that only a body with broad
international legitimacy stands a chance of success." 9 The demise of colonialism
and the subsequent rise of international organizations (1Os) have contributed to the
development of an assumption that international organizations are somehow
inherently more legitimate for undertaking territorial administration than are
individual states.' 0 The result is that states and international organizations have
been placed at opposite ends of a legitimacy continuum, whereby states are
associated with imposed rule and self-interested motives-thereby making them
illegitimate-and international organizations are viewed as benevolent, selfless,
and thus, legitimate.''
7. See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 76 (2001) (noting that the role of the United Nations in governing postconflict societies has
"substantially expanded"). However, Matheson is incorrect that this somehow constitutes a new
practice by international organizations; for example, the United Nations took over full governance of
the Congo following the exit of Belgium as a colonial power in order to handle the resulting power
vacuum in the 1960's. See, e.g. PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 50 (1994). Similarly,
the League of Nations was present in the Saar territory for some fifteen years before handing over final
sovereignty to Germany. During that time, it was involved in plenary administration. Ralph Wilde,
From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond The Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 583, 589-90 (2001) [hereinafter Wilde, From Danzig]. See also STEVEN R. RATNER, THE
NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR 16-17
(1996).
8. Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301, 345-46
(1995) (noting legal and political difficulties in reinstating a trusteeship model); Jacob S. Kreilkamp,
Junior Fellow's Note, U.N. Postconflict Reconstruction, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 619, 621 (2003)
(portraying the United Nations as engaging in a form of neocolonialism); Joel C. Beauvais, Note,
Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1101, 1177-78 (2001) (arguing foe' increased local participation during transitional governance); Kristen
Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant's
Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285 (2005) (examining jus post bellum in light of the United
Nations' plenary assumption of legislative activities in East Timor and Kosovo).
9. Kirsti Samuels & Sebastian von Einsiedel, The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and
Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq 12, International Peace Academy, Nov. 2003 available
at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF-Reports/FUTURE OFUNSTATEBUILDING.pdf.
10. INIS L. CLAUDE, STATES AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION 148
(1988).
11. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 263. See also Steven R. Ratner, Foreign
Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 EUR. J.
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I argue that this normative bifurcation is oversimplified and masks very real
concerns that do exist regarding the legitimacy of international organizations to
carry out territorial administration, while at the same time highlighting preexisting
tensions within international law as a whole. In the end, by presenting states and
lOs as polar opposites with respect to territorial administration, the formulation
merely legitimizes activities undertaken by lOs that are considered illegitimate
when done by states.12  A recent example of the blurring that can occur in
distinguishing states from lOs has been seen in the C6te d'Ivoire. The U.N.'s
mission there (UNOCI) stated that the mandate of the C6te d'Ivoire National
Assembly should not be extended. Local residents saw the statement as "an affront
to Ivorian sovereignty," and engaged in violent protests demanding the United
Nations leave the country. 13 As one protestor put it, "[w]e want the complete
liberation of Ivory Coast. I won't go home until the U.N. and France leave my
country.' 4
This article begins where previous discussions of ITA have left off by
examining whether or not legitimacy can be assumed on behalf of international
organizations as an administrative actor. In doing so, it explores the legitimacy of
1Os as administrative actors with respect to some of the characteristics that
scholars, nations, and local populations most commonly focus upon when
questioning an outside actor's validity to assume territorial control. Three aspects
of legitimacy will be discussed: first, the legal authority of international
organizations to conduct territorial administration; second, the accountability of
lOs within the context of ITA; and third, relevant factors related to certain
personality traits of international organizations, specifically their reputations for
selflessness and impartiality. By attempting to break ITA legitimacy down into
some of its primary components, my hope is that a more honest and principled
approach to future administration mandates may be realized that capitalizes on the
strengths of lOs while at the same time consciously compensating for their
weaknesses. This article does not seek to answer the question of whether any given
ITA project was or was not legitimate and does not attempt to answer whether, in
the end, international organizations themselves are wholly legitimate or
illegitimate. Instead, by creating a framework for assessing the legitimacy of lOs
to carry out the specific task of territorial administration, future ITA mandates can
be drafted that take into account a wider variety of players, processes, and
considerations than before. This, in turn, will help international organizations-and
particularly the United Nations in this era of reform-to start asking themselves
INT'L L. 695, 696 (2005).
12. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 262-63; (quoting Wilde "[j]ust as territorial
administration by foreign states was presented as essentially unjust in the era of decolonization, so this
activity performed by international organizations is sometimes considered essentially legitimate
because it is conducted by international organizations. At the very least, the presumption is reversed;
what was presumed to be illegitimate is now presumed to be legitimate.").
13. Lydia Polgreen, Ivorian Leader Urges Youths to End Anti-U.N. Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2006, at A8.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
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the right questions with respect to these missions by examining them through a
more nuanced approach.
Part II of this article defines ITA by depicting its usages in response to so-
called sovereignty and governance problems, which will be defined below. Part III
examines the historical basis for the state/IO distinction by briefly tracing the
evolution of territorial administration through colonialism, the League of Nations,
the early activities of the United Nations, and up to the current post-Cold War
setting. Part IV then analyzes an ITA actor's legitimacy through the three separate
lenses of legal authority, accountability, and reputation. Lastly, Part V concludes
by showing that while there are reasons to doubt that international organizations
are the best administration actor, by acknowledging the gaps that currently exist,
efforts can now be made to bridge them.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION
ITA is a subset of the larger activity of foreign territorial administration. At a
basic level, foreign territorial administration can be thought of as local governance
of a territory (whether it be a state, nonstate, or substate unit) conducted by an
outside actor. 15 According to Ralph Wilde, the move from individual state
administration under colonialism to administration by international organizations
following World War I constitutes a distinct practice, both in terms of the role
performed by international organizations as well as their very identity as
international-as opposed to local-actors.' 6 Beginning with the League of
Nations' administration of the Free City of Danzig, ITA has been used in response
to essentially two types of operations, what Wilde terms sovereignty problems and
governance problems. 17 Depending on which type of situation is at issue, an 1O's
legitimacy for undertaking a particular ITA project will be affected.
Sovereignty problems concern the identity of who is in control and the basis
upon which that control is exercised. When ITA is used to manage a sovereignty
problem, it seeks to answer a larger question regarding the status of a territory.' 8 In
such situations, IOs are brought in to administer because they are "seen as 'neutral'
as compared with the local actors to whom the sovereignty problem relates."' 9
Thus, the League of Nations took control of the Saar region following World War I
because it was contested territory between France and Germany. 20 Similarly in
Leticia, the League responded when a group of Peruvians invaded and occupied
15. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 17; see Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 585
(explaining that administrations can be partial (concerned only with certain matters) or plenary
(exercising full governmental powers)).
16. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 18, 33-84 (thoroughly discussing the meaning of
"international organization").
17. Id. at 164.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The Versailles Treaty, arts. 45, 49, June 28, 1919, Consol. T.S. 188 [hereinafter Versailles
Treaty].
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the Colombian town-the League exercised control for a one-year period in order
to serve as a neutral buffer before turning administrative control back over to
Colombia. 21 The United Nations played the same role with respect to West Irian in
the 1960s by conducting plenary administration for a seven-month period before
the transfer of authority from the Netherlands to Indonesia.
2 2
The second type of ITA operations, those involving governance problems,
occur when the basis for outside involvement is the manner of governance being
exercised in a territory, rather than the identity of the actor in control.23 The recent
U.N. operations in Kosovo (United Nations Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK) and
East Timor (United Nations. Transitional Assistance in East Timor, or UNTAET)
are both representative of this type of administration.24 In Kosovo, UNMIK was
established following mass human rights violations by Serb leaders against
Kosovar Albanians; the goal of the mission was to effect a change in the existing
local governance (the Serbs), not to answer a question of who that governance
was. 25 In East Timor, because the local people were not deemed to be ready or
capable of assuming the responsibilities of self-governance themselves at the time
of independence, UNTAET actively engaged in plenary governance in East Timor
for a period of three years.26
Aside from the sovereignty- and governance-problem model, another manner
in which ITA can be viewed is as a mechanism for promoting self-determination
entitlements. According to Wilde, by looking at ITA from the perspective of self-
determination, the focus shifts away from the territory itself and onto the people.27
1Os promote the right to self-determination by assisting in referenda (as in the Saar
and West Irian) or by promoting a particular territorial outcome based on an
existing right to either internal or external self-determination (as in Kosovo).25
21. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 587; see id at 588 ("For Colombia, it was a staging post
in between control by the Peruvian irregulars and control by Colombian authorities. For Peru, however,
it ensured that the territory would not be transferred to Colombia until the wider border dispute between
the two countries was resolved.").
22. The Netherlands' claim for control had failed to garner the necessary two-thirds support
needed in the General Assembly. Acting to save itself from embarrassment, the Netherlands said it was
for the local population to decide, and the interim period of administration under UNTEA (U.N.
Temporary Executive Authority) again provided a convenient buffer. Id. at 588; John Saltford, United
Nations Involvement with the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea)
1968 to 1969, at 1,2, available at http://www.fpcn-global.org/downloads/act-of-free-choice-papua/un-
papua- 1968-69.pdf.
23. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 592.
24. Idat 593.
25. Kosovo presents a unique situation in that the final status of the territory has not yet been
determined. In the preceding examples of Leticia and West Irian, the underlying issue of who would
ultimately govern had already been resolved, and an international organization merely provided interim
administration. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 177.
26. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 600. UNTAET"s mandate under Resolution 1272
included providing security and maintaining law and order, in the development of civil and social
services, and supporting East Timor's capacity for self-government. See S.C. Res. 1272, at 2, 2, U.N.
SCOR, 54' h Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
27. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 199.
28. Id. at 201. In West Irian, Indonesia received assistance from the U.N. representative to carry
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Arising out of a rejection of the colonial approach, the right to self-determination
continues to form much of the background to modem-day international
administration prerogatives.
Thus, territorial administration as conducted by international organizations is
characterized by certain activities and by certain purposes. 29 It is important to
differentiate ITA from peacekeeping, which is commonly (though variously)
defined as the deployment of military intervention forces designed to prevent
existing disputes from reemerging.3 ° ITA more closely fits with the idea of
postconflict peacebuilding as endorsed by former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in his An Agenda for Peace.31 According to Boutros-Ghali,
peacebuilding includes efforts to advance economic and social development while
fostering the type of confidence in local institutions that is fundamental for a
lasting peace.32
The basic connection between all administration projects, whether conducted
by states (foreign territorial administration) or by international organizations
(ITA), is that in each case local actors are displaced by an outside administration.
Who precisely is conducting the administration and that actor's legitimacy in doing
so is the focus of the remainder of this article.
III. THE BASES FOR LEGITIMACY ASSUMPTIONS
The story of ITA is fundamentally one of sovereignty 33 and self-
determination. A chronological look at the history of foreign territorial
administration reveals a pattern closely aligned with prevailing notions of state
out the plebiscite. RATNER, supra note 7, at I11.
29. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 191-227 (discussing how ITA implements
international law in the areas of international dispute settlement and prevention; resolution of certain
areas of public policy, such as territorial status outcomes and liberal governance; and the promotion of
international peace and security).
30. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Thinking Ethically about Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, in
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING 17, 18 (Tom Woodhouse et al. eds., 1998); Interview with Sir Brian
Urquhart, Former Undersecretary General of the U.N., in Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 19, 1996),
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/UN/Urquhart/urquhart6.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) [hereinafter
Urquhart Interview].
31. The Secretary-General, Agenda for Peace Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping, para. 55, 56, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/47/277, S/241 11 (June 17, 1992), http://www.un.orgADocs/SG/agpeace.html [hereinafter Agenda for
Peace].
32. See id. at para. 5; Many commentators continue to use the language of peacekeeping when
describing ITA without carefully distinguishing between the two. See, e.g., RATNER, supra note 7, at
40-41; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (2003) (discussing ITA projects, including the U.N. Operations in the Congo
(ONUC) and UNTAET, under the mantle of peacekeeping).
33. The use of this term is not without its problems. Ian Brownlie has noted its frequent invocation
by statesmen acting pursuant to political motivations. In addition, he finds that its usage by lawyers
tends to obscure complex considerations of "the rights, duties, powers, liberties, and immunities of
states." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003)
(1973); However, Brownlie also finds that over time a consistency of use has developed, such that
"[t]he normal complement of state rights, the typical case of legal competence, is described commonly
as 'sovereignty."' Id. It is this latter meaning that I intend here.
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responsibility vis-A-vis international law at given points in history. As pure
positivism gradually declined in influence and a growing recognition of self-
determination entitlements came into existence, a belief in international
organizations as a viable alternative to imposed colonial regimes took hold. The
following historical discussion sets forth the normative bases upon which foreign
territorial administration as conducted by individual states and as conducted by
international organizations are distinguished.
A. Colonialism
"Colonies, by definition, lack sovereignty." 34  Today, scholars cite to
economic, strategic, religious, and psychological factors as the motivations behind
colonialism. 35 Antony Anghie notes that the confrontation that occurred between
the European nations and their colonies was not seen as one between sovereign
nations, but rather as between sovereign European nations and uncivilized ones
lacking in sovereignty. 36 For example, Jules Ferry, prime minister of France during
the 1880s, once emphasized that "the superior races have a right because they have
a duty. They have a duty to civilize the inferior races....
37
Based upon such sentiments, Anghie persuasively argues that international
law legitimized such conquests and that therefore, the very notion of sovereignty
was established and shaped through the practice of colonialism. 38 Therefore, prior
to World War I, the world was essentially divided into the civilized and the
uncivilized, with only the civilized possessing full sovereignty. 39 Because colonies
were not considered politically independent, individual states were able to use their
superior military and economic power to control individual territories and impose
plenary administration upon them. 40 At the same time, the colonial powers were
themselves held unaccountable for abuses perpetuated during their time in power.41
The imposition of forced foreign rule, the presence of self-interested motives, and
the overall lack of accountability are among the characteristics that international
territorial administration seeks to overcome.
34. Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 513
(2002) [hereinafter Anghie, Colonialism].
35. Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 903, 932-33 (1997).
36. Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century
International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,3 (1999) [hereinafter Anghie, Peripheries].
37. Jules Franqois Camille Ferry, Speech Before the French Chamber of Deputies (Mar. 28, 1884)
in
DISCOURS ET OPINIONS DE JULES FERRY (Paul Robiquet ed., 1987), available at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1884ferry.html.
38. Aghie, Peripheries, supra note 36, at 6.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Gordon, supra note 8, at 339-340.
41. See Giselle Reid, The Legacy of Colonialism: A Hindrance to Self-Determination, 10 ToURO
INT'L L. REv. 277, 286-90 (2000) (discussing the more harmful aspects of colonial regimes).
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B. The League of Nations
The establishment of the League of Nations following World War I reflected
a new-found internationalist spirit among the world community.42 The post-World
War I period witnessed a dramatic rethinking in the principles of sovereignty and
collective security, leading to the creation of a new international body devoted to
the prevention of international conflict. 43 The League of Nations challenged the
prevailing positivist model of international law by focusing on international
cooperation, something that necessarily entailed a diminution in state sovereignty
in a world where working together rather than fighting against became the new
norm. 44 In addition, President Wilson's endorsement of a right to self-
determination exerted a powerful influence over postwar thinking, which in turn
influenced the manner in which the post-colonial territories were treated, both
legally and politically. 45 The League's response to anticolonial sentiment and the
presence of newly independent territories as a result of the post-World War I
decolonization movement was the Mandates system, which placed territories "not
yet able to stand by themselves" under the "tutelage" of "advanced nations.
' 4 6
Anghie states that the Mandate system "attempted to do nothing less than to
promote self-government and, in certain cases, to integrate previously colonized
and dependent peoples into the international system as sovereign, independent
nation-states.4 7 This was intended to be in juxtaposition to the colonial vision that
had excluded non-European people (i.e., those living under colonial regimes) from
the international system.48 The Mandates system, although still administered by
individual states, differed from colonialism in at least one important respect-the
authority for the Mandates issued forth from the League Covenant rather than from
coercion as exercised by individual states.49
42. DIEHL, supra note 7, at 15.
43. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT pmbl.
44. See id arts. 10, 11; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 93-94 (2004).
45. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 44, at 93.
46. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, paras. 1, 2; Article 22 embodied two sets of
obligations: substantive ones to help the former colonies "stand alone" and procedural ones that
required nations to submit annual reports to a permanent League Commission acting in a supervisory
role. Id.; While the Mandate system did confer equivalent legal status upon the administered territories
and charged the League with supervising the undertakings of the administering nations, in practice
Article 22 provided for three different levels of administration according to the degree of independence
a territory had thus far attained. Gordon, supra note 8, at 340.; "A" Mandates were those whose
"existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory..."; "B" Mandates required administration in a
way that would guarantee certain fundamental rights, prohibit the slave trade, and secure equal
economic opportunities; and "C" Mandates were to be administered "under the laws of the Mandatory
as integral portions of its territory .... LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
47. Anghie, Colonialism, supra note 34, at 515.
48. See id. at 516.
49. Edward Marks, Commentary, Transitional Governance: A Return to the Trusteeship System?,
AM. DIPL. COMMENTARY (Am. Dipl., Chapel Hill, N.C.) Feb. 1999, at 4,
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD-Issues/amdipl-10/marks2.html.
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The League marked an important shift in the purpose of territorial
administration by attempting to provide for the eventual independence of the
Mandates and, during the entire period of its existence, the League itself only
conducted three ITA projects-the Free City of Danzig, the Saar, and Leticia. 50
Still, the choice for an international organization as the administering body
remained the exception, and individual state administration the rule.
C. The United Nations
The successor to the League, the United Nations, inherited the League's focus
on collective security and faith in international organizations. With respect to
territorial administration, the U.N. Charter marked another evolution in the concept
of sovereignty, as primarily seen in Article l's focus on the maintenance of
international peace and security, equality among nations, and its enshrinement of
the principle of self-determination. 51 The dual goals of promoting self-
determination and collectively ensuring international peace and security have
together provided the bases for U.N. ITA projects.
With respect to the colonies, the Charter sought to finish what the League had
started: ending colonialism's final vestiges by making the former colonies full
members of the international community. 52 The long-term goal of the Charter's
Non-Self-Governing Territories and the Trusteeship Council was to lead these
territories to the point where they could freely choose for themselves their own
political status, which would presumably be independence. 3 The Charter's
commitment to self-determination fundamentally rejected individual state
administration altogether, and the effect was that all such existing projects were
made contingent upon the expressed will of the local populations as a
manifestation of a self-determination entitlement.5 4 Wilde points out the
incongruity in the decolonization agenda:
Because of the historical denial of self-administration, a people were
entitled to decide how their internal administrative arrangements, and
external status, were to operate in the future. However, this legacy of
external administration also meant that the local population was not
in a position to carry out the process through which its entitlement
would be realized.... The use of ITA both to implement the
obligations of the administering authority, and enable the 'act of self-
determination' is, then, ultimately consistent with the self-
determination agenda of preventing a repeat of the colonial activity in
50. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 586.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1,2, 4.
52. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-85, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter;Chapter XIII
created the Trusteeship Council to oversee the trust territories by considering reports submitted by the
administering authority, accepting petitions, and conducting periodic visits at times agreed upon with
the administering authority. Id. art 87, para. 1., available at
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapt13.htm.
53. Gordon, supra note 8, at 319.
54. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 247-48.
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the future. Ironically involving a form of this activity, it was
necessary to bring the activity to a permanent end.
ITA continued during the post-World War II decolonization period while
administration projects conducted by states were phased out and eventually
discarded altogether.5 6 Throughout the Mandate and Trusteeship systems,
individual state administration and ITA existed side-by-side; 57 after World War I,
the desire of victorious states to assume control prevailed over League
administration, and the continuation of this model in the United Nations provided a
strong precedent for state administration.5 s Over time, however, the illegitimacy
that came to be associated with individual state administration in the wake of
colonialism and the corresponding rise of self-determination entitlements created
the normative space necessary for international organizations to assume these
functions.59
D. Post-Cold War
Today's critics of international organizations have been prompted in part by
the United Nations' increased use of Charter operations in the post-Cold War
environment. In his 1992 An Agenda for Peace, then-Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali set forth an expansive vision of a newly activated United Nations
that would play a leading role in "post-conflict peace-building. '60 Boutros-Ghali
emphasized the importance of respecting the sovereignty of each state while
simultaneously encouraging the Security Council to use the full range of Charter
provisions for ensuring international peace and security. 61 In March 1993, for the
first time, the Security Council declared that a purely internal civil war was a threat
to international peace and security and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
established the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II).62 UNOSOM
1I's mandate included not only the unprecedented request for humanitarian
assistance from U.N. organs, but also the administrative goals of reestablishing
national and regional governmental institutions and conducting civil affairs
throughout the entire country.63
Those who view ITA in generational terms commonly see the more recent
U.N. operations in places such as Cambodia, Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor as
55. Id. at 250-51.
56. Id. at 251.
57. See Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 603.
58. See id. at 604.
59. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 263.
60. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 31, para. 5.
61. See id. at para. 35.
62. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
63. See id. at para. 4(a), (c), (g); More recently, Secretary-General Annan's 2005 report pursuant
to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stated that "the
United Nations now has more missions on the ground than ever before." The Secretary-General, In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, para. 111, delivered to the
GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom]..
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marking a new high point of U.N. activity. 64 This, in turn, has led to accusations
that the United Nations is usurping the power of its Member States, becoming too
involved in matters of domestic concern, and, in short, taking over a neocolonialist
role in the world.65 Nevertheless, the modem-day choice of international
organizations as the actors conducting territorial administration seems to have
largely displaced foreign state administration as "the device of choice. 66
IV. THE LEGITIMACY INQUIRY
Up until now, this article has set forth the historical basis for the state/IO
divide with respect to territorial administration actors by briefly tracing the
chronological evolution of concepts such as sovereignty, self-determination, and
decolonization. The question remains, however, whether in light of the basis for
the distinction, legitimacy on the part of international organizations can be
assumed when it comes to ITA.
Of late, much scholarly discussion has revolved around the legitimacy of
international organizations, in particular the United Nations. 67  Yet legitimacy
itself is an intangible concept with significant political, legal, historical, and social
dimensions. One definition describes legitimacy as "the process through which
political differentiation-the fact there are people who govern and others who are
governed-is justified., 68 David Caron points out that legitimacy is based on
"subjective conclusions, perhaps based on unarticulated notions about what is fair
and just, or perhaps on a conscious utilitarian assessment of what the process
means for oneself., 69 Jean-Marc Coicaud is one commentator who has been
particularly critical of U.N. legitimacy. He believes, however, that ultimately, the
concept of legitimacy on the international level is still in its infancy because the
process of true global integration has only just begun.7 °
Since the end of World War I, the overwhelming majority of territorial
administration projects have been conducted by either the League of Nations or the
United Nations.71 Whereas formerly, international organizations were seen as more
or less beholden to their Member States, many believe that today's lOs are seeking
64. See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 7, at 76; See Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United
Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building 2, International Peace Academy, Nov. 2003
available at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDFReports/YOUTHEPEOPLE2.pdf.
65. Veijo Heiskanen, THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 8 (Jean-Marc
Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001); see Krcilkamp, supra note 8, at 667.
66. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 605.
67. See generally The Secretary-General, A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, (Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
68. Jean-Marc Coicaud, International Democratic Culture and its Sources of Legitimacy: The
Case of Collective Security and Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 256, 259 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
69. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 552, 557 (1993).
70. Coicaud, supra note 68, at 260.
71. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 29.
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to become independent actors in their own right, complete with their own agendas
and goals.72 An important related shift in international relations theory now
concentrates upon weaker states as a source of international problems, as opposed
to more traditional views that focused upon the larger, more powerful nations.73 As
mentioned, accusations that the United Nations is acting ultra vires when it comes
to operations like UNMIK and UNTAET are becoming more widespread today.74
In response, the United Nations has resisted "the equation of the post-colonial ITA
missions with the earlier state-conducted manifestations of foreign territorial
administration.... The need for this intentional distancing from the image of
colonialism raises questions as to whether the legitimacy of international
organizations truly can be assumed in today's political and legal environment.
This section begins by examining the legal authority for ITA and then turns to
an analysis of 10 accountability, followed by a discussion of certain aspects of an
10's identity as they relate to an 10's legitimacy to undertake territorial
administration. Despite an overlap in many areas, the overall framework serves as
a useful basis upon which legitimacy can be mapped and analyzed within the
specific context of territorial administration.
A. LegalAuthority
The rejection of colonial rule stems in part from its forced imposition, and the
collective security system that served as a basis for the creation of both the League
and the United Nations implies precisely what was lacking under colonialism-
consent. While it remains true that the League did not enjoy universal membership,
much of the belief underlying U.N. action is based on the premise that it serves as
an expression of international will that is itself properly reflective of the consent of
those involved.76 When examined in the context of ITA, the question becomes one
of whose consent matters: the Member States, the host state, or the local
population. Because ITA has largely grown out of a rejection of imposed colonial
rule, the existence of meaningful consent is necessary to transform what is
illegitimate administration when done by individual states into legitimate
administration when conducted by IOs.
77
Gene Lyons has said that "[i]ntervention must be collective and subject to
72. Jan Klabbers, The Changing Image of International Organizations, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 221, 226 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
73. See CLAUDE, supra note 10, at 33; For example, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner both
propose a model of U.N. conservatorship with respect to the problem of so-called failed states without
addressing why the U.N. is the ideal actor chosen for this. See Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner,
Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 12-18 (1993).
74. See generally Symposium, The Security Council: Its Authority and Legitimacy, 87 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 300 (1993); How a society feels about such "laudable hyper-activity" largely depends on
its political realist versus internationalist orientation. Kegley, supra note 30, at 18.
75. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 255.
76. See Michael Ottolenghi, The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: The Implications for the
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2194 (2004) (describing three
models of U.N. governance: the Trusteeship system, Chapter VII operations, and a consent-based model
dependent upon the consent of the parties involved).
77. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 262-63.
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broadly accepted rules through which the international community, through the
UN or other recognized means, authorizes intervention in the common cause...
,78 In terms of legality, modern (i.e. post-Cold War) ITA projects are authorized
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.7 9 In terms of
relevant Charter provisions, Article 24 gives the Council the primary responsibility
for ensuring international peace and security8" and, under Article 39, the Council is
charged with determining the existence of any threat to the peace. 81 Thus, when
acting pursuant to Chapter VII to authorize an ITA project, it must be the case that
the Security Council has deemed the situation---either between two states or within
a single one-to pose such a threat.
Caron argues that perceptions of 10 legitimacy principally arise in "that space
between the promises of the preamble to the charter of the organization and the
realities of the compromises in the text that follows, a space where there is
discretion regarding the use of authority." 82 He notes that too great a discrepancy
between the ideals of an organization and its eventual actions is one source of
illegitimacy.83 Indeed, the Agenda for Peace has today become largely discredited
for its overreaching idealism concerning the expansive manner in which the
Charter should be read to allow for increased U.N. involvement in individual
states.84 In Kosovo and East Timor, for example, the Security Council invoked
Article 41, concerning nonmilitary means of enforcing international peace and
security (and listing as examples interruption of the means of communication and
85
severance of diplomatic relations), to authorize plenary territorial administration.
Related to the ultra vires claims, some argue that internal Charter limits
restrict the use of territorial administration, pointing specifically to Article 2(7)'s
prohibition on intervention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state.86 The counterargument holds that the erosion of sovereignty since World
War II makes the limits imposed by Article 2(7) largely irrelevant and that today,
there could exist an emerging "legitimate 'right' to intervene in the domestic
affairs of member states in the name of community norms, values, or interests[.]
87
78. Gene M. Lyons, The United Nations, International Security, and the National Interest, in
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING 75 (Tom Woodhouse et al. eds., 1998).
79. U.N. Charter arts. 39-42.
80. Id. art. 24.
81. Id. art. 39.
82. Caron, supra note 69, at 560.
83. Id.
84. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 209. One example of such an expansive reading is
the Somalia intervention. See discussion supra Part III.D.
85. U.N. Charter art. 41; see Ottolenghi, supra note 76, at 2197.
86. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7; The more legalistic viewpoints of Jonathan Chamey and Bruno
Simma in the context of Kosovo are set forth in A. Mark Weisburd's, International Law and the
Problem of Evil, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 238 (2001); See also Ratner & Helman, supra note
73, at 9; Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1
(1999); MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 34
(2003).
87. Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduction: International Itervention, State
Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY
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Therefore, underlying the legal authority of ITA as a function of consent is a more
elemental debate as to whether ITA is ever appropriate under the U.N. Charter.
88
1. Member State Consent
As Steven Ratner has stated,
"[t]o avoid the stigma of being seen as occupiers, [international
organizations] have developed their own legal and political coping
mechanisms. They have, I believe, assumed that the approval of
these missions by the organization's competent organs insulates them
from the problems of occupiers and have refused to apply the term to
these missions."89
With regard to Member State consent, the decision-making process in the
Security Council has also been the source of much critique, primarily due to the
fact that its membership is not democratically elected and is dominated by a few
powerful states.90 In order for a resolution to pass, an affirmative vote of nine
Members is needed, with all permanent members concurring. 9' Any resolution
passed by the Security Council is legally binding on all Member States and
prevails over any other law.92 Whether or not the Security Council serves as an
accurate proxy of international will and the problems inherent in its structure will
be discussed in Part C below, but suffice it to say here that when the Council
authorizes an ITA mandate, it provides the necessary legal authority for the
Organization to administer a territory.
Much of the rationale for seeking Member State consent grows out of a theory
of international public power that requires that the conditions of governance must
be acceptable both to those exercising the power as well as those affected by it.
9 3
The Security Council purports to give rise to an implied international consent for
the projects it authorizes; in other words, collective security "implies action under
authority of the world community as a whole.... However, the voting results for
past ITA missions reveal a somewhat lopsided record, which tends to lend these
AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 3 (1995).
88. I do not attempt to resolve that debate here, but for a good discussion on the controversies
underlying Charter authority for "old" and "new" peacekeeping (a definitional approach that
encompasses ITA operations) see RATNER, supra note 7, at 56-61.
89. Ratner, supra note 7, at 697.
90. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 67, para. 248 ("[i]ncreasing both the effectiveness
and the credibility of the Security Council] requires greater involvement in Security Council decision-
making by those who contribute most; greater contributions from those with special decision-making
authority; and... a firm consensus on the nature of today's threats..
91. U.N. Charter art. 27.
92. Id. art. 25.
93. Philip Allot, Intergovernmental Societies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 70 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds.,
2001).
94. QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (1960); It should be
noted that because Chapter VII resolutions are legally binding under the Charter, by virtue of having
ratified the Charter a state therefore consents to be bound by determinations of the Security Council.
U.N. Charter art. 103.
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resolutions less authoritative weight than a unanimous, unambiguous voice
would.95 Caron points out that the potential for a veto by any one of the permanent
members has a detrimental effect on the sense of participatory democracy that is
meant to give authority to Security Council resolutions.96 From the realist
perspective of international relations theory, it is not entirely clear that the legal
authority that emanates from the Security Council reflects the United Nations'
universal membership and overall "collectiveness" by taking into account a
broader range of states with no effectual voice in the Council's decision making.97
This in turn raises questions as to the true existence of Member State consent for
U.N.-authorized ITA projects.
2. Host-State Consent
Turning to host-state consent, Lyon uses the Security Council to invoke the
colonial image of the strong overbearing the weak by stating that "[i]ntervention...
cannot be an extension of the practice of strong states intervening into the domestic
affairs of the weak on their own initiative in terms of their own assessment of what
international security requires., 98 Because Article 2(4) of the Charter expressly
prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, in order to make military interventions legal the consent of the host
state has traditionally been required for peacekeeping operations.99 According to
David Wippman, "That [host-state] consent may validate an otherwise wrongful
military intervention.., is a generally accepted principle."' 00 It is less clear,
however, the degree to which this principle extends to ITA, where the intervention
is not military action but rather civilian administration. Article 2(7) does not
contain a corresponding limitation to only uses of force, yet from the perspective
of those who argue for its irrelevancy, host-state consent is not necessary to
transform nonmilitary intervention from illegal to legal.' 0 ' Others, however,
continue to maintain that host-state consent remains vital to any exercise of power
under Chapter VII, whether it be military or civilian in nature.
10 2
Problems of host-state consent may only be relevant in the context of the
aforementioned governance problems, where ITA is often conducted precisely to
95. See Caron, supra note 69, at 563; see Claude, supra note 10, at 154; see, e.g., S.C. Res 143,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/143 (July 14, 1960); S.C. Res. 435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435 (Sept. 29, 1978); S.C. Res.
1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). China abstained from ONUC's authorization, China and
Russia both abstained from UNTAG's authorization, and China and France abstained from UNMIK's
authorization.
96. See Caron, supra note 69, at 566.
97. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty and Intervention, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 229 (1995).
98. Lyons, supra note 78, at 75.
99. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see Andreas Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State 0)
Necessity, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 510 (2004) (referring to a statement by Oscar Schachter).
100. David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 209 (1996) (emphasis added).
101. Lyons & Mastaduno, supra note 87, at 14.
102. Ratner, supra note 7, at 26 (finding that ITA operations "must start with the consent of the
parties to the conflict."); Orakhelashvili, supra note 32, at 518-19.
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go against the wishes of the host state in order to effect a change in the local
government. In these situations, in place of host-state consent, there is, instead,
Security Council authorization. UNMIK in Kosovo was such a case.'0 3 While
U.N. administration was provided for in the Peace Plan signed by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (the FRY), the FRY was not considered to be a member of
the U.N. when Resolution 1244 was passed, thus negating the aforementioned
effects of any sort of implied consent via the operation of Chapter VII. 10 4 On the
other hand, the U.N. Operations in the Congo (ONUC) presents a classic case of
host-state consent with respect to a governance problem: following Belgium's
withdrawal, the fledgling Congolese government requested U.N. assistance to help
it maintain law and order and provide effective governance. 0 5 By contrast, in
Namibia the Security Council intended for UNTAG to engage in direct governance
yet, due to South Africa's resistance following complex peace negotiations, it only
performed election monitoring in the end, despite determinations by the
International Court of Justice and General Assembly that South Africa's continued
presence was illegal. 1
06
When, however, ITA has been conducted in response to sovereignty
problems, host-state consent has invariably been sought prior to the 10's presence.
For example, the League's presence in the Saar was included in the Versailles
Treaty, 107 both Indonesia and the Netherlands consented to the U.N.'s role in West
Irian, and Croatia and the Serb militias invited the U.N. to administer Eastern
Slavonia during the interim handover period.'0 8 A distinction must therefore be
made between governance problems that require changes of certain local
governmental actors and those that operate to assist a struggling state or to serve as
an interim buffer; the legal relevance of host-state consent in the former appears to
stand on weaker footing than in the latter. The substitution of Security Council
authorization in place of host-state consent is in and of itself problematic due to
flaws in the Council's decision-making processes and the composition of its
members. Nevertheless, when the attainment of host-state consent is possible, the
U.N. in practice seeks it, showing that such consent can continue to serve a
legitimizing function, even if only on a political or normative level.
3. Local Consent
Even if host-state consent has been present, additional concerns have arisen
with respect to whether or not the consent of those most affected by territorial
administration has been obtained. In terms of local consent, as discussed in Part II,
one way in which ITA projects can be conceived of is as promoting self-
determination entitlements, and one of the primary mechanisms for achieving this
goal is through the use of local referenda that allow a population to decide the
103. See discussion infra Part II.
104. U.N. Doc. S/1999/649, para. 3, 5 (1999); Penelope Mathew et al., The Role of State Protection
in Refugee Analysis, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 444,457 (2003).
105. Diehl, supra note 7, at 50.
106. S.C. Res. 629, U.N. Doc. S/RES/629 (Jan. 16, 1989); Ratner, supra note 7, at 118-21.
107. The Versailles Treaty, supra note 20, art. 16.
108. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 588-89.
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future of their territory. The law of self-determination requires that the inhabitants
of a territory be able "freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their own economic, social, and cultural
development."' 0 9 Simon Chesterman seeks legitimacy for territorial administration
by looking to the consent of the local population." 0 However, Chesterman also
explains that it would be inaccurate and counterproductive:
to assert that transitional administration depends upon the consent or
,ownership' of local populations. It is inaccurate because if genuine
local control were possible then a transitional administration would
not be necessary. It is counter-productive because insincere claims of
local ownership lead to frustration and suspicion on the part of local
actors.'
Wilde too looks to the consent of local populations. According to him, the
need for a popular consultation to determine the status of a territory has its roots in
the rejection of colonialism as an imposed regime not consented to by the local
population." 2 In its Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the International Court of
Justice stated that in order for something to serve as an act of self-determination, it
requires "a free and genuine expression of the peoples of the Territory.""l l
3 Ian
Brownlie notes that territorial administration by the U.N. is not inconsistent with
the view that the U.N. cannot have territorial sovereignty, and in conjunction
Wilde emphasizes the fact that the U.N. makes not claim to title over the areas it
administers."l 4 When ITA is conducted with respect to a territory (whether a state
or nonstate) that enjoys an external self-determination entitlement, Wilde argues
that such areas, by virtue of that entitlement, take on a distinct legal personality.'
In order to legitimize a territory's juridical status and give meaning to the concept
of self-determination as a human right, the consent of local populations is required
for ITA because "determinations of external status... are quintessentially public
decisions."' 16
109. Gordon, supra note 8, at 320-21.
110. See Chesterman, supra note 64, at 3; see WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 154
(arguing that a similar situation existed in 1975 in East Timor when two competing factions made
claims for statehood in the absence of a referendum involving the entire population).
l 11. Id. This was arguably the situation in 1975 when two competing factions made claims for
statehood in the absence of a referendum involving the entire population. See Wilde Administration,
supra note 4, at 154.
112. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 139.
113. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 32 (Oct. 16).
114. BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 167 (noting that administrative powers rest legitimately on the
principle of necessary implication).
115. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 136.
116. Id. at 140; The Canadian Supreme Court has famously distinguished the rights to external and
internal self-determination. A right to external self-determination exists when a people are prevented
from meaningfully exercising their right to self-determination within an existing state, thereby giving
rise to a potential right of secession. Internal self-determination, however, is defined by the Court as "a
people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state." Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217.
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Both the League and the United Nations have played a significant role in
giving a voice to local populations,' 17 yet doubts have arisen as to the true validity
of at least some of these consultations. On the one hand, the plebiscite held in the
Saar under League auspices gave the people the option of union with France, union
with Germany, or continued League administration; the people's choice of
Germany reflected the outcome of a democratic process aimed at ensuring a then-
emerging right to self-determination.' 18 In contrast to the Saar plebiscite, in West
Irian, Indonesia and the Netherlands reached an agreement to transfer control of
the territory to UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority), and,
following the U.N.'s exit, a consultation took place to determine whether the
people wished to remain or sever ties with Indonesia." 9 The consultation was
largely viewed as corrupted and controlled by the local elite to ensure the resulting
decision to remain with Indonesia. The consultation was nonetheless endorsed by
the United Nations in the end. 20 The area was incorporated into Indonesia, and the
local people have continued to press for their full independence ever since. 12 1 In
East Timor, the autonomy proposal was rejected by 78.5% of the voters,
expressing the popular will for exercising self-determination in the form of
independence.' 2 2 However, only if the locals had read the May Agreement would
they know that a vote for independence was also a vote for U.N. administration. 12 3
Because the question was never properly put before the people, approval for
UNTAET cannot be inferred from the people's vote for full independence.
The legality of ITA missions as based upon the consent of relevant actors
rests on somewhat shaky grounds. While the universal membership of lOs gives
rise to the idea that there exists an identifiable international community that can
adequately express its will, the uneven distribution of power in the Security
Council raises concerns as to the effectiveness of implied international consent. In
some cases, the very fact of universal membership has worked against the United
Nations. For example, the choice for EU administration of Mostar under EUAM in
1994 can best be understood as a preference for a regional, rather than
international, organization that was more representative of the territory in
question. 12 4 In addition to this, going into nations without their prior consent runs
117. See David J. Scheffer, U.N. Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ETHNIC CONFLICT 156 (David Wippman ed., 1998) ("[T]he United Nations is fusing self-determination
and democratization through organization, supervision, verification, coordination, or other support of
elections.").
118. Versailles Treaty, supra note 20, pt. III Annex, para. 34. The plebiscite, in turn,
prevented a potential territorial dispute from arising between France and Germany over the Saar. See
Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 589-90.
119. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 591.
120. Id.
121. See RATNER, supra note 7, at 111. Today, there continues to exist an as yet unresolved self-
determination claim for many of the local Papuan population, many of whom viewed the U.N.
involvement as more harmful than helpful. See Saltford, supra note 22, at 19-20.
122. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 44, at 673.
123. See id.
124. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 48; The essential purpose of EUAM was to
solve both a sovereignty and a governance problem. The city of Mostar was contested between the new
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against Charter norms 25, and instances of a corresponding lack of meaningful
consent by local populations seemingly violate embedded principles of self-
determination. In the end, many ITA projects suffer from the same imposed nature
that came to characterize colonial administration. This presents one area that the
emerging body ofjus post bellum needs to account for.
The U.S.- and U.K.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq did
much to increase 10 legitimacy in this regard. From the beginning, the now-
defunct CPA was primarily regarded as a military occupation that existed without
international, host-state, or local consent, despite a mandate that was directed
expressly at transitional administration and eventual self-governance. 126  Its
association with a single state (the United States) and its forced imposition upon
the people of Iraq has given rise to strong associations with imperialism. 127 While
the Security Council subsequently recognized both the United States and the
United Kingdom as the occupying powers in Iraq, the mere fact of ex post U.N.
approval did little to "internationalize" perceptions of the CPA.128 The example of
Iraq shows that in certain situations, the voice of fifteen nations could be preferable
to one state acting alone.
B. Accountability
The International Law Association (ILA)'s 2004 Report, Accountability of
International Organisations, states that accountability "is linked to the authority
and power of an 10. Power entails accountability; that is the duty to account for its
exercise. ' ' 12 9 International organizations have traditionally been seen as beholden
to their Member States, yet today, some have claimed that bodies such as the
United Nations are acting independently with a will all their own. 3 ° The ability of
state of Herzog-Bosna and Croatia, and EUAM's purpose was to overcome the city's ethnic divide
through physical reconstruction and social reunification. See Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 593-
94; SARAH REICHEL, WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN FUR SOZIALFORSCHUNG, TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATIONS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A REPETITION OF FAILURES OR A NECESSARY LEARNING
PROCESS TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL PEACE-BUILDING TOOL AFTER ETHNO-POLITICAL WAR? 4 (2000)
available at http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2000/p00-305.pdf; The Memorandum of Understanding
creating EUAM gave the EU civil authority over the city, with the ultimate goal of self-sustaining and
multiethnic local governance. Memorandum of Understanding of the European Administration of
Mostar art. 2.
125. Christopher M. Tiso, Safe Haven Refugee Programs: A Method of Combating International
Refugee Crises, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 575, 576 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Ottolenghi, supra note 76, at 2201-2203; Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation
1 §1, para. 2, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20030516 CPAREG IThe CoalitionProvisionalAuthority_.pdf (also giving
the CPA "all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to fulfill its objectives").
127. See, e.g., Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During Occupation of Iraq, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 601,605 (2004) (Sean D. Murphy ed.).
128. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); Ottolenghi, supra note 76, at 2177-
78 (2004) (noting that Jerry Bremer, the head of the CPA, was appointed by U.S. president George W.
Bush).
129. INT'L L. ASS'N, 2004 REPORT OF THE SEVENTY FIRST CONFERENCE ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2004) [hereinafter ILA Report].
130. See Klabbers, supra note 72, at 226.
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Member States to control "their" organization, the organization's commitment to
upholding international law, and the ability of a local population to have recourse
for potential abuses all factor heavily into an 10's legitimacy to perform territorial
administration. There are two primary components to the question of
accountability vis-A-vis ITA operations: the accountability that exists between the
1O and its Member States and that which exists between an ITA project and the
local population.
In response to claims that the Security Council acts beyond its legal authority
when authorizing ITA mandates,'13 Neils Blokker has stated, "When a member
feels that an organization is not acting as it should, or is not acting at all, it is likely
that sooner or later the member may accuse the organization of not being
'accountable."" ' 32 While the League of Nations remained relatively weak and
inactive, the accountability of the United Nations has become a major focus of
reform proposals, including one put forth by the Working Group on the Equitable
Representation On and Increase In the Membership of the Security Council and
another in the December 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change. 133 Significantly, there exist-no institutional limits on the
Security Council in the Charter. The General Assembly may make nonlegally
binding resolutions that are often reflective of international will, but it has no
ability to consider questions concerning international peace and security if they are
already being discussed by the Security Council. 34 In terms of Charter limitations,
however, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated in
Tadi6:
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization,
established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for
that organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain
constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the
constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the
limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention
other specific limitations. ..
One area of current debate is the relationship between the ICJ and the
Council, specifically whether or not the ICJ may review decisions of the Security
131. See discussion infra Part III.A.
132. Exploring the Evolution of Purposes, Methods and Legitimacy: Accountability of
Intergovernmental Organizations, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 204,205 (2000).
133. See U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other
Matters related to the Security Council, para. 7, annex IV paras. 57-8, U.N. Doc. A/58/47 (2004)
(suggesting improved transparency, higher participation of the nonpermanent members, and increasing
the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly); See High-Level Panel
Report, supra note 67, annex I, para. 74-7 (presenting two separate proposals for a restructured Security
Council).
134. U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-12.
135. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule", Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995),
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.
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Council. The Court itself has rejected the argument that Security Council
determinations made under Article 24 are the exclusive province of the Council.
136
In the Libya case, the Court held that Chapter VII resolutions prevail over other
legal obligations under Article 103 of the Charter but, in so holding, did not
address specifically whether or not there existed limits upon the Council's ability
to override the legal rights of states.' 37 Thus, accusations by the international
community that the Security Council is acting ultra vires when authorizing
complex ITA projects may or may not find recourse at the ICJ. The larger issue of
whether or not the ICJ should exercise judicial review is a question beyond the
scope of this article.
138
At the second level of accountability, that which exists between the
organization's ITA mission and the local population, the discussion here will focus
upon the United Nations' legal accountability, with UNTAET and UNMIK
presenting compelling case studies. 139 The perpetration of human rights abuses by
U.N. officials as well as a lack of firm political controls over administrative
projects has given a renewed sense of urgency to the question of 10 accountability.
As set forth below, while the law in this area remains complex, its evolving nature
has shown a move toward increased responsibility for both peacekeeping and ITA
activities. 14
0
In terms of general legal accountability, the United Nations is afforded
privileges and immunities under Article 105 of the Charter and is endowed with
legal personality under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations.' 4 1 In the Reparations Case, the ICJ notably implied that the
United Nations enjoys legal personality, not as a collection of individual legal
personalities of the its Member States but as a separate entity altogether; 142 this
conclusion further implies a conferral of rights and duties upon the Organization as
136. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
392, 433 (Nov. 26, 1984).
137. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126-27 (Apr. 14, 1992); see Thomas M.
Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation ": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 519, 521-22 (1992).
138. For a thorough discussion of ICJ review of Security Council decisions, see Jos& E. Alvarez,
Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1996).
139. Whether or not the League enjoyed a distinct legal personality capable of assuming rights and
obligations is less clear than with the United Nations. For example, because the League operated by
consensus, there seemed to be no distinct body capable of acting independently of Member States who
did not agree with a particular course of action. However, the League appears to have taken on the
characteristics of a distinct actor in other respects, as seen in the enjoyment of privileges and
immunities by League officials and the inviolability of League property. See WiLDE, ADMINISTRATiON,
supra note 4, at 46-47.
140. See ILA Report, supra note 129, at 250-53.
141. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. 1, § 1, Feb. 13, 1946,
21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15; U.N. CHARTER art. 105; Article II of the 1946 Convention likewise
accords the United Nations "immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity."
142. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 178-80 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparations Case].
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a whole based upon the notion of functional necessity. 143 The idea of functional
necessity allows the United Nations to carry out the functions implied in its
purpose, functions that often "mirror the functions of a State."'
144
Within the context of military force, the United Nations has recognized
certain principles of legal accountability, primarily through the Secretary-
General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, which renewed the United Nations' commitment to
international responsibility for damage to life and property caused by the activities
of U.N. forces.145 It has also implemented a policy decision to establish third-party
liability, albeit with temporal and financial limitations, which, together with the
Bulletin, represents the framework of the United Nations' internal doctrine for
legal responsibility with respect to military actions. 146 Military members of
national forces, who are not covered under the 1946 Convention, are afforded
privileges and immunities in the various status of forces agreements (SOFAs)
entered into between the United Nations and that country, 147 and contributing
countries have adopted internal peacekeeping codes of conduct promulgated by the
U.N.'s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 48 Under the model SOFA
adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council, military
personnel are subject to the criminal authority of the contributing nation.149
The legal standards that apply to territorial administration are, however, much
less clear and much more complex. 50 Under the 1946 Convention, U.N. personnel
143. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 41; see also Elizabeth Abraham, Comment, The
Sins of the Savior: Holding the United Nations Accountable to International Human Rights Standards
for Executive Order Detentions in its Mission in Kosovo, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1310 (2003).
144. Abraham, supra note 143, at 1311.
145. See Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of
International Humanitarian Law, para. 1.1, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1993/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/st-sgb_1999_1 3.pdf.
146. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters; and Administrative and
Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the
United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/389
(Sept. 20, 1996); see Daphna Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406, 406
(2000).
147. The Secretary-General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping
Operations in All of Their Aspects: A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, para. 19, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Comprehensive Strategy].
148. Id.
149. It should be noted, however, that it has become the practice of the United Nations to fail to
obtain specific guarantees regarding the willingness of nations to exercise such jurisdiction. Id. at para.
78.
150. Id. at para. 14 ("A United Nations peacekeeping operation may have a civilian component, a
military component and a civilian component. The components are governed by different rules and
disciplinary procedures because they each have a distinct legal status. The 2003 Secretary-General
bulletin [promulgating detailed rules prohibiting sexual exploitation and abuse that are mandatory for
all United Nations staff] does not, of its own force, apply to all three categories. This is a serious
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are granted privileges and immunities for acts committed within their official
duties; 15 1 the aforementioned SOFAs provide that civilian staff members of U.N.
missions are deemed to be officials under the 1946 Convention.152 If an act is
within an individual's official duties, the Secretary-General has "the right and the
duty to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice
to the interests of the United Nations."'' 53 The determination as to whether or not a
staff member was acting within his or her official duties is made by the Secretary-
General acting upon the advice of the U.N.'s Office of Legal Affairs., 54 Thus, a
functional approach to the issue of accountability is the practice of the
Organization.
In the context of ITA, however, because the United Nations makes no claim
to sovereignty over the territory it administers, two legal persons come into being:
the United Nations and the territorial unit that is part of a larger legal person, such
as a state. 155 This has given rise to the concept of functional duality, as enunciated
by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a case involving a
decision made by the OHR to implement a new Law on the State Border
Service.' 56 The OHR was a sui generis international organization provided for in
the Dayton Peace Agreement responsible for carrying out the civil administration
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) following the conflict in the Balkans throughout
the 1990s. 157 Under its elusive mandate, the High Representative has interpreted its
powers to include the passing of laws as well as the dismissing of elected officials
from office. 118 The Court recognized the immunity of the High Representative with
respect to his ability to interpret his mandate yet also recognized that the acts
performed by the foreign authorities on behalf of a sovereign state were on a
shortcoming.").
151. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 141, arts. V §
18, VI § 22.
152. This is so because not all Member States have themselves acceded to the 1946 Conventions.
Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 147, annex para. A.2.
153. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 151, at arts. V
§ 20, VI § 23.
154. Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 147, annex para. A.3; In addition, a 2002 Secretary-
General bulletin entitled "Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Members" requires
all staff to uphold the highest standards of integrity and act "in a manner befitting their status as
international civil servants..." The Secretary-General, Secretary-General's Bulletin: Status, Basic
Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Members, ch. IV, art. I, reg. 1.2(0, U.N. Doc.
ST/SGB/2002/13 (Nov. 1, 2002); these are, significantly, merely guideposts rather than legally binding
rules. id. ch. 1, para. 7.
155. Ralph Wilde, The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When International Organizations
Administer Territory, 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 251, 252 (2001) [hereinafter Wilde, Complex Role].
156. See Case U 09/00, Official Gazzette of Bosn. & Herz., paras. 13-14, (Nov. 3, 2000)
[hereinafter Case U 09/00].
157. The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 10, art. 1, delivered to the Security Council and General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. S/1995/999, A/50/79C (Dec. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accords].
158. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 252-53. For a detailed discussion of the OHR and
its legal authority, see WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 63-77.
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different footing.159 For this reason, it found a situation of "functional duality: an
authority of one legal system intervenes in another legal system, thus making its
functions dual."' 6 ° In accordance with this principle, whereas those acts performed
with respect to the High Representative's role as an international actor were
immune from prosecution, those performed with respect to his role as an agent for
the territorial entity were not. 161
Under the United Nations' functional approach of accountability, ITA
projects simultaneously invoke the two separate legal regimes of the law
applicable to states and the law applicable to international organizations.
62
Therefore, when international organizations perform acts that are the acts of a
national government, "as agents of that state, the UN officials must comply with
the international legal norms applicable to it. Moreover, these norms, and the
norms applicable to international organizations, are not just both in play-they are
both in play with respect to the same acts.
' ' 6 3
Human rights violations by international officials have been particularly
problematic in both East Timor and Kosovo, and much literature exists cataloguing
examples of serious crimes committed by U.N. officials and the contingent
problems related to uncertain privileges and immunities. 64 One prominent
example has been the issuing of executive orders of detention by UNMIK, a
practice that has received widespread criticism as a clear violation of international
human rights standards but which has continued. 65 Other abuses have included
rape, trafficking in women, solicitation of prostitution, and the destruction and
repossession of privately owned buildings and land. 1
66
Under this framework, the applicability of international human rights
standards to ITA officials must be examined with respect to whether an individual
is acting in his role as an international or as a governmental actor. 167 In the
context of human rights, some have criticized the functional approach, pointing out
that the existence of privileges and immunities for the United Nations without
reciprocal obligations under human rights law is inequitable and that, when
159. See Case U 09/00, supra note 156, para. 5.
160. Id.
161. See Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 255.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 256.
164. See, e.g., Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103, 118-24 (2002).
165. Id. at 121-22. In the case of Afrim Zeqiri, an ethnic Albanian arrested for murder, the
Ombudsperson in Kosovo required a legal clarification of the basis for his continued detention that had
been authorized under an executive order. The director of the Department for Judicial Affairs stated
that executive order detentions were lawful under a broad interpretation of Resolution 1244, which
permitted the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure public safety and the
administration of justice. In the end, Zeqiri was released for a lack of evidence, but not before spending
two years in detention. Abraham, supra note 143, at 1328-29.
166. Id. at 121.
167. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 255.
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conducting territorial administration, the United Nations-acting as a state-
should be expected to follow the same obligations of a state. 168 Succinctly put,
the question is increasingly put about the extent to which
international organizations, qua international organizations, are
bound by international human rights law.... [W]hat needs to be
considered is that the norms of international human rights law
applicable to states can also be in play when a governmental role is
performed.1
69
The ILA has supported this proposition by stating that an 10 is responsible for an
internationally wrongful act committed by an organ of a state over which it
exercises authority and effective control.
170
In practice, the international aspects of an official's conduct - and the
resulting immunities - have tended to eclipse the local ones. In the 2005
Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations itself addressed the
application of the 1946 Convention in civilian operations. According to the report:
In the great majority of cases the application of the tests in the
Convention is clear. What was not anticipated at the time the
General Convention was drafted was that the United Nations would,
on occasion, be operating in areas where there was no functioning
legal system or where the legal system was so devastated by conflict
that it no longer satisfied minimum international human rights
standards. In such cases it would not be in the interests of the United
Nations to waive immunity because its Charter requires it to uphold,
promote and respect human rights. In other words, it would not be in
the interest of the Organization for the Secretary-General to permit a
staff member to be subjected to a criminal process that did not respect
basic international human rights standards.
17
Because of this approach, in many cases the full extent of an international actor's
accountability has gone unrecognized.
In addition to the uncertain legal framework, Ombudsperson officers
established in East Timor and Kosovo were largely ineffective in providing
recourse to the local populations due to various constraints on their authority and a
168. Abraham, supra note 143, at 1304-05; The ILA's 2004 Report lists the ways in which human
rights law can become binding on international organizations: through the terms of their constituent
instruments, as customary international law, or through general principles of public international law.
The Report explicitly states that "10-s should incorporate basic human rights obligations into their
operational guidelines, policies and procedures, particularly when exercising governmental authority in
the conduct of temporary administration of a territory." ILA Report, supra note 129, at 22-23.
169. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 255-56. A separate question that I do not address
here is under what circumstances and the extent to which principles of international humanitarian law
should apply to ITA. See Ratner, supra note 11, at 705-12.
170. ILA Report, supra note 129, at 28.
171. Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 148, at para. 88.
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lack of material support.'72 Officials working within UNTAET's Human Rights
Unit reported feeling hampered by their belief that international human rights
norms were not binding upon the mission or its personnel. 173 Moreover, because
international officials rather than contingents of a multinational peacekeeping force
or the ones involved in the abuses, there is no obligation upon a contributing nation
to exercise any form of domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, in combination with the
uncertain legal framework is a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.
One reason cited for such abuses is the lack of adequate structural checks,
including those posed by an independent judicial body, upon the powers of both
the Transitional Administrator (TA) in East Timor and the SRSG in Kosovo. In
East Timor, the TA was given full legislative, executive, and judicial authority
over the territory 174 and had the sole authority to appoint local representatives to
successive phases of East Timorese self-governance, from the National
Consultative Council to the National Council, the Council of Ministers, and the
Second Transitional Government. 75 The overall lack of separation of powers and
the final voice of the TA in all administrative matters created a confusing picture
that ultimately meant the U.N. officials were not subject to the same sorts of
political pressures that would, in a democratic society, have made them more
accountable to the local population.176 In Kosovo, a similar conflation of legislative
and executive power in the SRSG has also raised concerns of undue influence over
judicial affairs and a lack of checks and balances. 177 For example, Regulation
1999/1 gives the SRSG all legislative and executive authority, administration over
the judiciary, and the power to appoint or remove any person in the civil
administration in Kosovo. 178  This in part allowed the SRSG in Kosovo to
promulgate Regulation 2000/47, giving absolute immunity to all personnel
172. Rawski, supra note 164, at 116; Abraham, supra note 143, at 1325.
173. Carla Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the
United Nations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 623,652 (2002).
174. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority
of the Transitional Administrator in East Timor, §§ 1.1, 1.2, UNTAET/REG/1999/1, (Nov. 27, 1999)
(prepared by Sergio Vieira de Mello).
175. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 2000/24 on the
Establishment of a National Council, §§ 1. 1, 1.2, UNTAET/REG/2000/24 (July 14, 2000) (prepared by
Sergio Vieira de Mello); U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 2001/2
on the Election of a Constituent Assembly to Prepare a Constitution for an Independent and
Democratic East Timor, §§ 1. 1, 2.1, UNTAET/REG/2001/2 (Mar. 16, 2001) (prepared by Sergio Vieira
de Mello); U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 2001/28 on the
Establishment of the Council of Ministers, §§l, 3.1, UNTAET/REG/2001/28 (Sept. 19, 2001) (prepared
by Sergio Vieira de Mello); U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET] Regulation No. 2002/7
on the Organic Structure of the Second Transitional Government of East Timor and to Amend
UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/28, §§ 1.1-1.5, UNTAET/REG/2002/07 (May 18, 2002) (prepared by
Sergio Vieira de Mello).
176. Beauvais, supra note 9, at 1169.
177. See U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, § 1.1 (July 25, 1999) (prepared by Dr. Bernard Kouchner); David Marshall
& Shelley Inglis, Human Rights in Transition: The Disempowerment of Human Rights--Based Justice
in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 114 (2003).
178. Regulation No. 1999/1, supra note 174, § 1.2.
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affiliated with KFOR (the NATO-led military security force) and extending
absolute immunity to the SRSG and the four Deputy SRSGs.1
79
Hans Corell, the former Legal Counsel for the United Nations, once stated
that the relationship between the U.N. Secretariat and the Special Representative in
East Timor provided adequate checks and balances on any abuses of power."8
However, this type of oversight is not readily visible to the local population and
runs the risk of being constrained by other unrelated political factors within the
United Nations.181 In addition, the lack of personnel at the Secretariat "makes it
impossible to keep the operations on a short leash."1 82 There have, however, been
indications of movement in a positive direction. For example, Frederick Rawski, a
former staff member of UNTAET's Human Rights Unit, has written that with
respect to some serious crimes (such as unlawful property damage, sexual
harassment, and rape), the United Nations has waived its immunity. 83 In addition,
in his 2005 In Larger Freedom report Secretary-General Annan stated that "United
Nations peacekeepers and peacebuilders have a solemn responsibility to respect the
law themselves, and especially to respect the rights of the people whom it is their
mission to help." 184 In the same report, Annan also announced his enactment of a
policy of "'zero tolerance"' for offenses committed by "all personnel engaged in
United Nations operations" without differentiating between military and civilian
operations.'"
Overall, the patchwork applicability of privileges and immunities to U.N.
officials has left large lacunae in ITA legal, and political, accountability. Rawski
correctly points out that these missions are fundamentally different from
peacekeeping operations and that, for this reason, "[s]tatements by UNTAET and
UNMIK personnel about immunity expose an unwillingness or inability to
recognize that transitional administration brings with it a different set of legal,
political and ethical realities. 1 86 Moreover, he observes that the source of much of
the problems concerning legal accountability for ITA missions has been the fact
that the "application of the Convention has been inconsistent and UN rhetoric has
been confused"'18 7 This lack of enforceable and cognizable limits upon the United
Nations' actions in Kosovo and East Timor has helped foster damaging
perceptions that international organizations are somehow above the law,
perceptions reinforced by the fact that cases in which U.N. officials had been
179. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Regulation 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of
KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo, §§ 2, 3.2, UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Nov. 18, 2000)
(prepared by Dr. Bernard Kouchner); The Regulation also granted the operation complete immunity
from suits arising out of operational necessity. Id. § 7; The Ombudsperson in Kosovo released a report
that was highly critical of Regulation 2000/47. Rawski, supra note 164, at 122.
180. See Kreilkamp, supra note 8, at 669-70.
181. Id. at 670.
182. Ratner, supra note 11, at 715.
183. Rawski, supra note 164. at 121.
184. In Larger Freedom, supra note 63, para. 113.
185. Id.
186. Rawski, supra note 164, at 126.
187. Id. at 123.
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suspected of committing criminal offenses (for example, East Timor) have not
been brought to trial. 188 Significantly, the 2005 Comprehensive Strategy to
Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations peacekeeping
operations recognizes the differing legal standards that currently apply to military
and civilian components of U.N. missions and the problems that this has created.
189
Such reports represent at a minimum a growing self-consciousness on behalf of the
United Nations that it cannot persist in taking an ad hoc approach to the question
of accountability in the context of ITA.
C. Reputation
1. Selflessness
Largely because the League of Nations and the United Nations were founded
upon the premise of collective security, there is an inherent notion of global
cooperation in their constitutions that removes the focus from individual states and
places it onto the international community as a whole. This lends itself to the idea
that when an 10 administers territory, it is acting not out of its own self-interest,
but rather for the greater good - creating, in other words, a "benevolent foreign
autocracy."' 90 However, the U.N. Charter also reflects a political balance between
the major powers of the world, giving them what some would argue to be a
disproportionately larger role in the organization's decision making.' 9' If an
international organization is seen as merely a front for powerful states' agendas,
then despite global membership, Lyons' fear of the strong overpowering the weak
becomes more pronounced. 92 Encouragingly, the U.N. has recently taken more
concrete, forward-moving steps toward complete institutional reform as presented
in the December 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change. 193 Secretary-General Annan has himself pushed forward several dramatic
recommendations in his 2005 In Larger Freedom report, and the General
Assembly responded with a Draft Outcome document directed at widespread
institutional change.' 
94
188. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, East Timor: Justice Past, Present and Future, § 5.4, A.I. Doc.
ASA/57/001/2001 (2001); See also Carla Bongiorno, supra note 173, at 692 (noting that "the U.N. has
obligations under international human rights law, that the U.N. has not formally acknowledged, when
its peacekeeping operations undertake governmental functions").
189. Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 147, at § 2, para. 14.
190. Chesterman, supra note 64, at 1.
191. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Process of Legitimation and the Legitimacy of Global
Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 129-30 (1997); See also Peter Vale, Engaging the
World's Marginalized and Promoting Global Change: Challenges for the United Nations at Fifty, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 283, 284 (1995) ("In its present configuration, the U.N. means little to those outside
the mainstream--those excluded from global society as a result of its existing discriminatory
structure.").
192. See generally Lyons, supra note 78.
193. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 67, at 1, 4-5 (addressing security concerns, their
causes, and how the United Nations can be more effective in the twenty-first century).
194. See In Larger Freedom, supra note 63, at 2. See also, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/l
(Sept. 16, 2005).
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As seen in Part III.A, Security Council critiques most often reflect the
perceptions that (1) it is dominated by a few powerful states and (2) the veto is
unfair. 195 Jos& Alvarez has observed that the United Nations is largely based on a
statist ideal, making it an "'undemocratic' hierarchical scheme dependent upon the
hegemonic power of a handful of powerful states.' 9 6 A former Japanese U.N.
ambassador once remarked that four of the five permanent members are from
Europe and America, but that today, "[t]here are other civilizations in other parts
of the world whose peoples are now more assertive than before."' 97  From this
perspective, the idea of legitimation by collective action in the Security Council
may merely serve to mask the motives of individual states pursuing their own
prerogatives.' 98 Echoing these concerns, Jan Klabbers has stated that perhaps
"international organizations have in the end fallen victim to their own success ....
[P]erhaps partly because the idea of their inherent goodness held sway for such a
long time, they may have succumbed to the arrogance of power."
199
In the last decade, much focus has been placed on the concept of humanitarian
intervention as a form of "enlightened" self-interest, whereby the reasons for
intervention are claimed to be so compelling as to make the means legitimate.2 °°
Nevertheless, humanitarian intervention continues to be attacked for resting upon
dubious legal grounds and for being selectively employed around the world.20' The
hurdles posed by Articles 2(4) and 2(7) have led to stretched justifications for
humanitarian intervention that have been criticized as putting the protection of
human rights above the Charter-endorsed principle of state sovereignty. 202 This has
been said to create a situation whereby "what is illegitimate unilaterally may be
195. Caron, supra note 69, at 562; see also Coicaud, supra note 68, at 272 (arguing that the flawed
decision making of the Security Council is one of the principle reasons for what he argues to be the
organization's overall (as opposed to ITA-specific) demise in legitimacy.).
196. Jos6 E. Alvarez, Constitutional Interpretation in International Organizations, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 104, 108 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen
eds., 2001).
197. Chusei Yamada, The United Nations at its Turning Point: A Japanese Perception, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 185, 191 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1995);
Yamada goes on to note that the lack of faith in the Security Council is due to a perception that "the
permanent members only make use when such action suits them." Id.
198. Caron, supra note 69, at 558 (listing five side effects that a perception of illegitimacy may
have on the effectiveness of the Security Council: (1) failure to pass a resolution due to a suspicion of
where it will lead, (2) refusal to adopt a strong resolution, (3) difficulty for a state to build domestic
support necessary to act under a resolution, (4) slow movement on the part of states in complying with a
resolution, and (5) actions and strategies that either intentionally or accidentally weaken the Council);
see also David D. Caron, Strengthening the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 300, 305 (1993).
199. Klabbers, supra note 72, at 245.
200. See Richard Falk, The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order
Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491,492 (1996).
201. See Christine Chinkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War?, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 846-47 (1999).
202. See Louis Henkin, NA TO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian
Intervention, " 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 824-25 (1999).
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legitimate if it is the subject of a collective decision of the United Nations. 2 °3
Thus, the fact that the Kosovo bombing, which ultimately led to administration of
the region by UNMIK, did not receive Security Council authorization due to the
threat of a veto posed by Russia and China has prompted many to examine the
underlying legality of the NATO bombing, despite the imperative for
intervention.2 °4  This situation (a needed response thwarted by political
motivations) has been extended to implicate the United Nations' ability as a whole
to effectively provide security.
20 5
Notably, the OHR was created to administer the BiH precisely because of
U.N. failure in the region and its discredited reputation for protecting the
population.20 6 One problem with the pursuit of selfless goals could be that the
United Nations is poorly constructed to effectively pursue those goals on a
consistent basis due to inherent political factors and technocratic limitations.20 7 In
the words of the 2004 High-Level Panel Report, "[the Security Council] has not
always been equitable in its actions, nor has it acted consistently or effectively in
face of genocide or other atrocities. This has gravely damaged its credibility.
20 8
Therefore, irrespective of whether or not IOs are seen as over-acting (i.e., ultra
vires criticisms) or under-acting (failing to prevent mass human rights atrocities),
claims of illegitimacy may arise.
The inability of the U.N. to act in a truly selfless way finds further support in
the claim that humanitarian intervention continues to reflect the interests of
individual states, a claim that takes two sides. On the one hand, commentators
point to the fact that less developed states express strong opposition to
humanitarian intervention and continue to rely on state sovereignty as an
unassailable and permanently overriding principle.2 °9 On the other hand are those
who claim that the West uses humanitarian intervention to promote its own
specific vision of world order, something Christine Chinkin has forcefully argued
elsewhere.210
203. Ralph Zacklin, Beyond Kosovo: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention, 41 VA. J.
INT'L L. 923,932 (2001).
204. Henkin, supra note 202, at 825-27.
205. Id at 827 (noting that "as Kosovo illustrated, the Council, as presently constituted and under
prevailing procedures, remains seriously defective and may sometimes be unavailable for that awesome
responsibility").
206. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 63-64.
207. The 2000 Brahimi Report gives a discussion of technocratic limitations, which are beyond the
scope of this article. ReporLof the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para. 77, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/809, A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 2000) available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations
[hereinafter Brahimi Report].
208. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 67, para. 246.
209. See Zacklin, supra note 203, at 935.
210. Chinkin, supra note 201, at 846 (stating "the Kosovo intervention shows that the West
continues to script international law, even while it ignores the constitutional safeguards of the
international legal order. The instances since 1990 that are most frequently cited as evidence that
humanitarian intervention is evolving as a doctrine of post-Charter international law were initiated by
the West and involved action in non-Western states . . . .The alleged doctrine seems to exemplify
international lawmaking by the West for its own application, in the name of its "civilizing" mission").
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Aside and apart from perceptions that the United Nations only serves to
promote Western action, the mandates for many ITA missions have themselves
been seen as strongly promoting Western ideals.211 The 'standards before status'
approach toward the administration of Kosovo is reflective of this. Under
Resolution 1244, Kosovo is to enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY; part of
ensuring the region's right to substantial autonomy is, therefore, putting into place
local actors supportive of this outcome.212 In order to achieve this goal, the same
Resolution gives UNMIK the power to secure the population's international human
rights by helping to install a democratic form of liberal government that is
instrumental in promoting and protecting these rights.21 3 UNMIK is one example
where ITA has been used, not only to fill a power vacuum, but instead to "engineer
a fundamental change in government policy" that is largely in line with prevailing
Western thought.2 14
In Kosovo and East Timor, the basis for the United Nations' continued
presence has been the Organization's insistence that the local populations are (or in
East Timor, were) unable to perform administration themselves.215 The
aforementioned problems with Security Council decision making and the use of
the veto power have the ability to turn even ostensibly "selfless" missions into
perceived self-interested ones. While the United Nations' initial goals of protecting
international human rights and enabling self-determination claims are in the
interest of the common good,216 its prolonged presence in certain cases seems
suspiciously paternalistic and based largely upon Western ideals of what
constitutes good governance. Importantly, the promotion of liberal democratic
principles does not find universal support in all nations of the world.217 However,
UNMIK and UNTAET must also be examined alongside the CPA, which was
strongly associated with the national security and economic interests of the United
States as a result of the war in Iraq and, as such, was largely discredited from its
Nevertheless, David Rieff remarks that "it may prove impossible to intervene in the world's gravest
crises without arousing fears of imperial agendas." David Rieff, A Nation of Pre-emptors?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at Magazine 12.
211. Wilde identifies a variety of policy objectives of ITA projects, the most relevant here being the
promotion of the institution of the state (i.e., "state building") and the imposition of liberal governance
and a market economy. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 203-207. Other objectives include
the promotion of territorial status and self-determination outcomes and the exploitation of natural
resources. Id. at 199, 208.
212. S.C. Res. 1244, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); see Paul R. Williams,
Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo's Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 387,409-10 (2003).
213. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 206.
214. Wilde, Critique, supra note 5, at 85.
215. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 186.
216. This assumes that the initial purposes of the administration were not pleaded in bad faith to
cover up more objectionable aims. See id. at 12.
217. See Bilhari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, FOREIGN POL'Y, FALL 1993 (accusing the
West of hypocrisy, and stating that "the hard core of rights that are truly universal is smaller than many
in the West are wont to pretend." Continuing, Kausikan argues that some Asian nations do not seek
"democracy"-a value-laden term for him-but instead seek "good government" that is effective and
efficient and able to secure basic needs.) Id. at 34, 37-38.
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inception. The experience of the CPA shows that foreign territorial administration
not conducted by 1Os still has the potential to prove equally problematic with
respect to perceptions of selflessness.,
2. Impartiality
Whereas the previous discussion of selflessness analyzed the potential for
self-interest leading up to a decision to intervene, here the discussion of
impartiality looks at the role 1Os play after intervention has already occurred. The
vision of U.N. impartiality rests on the same principles of multinationality as the
vision of U.N. selflessness described above. The Charter endorses impartiality in
Article 100, which states that the staff of the Secretariat "shall not seek or receive
instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the
Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their
position as international officials responsible only to the Organization. 2 18
According to the ILA, "[a]n 10 should conduct its institutional and
operational activities in a manner which is objective and impartial and can be seen
to be so. ' '21 9 Impartiality, like host state consent, has always been a cornerstone of
peacekeeping operations. 220 The very first peacekeeping missions mandated that
military observers be absolutely impartial at all times and serve as a buffer zone
between two sides to a conflict, and the 2000 report from the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations reaffirmed the Organization's commitment to this so-
called "bedrock principle.",221  An assumption exists that international
organizations are better suited for providing this type of impartiality than an
independent state would be. However, this assumption is made largely in the
context of pure peacekeeping and observer missions rather than ITA.222 Despite the
differences between peacekeeping and-ITA, the same presumption of impartiality
continues to apply to ITA and, particularly, to ITA missions aimed at solving
sovereignty problems.
The ability of an international organization to defuse a potentially divisive
sovereignty problem by serving as a buffer was the primary reason for the
League's administration in the Saar and Leticia and the U.N.'s administration of
West Irian.223 When placed between two opposing sides, the ability to remain
impartial is relatively easy. As Jane Boulden has remarked, "[s]uch mandates are
impartial, because all that they do is commit the UN to overseeing terms or
arrangements already agreed to by the parties. 224 It is when the international
218. UN Charter art. 100.
219. ILA Report, supra note 129, at 14.
220. RATNER, supra note 7, at 51.
221. Brahimi Report, supra note 207, para. 48; see also Urquhart Interview, supra note 30 (Ralphe
Bunche said that: "[b]eing popular is not the point, being fair is the point").
222. DIEHL, supra note 7, at 64.
223. Jane Boulden, Mandates Matter: An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations
Organizations, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 147 (2005).
224. Id. at 151.
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organization is actively involved in local governance, however, that maintaining
true impartiality has posed a more difficult task.225
With respect to governance problems, ITA actors tend to take on a larger role
that is more intermixed with local populations and local institutions.226 The U.N.'s
experience in Somalia is particularly illustrative of this because the reconciliation
and rebuilding of the country was performed by the same forces that were
exercising military control over it.227 In identifying General Aidid as a war
criminal and general hindrance to the peace process, the U.N. itself became
another party to the conflict, a situation that eventually led to the collapse of
UNOSOM 11.221 In Kosovo, the U.N. has repeatedly made substantive decisions
regarding the appointment of individuals to the civil administration and has
exercised the power to remove elected people from posts in pursuit of the goals set
forth in Resolution 1244.229 Similarly in Cambodia and East Timor, the U.N. was
placed in a position to further certain policy agendas by retaining ultimate control
230
over local governance during its time in administration.
Another important aspect of 10 impartiality is the aforementioned dual role
that international officials play when serving an ITA mission."' Although
functional duality was previously examined in the context of accountability, the
fact that international actors will be playing a direct role in local governance
proves the point that there will be times when such actors can definitively not be
neutral.232 Because governments are, by their very nature, biased toward the best
interests of the state, international actors are forced to promote individual state
interests when, as in Kosovo and East Timor, an international organization is
playing the very role of that government.233 One example of this was seen in the
negotiations over joint exploration between East Timor and Australia of oil and gas
resources in the zone known as the Timor Gap.234 UNTAET was actively engaged
in trying to gain the best deal for East Timor, a position that runs contrary to its
role as an international organization designed to represent the interests of all states
equally.235 As Wilde points out, "officials cannot possibly combine these two
contradictory roles. They cannot treat all states equally and advocate on behalf of
one state in particular.
' 236
225. See Urquhart Interview, supra note 30.
226. See discussion supra Part 1I.
227. Kreilkamp, supra note 8, at 636.
228. ld. at 637-38.
229. Regulation No. 1999/1, supra note 174, § 1.2.
230. See Kreilkamp, supra note 8, at 631-32, 655.
231. See discussion supra Part III.B.
232. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 257.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 257-258; Tania Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
31,53-54 (2002).
235. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 257-58.
236. Id. at 258.
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Winrich Khfine argues that the U.N. Charter itself and Security Council
mandates are neither impartial nor passive. 7 Consequently, he believes that when
the U.N. undertakes to execute a mandate, it is not necessarily equivalent to
"taking sides" but that instead, a fine line exists between fulfilling a mandate in
evenhanded way and avoiding the so-called "Mogadishu line" of Somalia. 38 But
this argument becomes less plausible the further a mandate moves away from
peacekeeping and the closer it moves toward ITA. While 10 impartiality worked
well in the Saar, Leticia, and West Irian, these operations were all instances of
partial administration and involved no direct governance by the 10. As seen in the
Congo, Somalia, UNMIK and UNTAET, invasive exercises of plenary
administration carry a strong potential to negate an international organization's
reputation as a neutral, impartial, or evenhanded actor.239
V. CONCLUSION
Attacks against U.N. peacekeepers in the C6te d'Ivoire show the extent to
which local populations can fail to distinguish an international presence from a
colonial one. 240 By looking at 10 legitimacy through the lenses of legal authority,
accountability, selflessness, and impartiality, it becomes clear that there are good
reasons for doubting assumptions that international organizations are inherently
more suited for territorial administration than states. The United Nations' more
recent "light footprint" approach to Afghanistan could present a picture of future
U.N. ITA projects.241 This contrasts with the intrusiveness that has come to be
associated with the missions in Kosovo and East Timor, not to mention those
conducted by other international actors (e.g., the OHR).
Overall, legitimacy on behalf of international organizations cannot be
assumed. But the question that remains is whether international organizations, and
particularly the United Nations, are perhaps the least illegitimate of all outside
actors.242 It may be the case that international administration will never be fully
legitimate or supportable on a normative level due to the tensions that are inherent
in using outside rule to bring about internal change.Yet proceeding from the
presumption that these types of activities will continue in the future, as evidenced
by the recent establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission within the U.N.,
237. Winrich Kuibne, The United Nations, Fragmenting States, and the Need for Enlarged
Peacekeeping, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 91, 101 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1995).
238. See id. at 102.
239. Describing the United Nation's dilemma in the Congo during the 1960's, Jane Boulden
remarked, "[d]eployed in a country in the midst of civil war, now without a government, every move
the UN made inevitably, if advertently, favored one group or the other .... [Elach decision the UN
took (especially the determination not to accept the secession or Katanga, albeit in pursuit of the need to
restore law and order and to prevent civil war as the mandate directed, had an impact on one or more of
the parties struggling for control." Boulden, supra note 223, at 153. She describes UNOSOM II in
similar terms. Id. at 154.
240. Polgreen, supra note 13.
241. U.N. Doc. S/2002/278, para. 98(d) (2002).
242. David Harland, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration, 10 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 15, 17 (2004).
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mandates must now be constructed in a way that takes into account a more diverse
range of actors and interests.243 Despite all of its other faults, UNMIK has done
precisely this by incorporating different bodies with specialized competencies into
its mandate. Specifically, the OSCE has assumed responsibility for promoting
democratization and institution-building, the UNHCR has led a humanitarian
component, and the EU has developed a reconstruction component that devises
economic and social policies for the region.
244
The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission is itself progress. The
stated purpose of the Commission, as set forth in the General Assembly's
September 2005 Draft Outcome Document from the Millennium Summit, will be
"to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and
propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery." 245
Included in this is the goal that the Commission "should provide recommendations
and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and
outside the United Nations....246 The Draft Outcome Document also provides for
an Organizational Committee that will consists of representatives from the country
under consideration; countries in the affected region; and the major financial,
troop, and civilian police-donating countries. 24 7  In December 2005, a draft
resolution was circulated in an effort to implement these suggestions, 24 and as of
this writing progress continues to be made in this direction.
The UNMIK model could continue to be usefully deployed in other situations
to ensure that some of the problems discussed above, such as a lack of local
involvement and problems with impartiality, might be eliminated. 249 And the goals
of the Peacebuilding Commission certainly go far in adding more voices to the
decision-making chorus. However in other areas, such as legal authority and
accountability, the law has not yet caught up to the situation on the ground with
respect to ITA.
As Ruth Gordon has stated, "to rebuild 'failed states,' perhaps we should start
at the bottom rather than the top by focusing on the peoples themselves, without
preconceived ideas of the answers or the solutions., 250  At a minimum, by
243. On the contrary, some believe that in the future the United Nations' activities will be far more
constrained. Edward Luck has stated, "'In the late '90s and the beginning of this century, it got overly
zealous in building norms, setting international law and trying to regulate state behavior. Now they
have to step back in an attempt to do both."' Warren Hoge, U.N. is Transforming Itself but Into What
is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A3.
244. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779, paras. 79-109 (1999).
245. World Summit Outcome, supra note 194, at paras. 97, 98.
246. Id.
247. Id. at para. 100.
248. U.N. Doc. A/60/L.40.
249. Proposals have also been made to revitalize the Trusteeship Council to oversee ITA projects.
Saira Mohamed, Note, From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposal for a Revitalized United
Nations Trusteeship Council, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (2005). An additional, unexplored idea is to
take the lessons learned from ITA and use them to improve state administration.
250. Gordon, supra note 35, at 973.
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recognizing and acknowledging the gaps in 1O legitimacy to undertake such
projects, steps can now be made to improve upon existing weaknesses. In keeping
with Gordon's philosophy, international organizations should now begin aiming
for a new form of ITA that serves equally both the international and local
communities.
MOSQUE AND STATE IN IRAQ'S NEW CONSTITUTION
STEPHEN TOWNLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, October 15, 2005, the Iraqi people ratified their new
Constitution.' Despite this endorsement, many believe the Constitution is flawed.
Indeed, it has provoked hostility2 since its provisions became known late in August
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2006. Yale College, B.A. 2002. Thanks to Professors Jack
Balkin and Sandy Levinson. In writing this article, I drew on what I learned in Professor Noah
Feldman's pioneering class on Islamic constitutionalism. My gratitude also goes to the editors of the
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy for their heroic work in preparing this article for
publication. Thanks finally to Amanda Aikman and my family for their support and advice.
As this article moved through the editorial process, facts on the ground in Iraq continued to
change, often for the worse. See, e.g., Damien Cave, 7 Killed As Full-Scale Sectarian Fighting Rages
in Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006 1 write therefore to clarify two potential points of confusion.
First, although I advocate government cooperation with belief associations (see, e.g., infra notes 102-
104 and accompanying text), I do not endorse the creation or deployment of private sectarian militias.
Rather, my argument is that the Iraqi government should work with those belief associations willing to
join the political process, and encourage their competition with each other (as, for instance, the
government has worked with Muqtada al-Sadr, who has become considerably less radical since he
entered mainstream politics, see, e.g., Int'l Crisis Group, Iraq's Muqtada al-Sadr: Spoiler or
Stabiliser?, Aug. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle east north africa/iraqiran-gulf/55_iraqsm
uqtada al-sadr spoiler or stabiliser.pdf.). Cf. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations July 11, 2006 (prepared testimony of Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow
and Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute) (noting that
"[t]aking a page from Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the militias are
providing average Iraqis with a semblance of security, social services, health clinics, jobs, and whatever
else is required to gain their loyalty."). By contrast, the Iraqi government should restrain and
demobilize those groups, particularly heavily militarized groups, which refuse to participate in the
political process.
Second, I take no position on the extrinsic, or general, merit of government establishment of
one particular religion or cooperation with non-dominant belief associations. My argument is unique to
Iraq today. I take no firm position on the role religion should play in the United States, elsewhere in the
Middle East (although Hizballah's ability to survive devastating Israeli air strikes suggests the futility of
attempts to eradicate religious parties entirely), or in Iraq in the future.
I. See Kirk Semple & Robert F. Worth, Early Signs Show Iraqis' Approval of
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at A6.
2. Compare IRAQ CONST. art. 61(c) (Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html (Mar. 8, 2004)
(declaring that if two-thirds of the voters in any three provinces were to reject the Constitution, it would
not be adopted, thereby confirming the fact that Sunnis have the ability to veto any constitution that is
not to their liking) with Iraq, Still Divided After Three Deadlines, THE ECONOMIST: GLOBAL AGENDA,
Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?storyid=4334638
(affirming that Sunnis are a majority in four provinces). See also Juan Cole, The Iraqi Constitution:
DOA?, SALON.COM, Aug. 26, 2005, at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/26/sunnis
(explaining that the Sunnis levied attacks on both the substance of the Constitution and the procedure
pursuant to which it was drafted, and claiming that "[m]ore than anything else, the Sunnis oppose the
plans of the Kurdistan Provincial Confederation and the mooted Shiite Provincial Confederation
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2005.3 Characteristic of this early response are the reactions of Sheik Abdul
Rahman Mished, who said, "Kirkuk's Arabs refuse any constitution that would
divide the country by different names, which is at odds with Islam and with the
Arabic nation of Iraq,",4 and Abdul-Nasser al-Janabi, who exclaimed, "[w]e declare
that we don't agree and we reject the articles that were mentioned in the draft and
we did not reach consensus on them in what makes the draft illegitimate."5 The
hostility has not abated since the referendum 6 and may have even aggravated
divisions expected to heal.7
In the United States, in the weeks between when the document was translated
into English and the referendum, pundits focused on, and reserved their most
vituperative language for, the role the Constitution assigns Islam--establishing it as
the religion of the state. David L. Phillips of the Council on Foreign Relations
opined, "[t]he Constitution pits Islamists against secularists, Shia against Sunnis..
. . The 'new Iraq' is a far cry from what President Bush had in mind when he
promised freedom to the Iraqi people.",8 Likewise, the editorial board of the New
York Times declared, "[p]rovisions that could strip away the legal rights of Iraqi
women have been left unchanged [in the Constitution]. The chances of this
language being interpreted benignly by a future legislature dominated by Shiite
religious parties or a future Supreme Court packed with senior clerics is [sic] less
than nil." 9 Since the referendum, these observers have reiterated this criticism.'0
('Sumer') to keep substantial amounts of the petroleum profits in the regions rather than sharing them");
Robert H. Reid, U.S. Envoy: Iraq Constitution May Change, (Aug. 30, 2005),
http://dehai.org/archives/AWnewsarchive/0352.html (noting that Sunnis also objected to the
Constitutional purge of the Baath Party, the former ruling, and heavily Sunni, party of Iraq, and to the
designation of Iraq as an Islamic, but not Arab nation). Cf Noah Feldman, Agreeing to Disagree in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at A19 (arguing that "[t]he major problem is one of who is agreeing,
not what they have agreed on").
3. See Dexter Filkins & James Glanz, Shiites and Kurds Halt Charter Talks With Sunnis,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at A6 (discussing the publication of the Constitution in draft form).
4. Robert F. Worth, Sunni Arabs Rally to Protest Proposed Iraqi Constitution, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at A3.
5. Iraq's Sunnis Reject Constitution, BBC NEWS, Aug. 28, 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/lI/hi/world/middleeast/4192122.stm.
6. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise & Edward Wong, Two Sides of the Sunni Vote: Deserted
Polls and Long Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/international/middleeast/16sunni.html (describing the views of
Falluja residents, one of whom said, "[i]t's forbidden to vote yes because it contradicts Islamic law");
see also Hatem Mukhlis, Voting 'Yes' to Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/l0/18/opinion/1 8mukhlis.html?hp.
7. NATHAN J. BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, IRAQ'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM 2 (2005), available at
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/brown8-3I4.pdf [hereinafter IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL
CONUNDRUM]
8. David L. Phillips, Constitution Process Risks a Civil War, available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8766/constitution-process-risks-a-civil-war.html (Aug. 26, 2005); see
also IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the Constitution would
likely permit Shiite religious leaders to dominate at the polls).
9. The Fragments of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at A12. See generally Hannibal
Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM.
RTS. 4 (2005) (describing and endorsing criticism of earlier versions of the Constitution).
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Yet there are both ethical and practical reasons for the United States to
approve those provisions of the new Constitution addressing religion and Islam.
As Noah Feldman has explained in a recent book, we owe an ethical duty to the
Iraqi people." Feldman enumerates three roles for the "nonpaternalistic nation
builder": 1) to impose security; 12 2) support the freedoms of speech and
assembly;' 3 and 3) insure the participation of all relevant stakeholders in important
negotiations.' 4 Essentially, the role of outsiders like the United States is to assist in
the processes of state and nation construction.
This is not only an ethical duty; it is also a practical imperative. 15 The sooner
the United States can withdraw from Iraq, the better.' 6 But it is only when Iraqis
have built both state and nation that Baghdad will be safe and U.S. troops able to
withdraw. Larry Diamond, an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority,
emphasizes state building. One point he makes is that people are afraid of more
than the state; they are also afraid of loosing their freedom through the absence of
order. He argues that before Iraq can become a democracy "it must first become a
state, which establishes a monopoly on the means of violence."' 17 Toby Dodge, on
the other hand, highlights the importance of nation building.' 8 In 2004, he warned
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iraq's "largely atomized society"
would have to come together for the U.S. mission to succeed.' 9
Accepting Feldman's thesis-that the United States is ethically required to
work to help Iraqis build a state and construct a nation, and my extension of it-
that it behooves the United States to do as Feldman urges, the worth of the new
Constitution from the U.S. perspective will vary according to how well it advances
state- and nation-building efforts. 20 In this article, I offer a preliminary assessment
of that worth. I focus only on those provisions of the Constitution that relate to
10. See, e.g., Phyllis Bennis, The Iraqi Constitution: A Referendum for Disaster, Institute
for Policy Studies, at http://www.ips-dc.org/comment/Bennis/tp34constitution.htm (Oct. 13, 2005)
(arguing that "religious rights ... remain at risk").
It. See NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION
BUILDING 64 (2004) [hereinafter WHAT WE OWE IRAQI.
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 66.
14. Id. at 83 (claiming that "we can guarantee that all Iraqis get a seat at the table").
15. See Stephen Townley, Foreword, Perspectives on Nation-Building, 30 YALE J. INT'L L.
357, 359-62 (2005) (explaining the practical importance of creating a nation and building a state).
16. Withdrawal is important not only because U.S. soldiers are dying every day in Iraq but
also because recent empirical data suggests that suicide terrorism is fueled by U.S. military policies.
See ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN 246-50 (2005).
17. LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY 315-16 (2005).
18. See generally TOBY DODGE, INVENTING IRAQ: THE FAILURE OF NATION-BUILDING
AND A HISTORY DENIED (2003).
19. Iraq Transition: Civil War or Civil Society: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations at 4 (Apr. 20, 2004) (statement of Dr. Toby Dodge), available at
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/DodgeTestimonyO4O4
2 0.pdf.
20. 1 do not mean to engage with the deeper debate over the morality or practical merit of
providing assistance to Iraq as it develops and refines its Constitution. That debate is captured by a
recent interchange between Noah Feldman and Madhavi Sunder. Compare Noah Feldman, Imposed
Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857 (2005), with Madhavi Sunder, Enlightened Constitutionalism,
37 CONN. L. REV. 890 (2005).
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religion, both because they are among the most controversial in the United States21
and because they have great potential to affect the state- and nation-building
processes.22
In the first half of the article, I contend that Iraqis can most easily build a state
and construct a nation if they cooperate with religious groups, as the Constitution
permits and impels them to do. I also argue that such cooperation is inconceivable
unless the Constitution establishes Islam as the religion of the government, as it
does. In the second half of the article, I take up another question: that of the rights
due minorities and the requisite corollaries to cooperation and establishment. I
suggest that Iraq should make a concomitant commitment to protect Muslim
dissenters, those who neither want to abandon their Islamic faith nor accept the
dictates of the Muslim majority without question. I lay out practical steps the Iraqi
polity could take-including laws it could pass and judicial structures it could
adopt-to realize such a commitment. In sum, the thesis of this article is that U.S.
hostility to the new Constitution is misguided. I argue that the United States
should instead refocus its energy on spurring Iraq to take steps to protect Muslim
dissenters.
This article is sited at the intersection of policy and theory. The article could
be useful to U.S. diplomats and policymakers. To date, U.S. lawyers and legal
academics have not offered policymakers much assistance.23 This article aims to
remedy that failure and help U.S. policymakers prepare for the critical next two
years of Iraq's constitutional and legal development.
The article also makes three theoretical contributions to legal scholarship.
First, I offer a rebuttal to those who argue that the best way to render Islamic states
more tolerant is by reinterpreting and re-imagining Islam.24  Islamic
constitutionalism is a burgeoning field.2 ' But even after roughly ten years, most
21. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
22. We can learn from Lebanon, an object lesson in the power of religious conflict to
cripple a state and divide a nation. See generally KAMAL SALIBI, A HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS: THE
HISTORY OF LEBANON RECONSIDERED (1990).
23. Indeed, Sherman Jackson has shrewdly noted, "[o]ne of the limitations built into the
study of Islamic law in the West is that the majority of scholars of Islamic law are products of Area
Studies programs and have little to no training in law as a discipline." Sherman A. Jackson, Shari'ah,
Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State: Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 91 (2003). Two exceptions are Noah Feldman and Kristin Stilt. See NOAH
FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 54 (2003)[hereinafter AFTER JIHAD]; WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11; Kristin A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the
Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695 (2004). But
Feldman speaks primarily in abstract terms and Stilt writes from a historical perspective.
24. See, e.g., ABDUALLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 34(1996) ("[Naskh, the Islamic principle of abrogationJ would permit applying some verses of Qur'an
and accompanying Sunna instead of others."); Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic and American Constitutional
Law: Borrow Possibilities or a History of Borrowing?, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 492, 513 (1999)
(discussing the Prophet Muhammad's tolerance for Jews).
25. "Islamic constitutionalism" is a term of recent provenance. By it I mean scholarship
concerned with the customs, ideals and norms on the basis of which constitutions are written and that
buttress those constitutions. Cf Bassam Tibi, Islam and Modern European Ideologies, 18 INT'L J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 15, 16 (1986). Recent works on Islamic constitutionalism include NATHAN J.
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD 92 (2002); WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra
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scholars still seem content to look backward, tracing principles of tolerance
through Islamic history.26 As Erik Jensen has said, contemporary scholars "look[]
superficially at selected passages from the Quran, the Constitution of Medina, as
well as concepts and practices such as shura, i'ma and maslaha, and pour[] Islam
into liberal democratic vessels. 27  I take the Shari'a and unwritten Islamic
constitution as I find them and explain how they can usefully be used to promote
tolerance. Second, I describe a new way to conceptualize the relationship between
religion and government. Although much ink has been spilled on the question, no
one, to my knowledge, has mapped this relationship in two dimensions, rather than
in one.28 I do so. Third and finally, I strive to contribute to the ongoing discussion
of the utility of comparative law.29 I am fully expert in few of the areas of law I
discuss. I am neither verifying a theory nor building one immediately susceptible
of falsification. 30 Rather, by discussing and comparing constitutional experiences
proximate to Iraq's, such as that of Egypt, and distant from Iraq's, such as that of
the Netherlands, I hope first to debunk a popular perception (that the establishment
of Islam as the religion of Iraq is a recipe for disaster),3' second, to tentatively
explore the role religion should play in Iraq,32 and third, to show, by example, how
note 11; AFTER JIHAD, supra note 23; SHERMAN JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI (1996); Khaled Abou EI-Fadl,
Constitutionalism and the Islamic Sunni Legacy, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 67 (2001-02);
Khaled Abou EI-Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 4
(2003); and Sherman Jackson, From Prophetic Action to Constitutional Theory: A Novel Chapter in
Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence, 25 INT'L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 71 (1993).
26. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 23, at 73-74 (deriving a new principle of Islamic
interpretation from the work of medieval philosopher lbn Qayyim).
27. Erik G. Jensen, Confronting Misconceptions and Acknowledging Imperfections: A
Response to Khaled Abou El Fadl's 'Islam and Democracy', 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 81, 83 (2003).
28. Professor Garlicki has come the closest to making this point. He has noted, "there is a
range of systems from the most strict - even hostile - separationist models to the most friendly, positive
separationist schemes. This range includes models based on accommodation, cooperation, and even
churches supported or preferred by the state." Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of
Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. REV. 467, 469.
29. Compare KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(3d ed. 1998) (assuming that countries should adopt similar law to deal with similar problems) with
Mark Tuhsnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1225 (1999)
(articulating a cautious approach to constitutional borrowing) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
628, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1229 (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal
Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUROPEAN & COMP. L. 111-24 (1997).
30. Cf GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY (1994) (arguing for rigorous theory
development and testing).
31. For an example of another effort to "debunk" a popular myth, see James Q. Whitman,
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004) (discussing the myth that there is one
international, universal conception of privacy).
32. See Alexander George, Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of
Structured Comparison, in DIPLOMACY: NEW APPROACHES IN HISTORY, THEORY AND POLICY 51
(1979) (noting that comparative studies can be useful "as a means of stimulating the imagination in
order to discern important new general problems, identify possible theoretical solutions"). Cf. Harry
Eckstein, Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE at 91
(1975) (discussing hypothesis formulation).
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Iraqis might better understand their own system by looking to other countries. 3
Before laying out the structure of this article, I want to define a few important
terms and offer a brief caveat. A "state" is a territorial entity that provides
essential services (including security). The state should assure freedoms of speech
and assembly. The state should also assure the full participation conducive to
national legitimacy. A "nation" is a sociological and legal idea to which those
who live within the territory of a state may or may not subscribe. "Government"
means something different than either "state" or "nation." The government is the
set of actors able at any given time to effect policy. Finally, a "belief
association" 34 is a group of individuals who hold common and sincere beliefs3 that
help to define their relationships to other men, to the universe, or to God.36 This
term is broad and I mean it to include both religious and quasi-religious groups,
like, for instance, scientologists and Jehovah's Witnesses. I do not intend it to
include, however, the Church of No Taxation. Rather, a "belief association"
facilitates and passes on "demands made upon us by society, the people, the
sovereign, or God .... [It offers a set of symbols and] signs by which each of us
communicates with others."
37
Finally, I articulate this theory rather forcefully at least in part in an effort to
stimulate a discussion on the merits of the new Iraqi constitution. I offer this
caveat: this article is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. Rather, I have simply
tried to generate plausible arguments and apply them to the Iraqi Constitution. My
hope is that this article will stimulate further discussion within the U.S. legal
community.
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I set the stage for argument by
modeling the relationship between governments and belief associations in a new
way: along two axes rather than along a single vector, with a government's
position along the x-axis representing the extent to which it prefers one belief
association (or indeed secularism) to other belief associations, and its position
along the y-axis representing the extent to which it is willing actively to cooperate
with non-dominant belief associations.
With this model in mind, in Part II I defend the way the Iraqi Constitution
33. Cf J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, Ill HARV. L.
REV. 963, 1005 (1998) (arguing that the purpose of comparative study it to "make the object ...
'strange' to us").
34. By using this term, and defining it in the way I do, I hope to avoid offering a definition
of "religion." To attempt any definition of "religion" might debase it and offend those whom the
definition excluded. Cf Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 241 (1999) ("To define religion is to limit it."). I also do not feel
competent to make the attempt. Compare Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional
Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984), with Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: 'Religion' in
the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964) with Ingber, supra.
35. By sincere I mean what the Supreme Court meant in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 176 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
36. To some extent, I endorse the definition offered by Judge Augustus Hand in United
States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) ("[r]eligious belief arises from a sense of the
inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe..
37. Robert M. Cover, Foreword, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1983).
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treats religion. I do so by articulating what I call the privilege paradigm. I suggest
that the two principal U.S. desiderata-the establishment of a state and the
construction of a nation--can best be realized if Iraq privileges religion. Using the
model, Iraq should not only cooperate with non-dominant belief associations (i.e.
be above the origin on the y-axis) but also entrench Islam as the religion of the
government (i.e. be to the right of the origin on the x-axis). I assert that this is
precisely what the Constitution requires and impels Iraq to do.
In Parts III and IV, I turn from the descriptive to the prescriptive. I no longer
defend the Constitution as it is, but rather, announce how I believe the United
States should suggest that the Iraqi government interpret it and what ancillary laws
and practices might help assure its success. First, in Part ILL, I enunciate what I call
the protection paradigm. 38 The protection paradigm is a scheme designed to
guarantee that neither the cooperation of the government with non-dominant belief
associations nor the entrenchment of Islam as its religion stifles dissent. Using the
feminist critique of the position I endorse in Part II to help limn the contours of the
protection paradigm, I argue that the state should ensure that citizens are able to
express dissenting opinions from within belief associations. Then, in Part IV, I
apply the theoretical insights of Part III and explain precisely what the United
States could suggest that Iraq do, should they wish to realize the protection
paradigm.
To sum up, the privilege paradigm suggests that the Iraqi government has
done well by approving the beliefs of the majority while at once ensuring that non-
dominant belief associations can prosper and that the dominant belief association
will continue to face competition for believers; but the protection paradigm
requires that the government take care that each belief association be permitted to
evolve, pressed from within by its own rebels. The Iraqi government still has
much work to do to instantiate this second paradigm.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND BELIEF ASSOCIATIONS: A
NEW MODEL
A. Two Dimensional Analysis
Many scholars, including Noah Feldman, model the relationship between
governments and belief associations as a vector moving from disestablishment to
establishment. In a description of the three shapes Islamic democracy might take,
for instance, Feldman moves from the minimally Islamic state (Islam is to that
state as Anglicanism is to England)39 to the maximally Islamic state (a state that
"adopt[s] Islamic law as its exclusive legal system"). 40  This Part proposes a
38. 1 borrow this term from Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager. Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: The
Vulnerability of Conscience: the Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1245, 1248 (1994).
39. AFTER JIHAD, supra note 23, at 54.
40. Id. at 55-56.
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different way of modeling this relationship. Rather than as a vector,4' this Part
models the relationship in two dimensions. At one end of the x-axis is
establishment or disestablishment. A government that has disestablished religion,
like a government that has established religion, favors one belief association (or,
more generally, one belief structure) over others. At the origin is what I will call
agnosticism. At one end of the y-axis is hostility, at the origin is neutrality, and at
the other end is cooperation [see Table One below].
TABLE ONE
CooNeratyo
Neutraitv Agnosticism
Germany
The Netherlands
Spain
Israel
United States
- Favoritism
England
Russia (Soviet Union)
Pakistan/TurkeyFrance
41. See W.C. Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework,
in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 15-25 (Johan D. van der
Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds. 1996) [hereinafter WITTE] for another formulation of the vector model.
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Both England and Israel are at one end of the x-axis since both states favor one
belief structure over others.4 2 England, for instance, permits twenty-four bishops
to serve as members of the House of Lords. 3 Turkey and France are similarly
situated along the x-axis (since both endorse laicit6/secularism over other belief
structures). 44  Indeed, the Turkish government has dismissed employees who
belong to fundamentalist groups without adducing evidence of the effect such
membership may have had upon job performance.4 5
Spain and the United States, by contrast, are closer to the origin (along the x-
axis) since both favor a single belief association over others (in the case of Spain
the Catholic Church and in the case of the United States 'civic religion'), but only
informally.4 6 In Spain, for instance, religious education classes taught by members
of belief associations other than the Catholic Church are not publicly funded.
47
Finally, at the other end of the x-axis, near the y-axis, are those governments that
are agnostic, those states like the Netherlands and Germany that do not favor one
belief association over others at all.4 8  For those governments, "religious
institutions must not be placed in a more disadvantageous position than societal
groups. ' 49 Yet, "the system of church and state relationships is characterized...
as one of separation."
50
The y-axis measures the extent to which a government cooperates with non-
dominant belief associations. Pakistan is at one end since it is hostile to belief
associations other than the dominant belief association (Sunni Islam). 5' For
instance, until recently, the government of Pakistan required Muslims entering and
leaving the country to affirm that Muhammad was the 'seal of the prophets,'
42. See, e.g., Asher Maoz, Religious Human Rights in the State of Israel, in WITTE, supra
note 41, at 357 ("Israel was established as a Jewish state."); Shimon Shetreet, State and Religion:
Funding of Religious Institutions - The Case of Israel in Comparative Perspective, 13 ND J. L. ETHICS
& PUB POL'Y 421, 431 (1999) ("'The process of establishment means that the state has accepted the
Church [of England] as the religious body in its opinion truly teaching the Christian faith."').
43. David McClean, State and Church in the United Kingdom, in STATE AND CHURCH IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 307, 311 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996) [hereinafter ROBBERS].
44. See ANAYASA [Constitution] art. 2 (Turkey); CONST. art. 2 (France).
45. Cf Kalac v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1199 (1997-IV).
46. See Constituci6n [C.E.] art. 16(3) (Spain) ("The public powers shall take into account
the religious beliefs of Spanish society and maintain the appropriate relations of cooperation, with the
Catholic Church and other denominations."); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 n.46
(1989) (mentioning "ceremonial deism").
47. Ivan C. Iban, State and Church in Spain, in ROBBERS, supra note 43, at 107.
48. STATUUT NED. [Constitution] art. 6(1) (Kingdom of the Netherlands) ("Everyone shall
have the right to manifest freely his religion or belief, either individually or in community with others");
GRUNDSETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 4(1) (F.R.G.) ("Freedom of creed, of conscience, and freedom to
profess a religious or non-religious faith are inviolable").
49. Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in Germany, in ROBBERS, supra note 43, at 60
(describing Germany).
50. Sophie C. van Bijsterveld, State and Church in the Netherlands, in ROBBERS, supra
note 43, at 215.
51. See generally M. Nadeem Ahmad Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheeruddin v. State and
the Official Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 275 (1995); see
also Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle East and North Africa, 10
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 139, 153-54 (1996).
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thereby forcing the Ahmadis, who consider themselves Muslim but believe in
subsequent revelation, either to recant or to declare themselves non-Muslims.
England and the United States are both near the x-axis, but England is below the x-
axis (it is more hostile, especially to groups like the Sikhs) 52 whereas the United
States is above the x-axis (it is more willing to cooperate, especially with groups
like the Old Order Amish). 3 Finally, at the other end of the y-axis are Germany
and the Netherlands. These states believe that "[c]hurch and state-throne and
altar- . . . hav[e] different responsibilities, but they both have public
responsibilities . and thus cooperation between the two works to the benefit of
society as a whole. 54 These cooperative states strive to "maintain a sphere of
positive tolerance that makes room for the religious needs of society., 55
I will now render two examples in more detail, in the hope of clarifying the
model. First consider Russia. Russia is in the bottom right-hand comer of my
graph because it comes closest to combining agnosticism with hostility. Russia is
at once predominantly Orthodox and a "secular state., 56 But it neither embraces
secularism,57 at least in part because secularism is tainted by its association with
the Soviet past,58 nor Orthodoxy.59 Indeed, as one commentator has put it, Russia
"forbid[s] 'the propaganda of exclusiveness' of religious communities [and this] is
to impose an extremely harsh constraint on the preaching of . . . the main
religion[].,, 60 Russia is not only agnostic, it is also hostile to non-dominant belief
associations. For instance, the government seems to discriminate against minority
religious groups.61 Moreover, there is no doubt that the Federal Law on
52. See generally Satvinder S. Juss, The Constitution and Sikhs in Britain, 1995 BYU L.
REV. 481.
53. Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
54. THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 171
(Stephen v. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds. 1997) [hereinafter MONSMA].
55. Robbers, supra note 49, at 60.
56. See KONST. (Constitution) art. 14 [Russian Federation] available at
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm ("1. The Russian Federation is a secular state. No
religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. 2. Religious associations shall be separated
from the State and shall be equal before the law.").
57. Indeed, Russia guarantees freedom of belief more extensive than that guaranteed by the
United States. See KONST. (Constitution) arts. 29(1), (3) [Russian Federation] ("1. Everyone shall be
guaranteed the freedom of ideas and speech .... 3. No one may be forced to express his views and
convictions or to reject them."); see also, J. Brian Gross, Note, Russia's War on Political and Religious
Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law 'On Counteracting Extremist Activity," 2003 BYU L. REV. 717,
750 ("The 1990 law created a fairly liberal regime that promoted the growth of foreign religious
organizations and, in some instances, led to a rise in religion-related abuses.")
58. The Soviet Constitution proclaimed, "[c]itizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of
conscience ... [but] the church is separated from the state, and the school from the church." KONST.
(Constitution) art. 52 [U.S.S.R.]). While "all Soviet citizens who profess[ed] any form of religious
belief [we]re placed on the same footing as all the other citizens who, pursuant to their right under
article 52, [might] elect to become atheists," the Soviet Constitution "embodie[d] a distinct political
ideology as well as a secular theology," Christopher Osakwe, Equal Protection of Law in Soviet
Constitutional Law and Theory -A Comparative Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 974, 1000 (1985).
59. See Gross, supra note 57, at 717.
60. Alexander Verkhovsky, Taking Anti-Extremism to Extremes, Johnson's Russia List, at
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6401 
-1 .cfm (Aug. 14, 2002).
61. Putin's Anti-Extremism Drive Is Failing, Rights Group Charges, 3 BIGOTRY MONITOR,
at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/013103Russia.shtml (Jan. 31, 2003) ("For example . .. when a
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Counteracting Extremist Activity62 throws a damper on the work of belief
associations.
Consider next the United States. The United States, because it favors civic
religion and cooperates with non-dominant belief associations to a limited extent,
is well to the right of and slightly above the origin on my graph. The United States
government endorses what sociologist Robert Bellah calls civil religion 63 -that is,
"a set of beliefs and attitudes that explain the meaning and purpose of any given
political society in terms of its relationship to a transcendent, spiritual reality, that
are held by the people generally of that society, and that are expressed in public
rituals, myths and symbols. ' '64 Indeed, government officials frequently advert to
'our Christian heritage' 65 and rely on religious symbols in public ceremonies. 66 As
Justice O'Connor has explained, religious images may "serve, in the only ways
reasonably possible in our culture .. .[to] solemniz[e] public occasions, express
confidence in the future, and encourag[e] the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society. ' ' 7 Although civic religion is not as obvious a dominant
belief structure as, say, Islam is in Pakistan,68 there is no doubting that the United
group of Orthodox believers objected to the use of mandatory tax identification numbers on religious
grounds, a court ruled to exempt them. But when Muslim women asked to wear their traditional
headscarves in their passport photographs, a court ruled that the Interior Ministry ban on head coverings
in ID photos took precedence over their faith.").
62. See Gross, supra note 57, at 717.
63. Bellah has defined American religion as "an elaborate and well institutionalized civil
religion [i.e.] certain common elements of religious orientation that the general majority of Americans
share [and that] have played a crucial role in the development of American institutions and still provide
a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political sphere." Robert
Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1, 24 (1967), quoted in Yehudah Mirsky, Note, Civil
Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1248 (1986).
64. E.M. West, A Proposed Neutral Definition of Civil Religion, 22 J. OF CHURCH & STATE
23, 39 (1980), quoted in Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1249.
65. John Quincy Adams, addressing the American people, once said, "the ark of your
covenant is the Declaration of Independence. Your Mount Ebal, is the confederacy of separate state
sovereignties, and your Mount Gerizim is the Constitution of the United States." H. Wayne House, A
Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State, 13 BYU
J. PUB. L. 203, 205 (1999) (quoting The Jubilee of the Constitution, A Discourse Delivered at the
Request of the New York Historical Society in the City of New York, on Tuesday, the 30th of April,
1839, Being the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of George Washington as the President of the
United States, on Thursday, the 30th Of April, 1789; by John Quincy Adams (Entered According to the
Act of Congress, in the Year 1839, by Joseph Blunt, for the New York Historical Society, in the District
Court of The Southern District of New York). More recently, Justice Douglas has pointed out, "[w]e are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313 (1952).
66. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983) (Nebraska's employment of a
chaplain to open each legislative session with a prayer is not a violation of the Establishment Clause).
In this respect, the government is simply responsive to recent polls, which suggest, "94% of Americans
believe in God or a universal spirit, 71% believe in heaven, and 53% believe in hell." Michael M.
Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 293,
294 (1993).
67. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For more on
the Supreme Court's willingness to acknowledge our religious past, see Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1245
("The legitimate functions of government are defined ... by what government is already doing, without
any reference to the substantive content and constitutional value of the activity in question.")
68. Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1250 ("A ... characteristic of civil religion is its essentially
political, non-sacral character.")
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States favors it over all others.69
The United States occasionally, but not always, cooperates with non-
dominant belief associations. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has excepted
the Old Order Amish from educational requirements.7 ° Other sects, on the other
hand, have not fared so well. The Mormons, for instance, were subject to
considerable persecution.7' Some argue that the Unites States will only cooperate
with those belief associations it considers harmless.72
B. What Is Cooperation?
While it is easy intuitively to understand what is meant by favoritism and
agnosticism, it is considerably harder to parse the terms cooperation, neutrality and
hostility. This sub-section strives to define the differences between cooperation
and neutrality (and between full cooperation and some intermediate type of
relationship, one that might be called benevolent neutrality). Simply put, a fully
cooperative government affords belief associations the right to take belief-
motivated action, supports belief associations, and offers belief associations
protection. A neutral government affords some individuals, but no associations,
the right to take belief-motivated action, does not support either individual
members of or belief associations as groups, and does not protect belief
associations.73 A benevolent neutral government74 affords members of belief
associations a thicker right to take belief-motivated actions than would a neutral
government, but otherwise differs little from that form.
69. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 325 (1987) ("[The] concept [of
neutrality and a civil religion] appears to be ... irresistible.").
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 161-62.
72. The harm principle finds its first expression in JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 114-
41 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956). Subsequent proponents include Marci A. Hamilton, Religious
Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1099.
73. For more on this distinction from the European perspective, see MONSMA, supra note
54, at 165; Martin Heckel, The Impact of Religious Rules on Public Life in Germany, in WITTE, supra
note 4141, at 199. See also Robbers, supra note 49, at 61 ("Freedom of faith .... [includes] a negative
aspect, that is the right not to have and/or not to belong to a particular faith .... [but] also guarantees
the right to act according to one's beliefs.").
74. Chief Justice Burger coined this term in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New
York. He said, "[s]hort of... expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship
and without interference." 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). As Frederick Mark Geddes has explained,
"[b]enevolent neutrality is the doctrinal combination to which we would return if religious exemptions
were reinstituted without substantial change in establishment clause doctrine." An Unfirm Foundation:
The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 569 (1998).
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First, a cooperative government offers belief associations thick rights to opt-
out of generally applicable laws; that is what I mean when I say a cooperative
government permits belief-motivated action. For instance, in the Netherlands, the
government permits employees to rest on whatever their belief system designates
as holy days. 75  Likewise, the German Constitutional Court has explained,
"[r]eligious freedom [under the German Constitution] . .. encompasses not only
the (internal) freedom to believe or not to believe but also the individual's right to
align his behavior with the precepts of his faith and to act in accordance with his
internal convictions. 76 Indeed, that court has maintained that a husband may not
be prosecuted for neglect even when he refuses a life-saving blood transfusion for
his wife on religious grounds.77
Neutral governments guarantee no such right of action. In the United States,
for instance, the Constitution precludes the government from singling out
associations for ill treatment 78 and protects the rights of individuals to believe as
they wish, 79 but does not necessarily permit them, or those with whom they
associate, to opt-out of generally applicable laws.8 ° Indeed, as the Supreme Court
explained in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Free Exercise Clause "embraces two
concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be.",81 Finally, benevolent neutral governments
offer a moderate right of action. In Greece, for instance, although members of
belief associations may opt-out of some generally applicable laws, a Jehovah's
Witness was nevertheless sentenced to prison for proselytizing. The European
Court of Human Rights has summed up the attitude of benevolent neutral
governments by saying, "in democratic societies, in which several religion's coexist
within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on
[the] freedom [of religion] in order to recognize the interests of the various
groups.''82
Second, cooperative governments support belief associations. In Germany,
for instance, the government helps churches collect membership dues. 8 3 Likewise,
75. Cf MONSMA, supra note 54, at 65.
76. Religious Oath Case (1972), 33 BverfGE 23, cited in Monsma, supra note 54, at 165
(emphasis added) see also Axel Frohr. von CAMPENHAUSEN, The German Headscarf Debate, 2004
BYU L. REV. 665, 677 ("Religious convictions that dictate one behavior as the correct way to cope
with circumstances are also protected by article 4.").
77. Edward J. Eberle, Free Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United States, 78 TUL.
L. REV. 1023, 1049 (2004).
78. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
79. Cf West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.")
80. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 921 (1990) (refusing to permit a Native
American Church an exemption from laws forbidding the consumption of peyote); see also Hamilton,
supra note 72, at 1101 ("When it comes to the public good, the rule of law needs to govern religious
institutions, just as it does other private entities.")
81. Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
82. Kokkinakis v. Greece, Ser. A, no. 260-A, para. 33 (1993).
83. MONSMA, supra note 54, at 173.
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in the Netherlands, the government guarantees belief associations a certain amount
of media exposure.84 Both Germany and the Netherlands also permit and fund
dedicated schools run by belief associations." Neutral governments, on the other
hand, offer no such support. The United States forbids, for instance, the direct
provision of federal funds to parochial schools.
86
Finally, a cooperative government protects belief associations by offering
them a remedy when their beliefs are impugned. 87 As Gary Jacobsohn has said of
Israel, for instance, "the defense of the group against outrageous verbal assault can
readily be assimilated into an argument for individual liberty. '988  A neutral
government, on the other hand, affords no such remedy. 89
II. THE PRIVILEGE PARADIGM AND THE NEW IRAQI CONSTITUTION
The model I have sketched of the set of possible relationships between
governments and belief associations suggests that one may disaggregate two
questions: the 'cooperation question' and the 'establishment question.' A
government may be agnostic yet cooperative, or it may have an established church
and remain hostile to other belief associations. From this model, my argument
proceeds in two steps. First, I consider what answers to the 'cooperation' and
'establishment' questions would best conduce to the construction of state and
nation in Iraq. I argue that cooperation is an engine that could drive Iraqi state-
and nation-building. I further argue that cooperation requires establishment, at
least in Iraq (and perhaps in other transitional Islamic states), and therefore that
establishment is a necessary prerequisite to the state- and nation-building project.
In brief, I maintain that the best way to build an Iraqi state and construct an Iraqi
nation is by adopting what I call a privilege paradigm-that is, by privileging both
non-dominant belief associations (cooperation) and the religion of the majority
(establishment). Second, I assess whether the Iraqi Constitution is congruent with
the theoretical ideals of the privilege paradigm and conclude that it is.
In making my argument for the privilege paradigm I echo Alexis de
Tocqueville 9° and James Madison. 91 De Tocqueville emphasized the importance
of civil associations, including and especially those I call belief associations, 9 2 to
84. Van Bijsterveld, supra note 50, at 220.
85. MONSMA, supra note 54, at 183 (discussing German schools); Van Bijsterveld, supra
note 50, at 219 ("Private schools are funded by the state under the condition that they meet certain
educational standards.").
86. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (noting that the Establishment
Clause forbids "government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools").
87. Maoz, supra note 42, at 360 (describing stringent Israeli penalties for racist or
religiously-inspired crimes).
88. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE
UNITED STATES 227 (1993).
89. Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a bias-motivated
crime law as content-based and inconsistent with the First Amendment).
90. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY N AMERICA 106 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Vintage Classics 1990) (1835).
91. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,63 app. (1946).
92. Indeed, this is unsurprising, since "[rieligion is the leading force in American civil
society .. " Maddigan, supra note 66, at 316.
VOL. 34:2
MOSQUE AND STATE IN IRAQ'S NEW CONSTITUTION
the effective provision of state services and the construction of national identity.
As John 0. McGinnis has said, not only did de Tocqueville think that belief
associations "generate what modem sociologists would call social capital," but he
also believed that "civil associations have influence at the local level, making local
government more responsive and contributory to a more public-spirited
citizenry. 93 This is one of two important strands in my argument for the privilege
paradigm-that privileging, and cooperating with, belief associations will best
permit Iraq to create a state and forge a nation.
Madison saw "the establishment clause primarily as a means of...
encouraging a multiplicity of mutually balancing sects, all competing for adherents
and defining themselves in relation to each other, thus achieving a creative
equilibrium., 94 As Michael McConnell has said, with "[j]udicially enforceable
exemptions ... [a government can] ensure that unpopular or unfamiliar faiths will
receive the same consideration afforded mainstream or generally respected
religions ...., This is the second strand of my argument for the privilege
paradigm-that Iraq should afford each belief association thick and equal rights in
order to induce each to become more responsive to its constituents.
A. Cooperation, State Formation, and Nation Building
1. State Formation
To be legitimate, a state must provide certain services.96 As Max Weber has
put it, the state is an entity that monopolizes the use of force within its
boundaries. 97 Some argue that this is the state's only responsibility.98 Others, like
Michael Walzer, believe that the state must also provide medical and social
services. 99 Iraq seems likely to be the latter kind of state. Indeed, the Constitution
purports to establish a welfare state. 00 This sub-section assumes, therefore, that
state legitimacy in Iraq first requires the creation of a secure environment and
second, the provision of certain services (including health-care and social
services). In the words of a recent panel on UN reform, the latter is important to
state formation "not because [it is] intrinsically good but because [it is] necessary
to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and safety of ... citizens."10' These goals-
security and services-can best be achieved by the Iraqi government through
cooperation with belief associations.
93. John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 491 (2002).
94. Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1239.
95. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1419-20 (1990).
96. Cf MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 84 ("[E]very political community attends
to the needs of its members as they collectively understand those needs.").
97. MAX WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947).
98. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
99. Cf WALZER, supra note 96, at 86-91 (discussing medical care and arguing that it
should be dispensed to all who need it).
100. See IRAQ CONST. art. 30.
101. United Nations, Report of the Secretary General's Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Changes at 17 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.
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First, as Noah Feldman has noted, the most "reliable guarantors of...
security [in Iraq are] associations forming around denominational identity."',0 2
Indeed, many prominent Iraqis rely on their co-religionists to keep them safe when
traveling about the country. 0 3 The way that Shi'a Ayatollah Ali Sistani was able
to rein in rebel leader Muqtada al-Sadr 0 4 suggests how important belief
associations may be to controlling Iraq.
Second, belief associations are effective purveyors of services. In the United
States, for instance, local associations provide many social services, and are often
more generous and effective than the federal government.'0 5 As one analyst has
put it, "[r]eligious charities are some of the most efficient social service providers,
as well as among the most successful, measured in terms of lives permanently
changed for the better."' 6 Therefore, there are strong practical reasons to permit
federal funding of religious belief associations.'0 7
The same is true elsewhere. In England "the church was the sole provider of
education or health care long before the state assumed these roles"10 8 ; and in
Germany, "[rireligious denomination[s] . . . have been a driving force for the
organization of social activities."' 1 9 As one prominent European commentator has
put it, "[w]ithout [religious] services, the guarantees of a social state .... [w]ould
be mere empty postulates."
''10
102. WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 78.
103. lyad Jamal Eddin, for instance, has "confirmed that the Shiite references are
independent from the state ... [and have] great weight ... in the Iraqi street." Al Hayat, Oct. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.almendhar.com/english_6984/news.aspx.
104. See WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 39 (describing Sistani's efforts to
marginalize al-Sadr as "a classic defense by institutional authority against incipient charismatic
appeal").
105. Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 631 (1999) (book
review) ("In the U.S. context, a state may be more likely to establish generous benefits than would the
federal government, where those benefits will be enjoyed by established state residents, for they will
share the solidarities that come with living in the same limited space.").
106. Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-
Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 39 (1997).
107. Michael Walzer, Leary Lecture: Drawing the Line: Religion and Politics, 1999 UTAH
L. REV. 619,635-36. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 375,382 (1990).
108. Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49
MCGILL L.J. 635, 647 (2004).
109. Van Bijsterveld, supra note 50, at 212.
110. Robbers, supra note 49, at 63.
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All this is doubly true throughout the Middle East."' Moreover, not only are
belief associations effective at ensuring the provision of basic services, but it was
Islamic constitutionalism, lobbied for by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood,"
2
that was the principal motive ideology behind and practical inspiration for the
establishment of the modem welfare states of the Middle East. That is, Islamic
constitutionalism has been a source of ideological justification. 1 3 Indeed, Islamic
law requires the community to provide sufficient levels of food, clothing and
housing for the poor; "every Muslim has the duty of zakat, to donate alms to the
poor."'"14  And Islamic constitutionalism has also been a source of procedural
inspiration. Classically, there were few procedural limits on secular law. For
instance, magistrates, those who dispensed secular law, were able to rely "on
intimidation and on circumstantial and hearsay evidence." ' 1 5  Procedure was a
matter of religious law. It has been at least in part by importing the procedures of
religious law that modem Middle Eastern welfare states have been able to
function.
Reaching out to religious communities, cooperating with them, will be
necessary if Iraq is to provide the basic services that are the prerequisites to state-
formation. Benevolent neutrality, or neutrality, would not likely be sufficient.
Simply affording individual members of belief associations thick rights to opt-out
of generally applicable laws would not foster the development of the partnerships
that the German government, for instance, enjoys.
2. Nation Building
A nation is an imagined community."l 6  Peter Schuck has suggested that
citizenship and nationality have four components: the political; the legal; the
psychological; and the sociological." 7 The political component "affirms the value
of public participation in the project of self-government."'' 8 The legal component
111. Cf Soli Ozel, Islam Takes a Democratic Turn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A27
(describing the victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey as "for the angry, downtrodden,
impoverished and excluded masses"); International Crisis Group, Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target?, at ii (2002) ("[S]uch institutions [belief
association in the Palestinian Territories] are more efficient than their secular or official counterparts,
delivering aid without distinction as to religious belief or political affiliation.").
112. L. CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS 155
(2000) (Sayyid Qutb once said, "when there are those who cannot even find rags to cover their bodies,
it is an impossible luxury that a mosque should cost a hundred thousand guineas").
113. See, e.g., PATRICIA CRONE, GOD'S RULE: GOVERNMENT AND ISLAM 393 (2004) (citing
AI-Amiri for the proposition that "' [r]eligions are never established for private benefit or individual
advantage but always aim at collective welfare'). There is at least one significant counter-example.
The Iranian counter-revolution of 1907 led by Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri disputed, inter alia, the "use of
funds allocated to religious ceremonies for the purpose of building factories." SAID AMIR ARJOMAND,
THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN 51 (1990).
114. Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 349, 371 (1996) [hereinafter Heroes or Heretics].
115. AL-MAWARDI, THE ORDINANCES OF GOVERNMENT 94 (Wafaa H. Wahba tr., 1996).
116. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (Verso 2d ed. 1991).
117. Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 207 (2000).
118. Id.
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"emphasizes the positive law that creates the distinctive status of citizen.""' 9 The
psychological component concerns "whether [citizens] conceive of themselves
primarily as members of a particular state rather than as members of some other
political community.' 120  Finally, the sociological component "looks to how
individual citizens are integrated into civil society."'12 1 Since the Constitution of
Iraq, like most constitutions, satisfies the requirements of the legal component,
122
and since I believe that the psychological and sociological components are
inextricably tied to each other, this sub-section presumes that nation formation has
two salient dimensions: the political/participatory; and the psycho-sociological.
The Political/Participatory Component
Citizens are likely to participate in national affairs when the government is
tolerant of opposing views, and when the government recognizes and affirms
group identities. When a government cooperates with belief associations, it
exhibits tolerance and becomes more tolerant; it also reinforces group identities.
When a government cooperates with belief associations, therefore, it stimulates
political participation.
A tolerant government willing to affirm group identities is likely to induce
participation. First, tolerance is good for participation. Many believe that
tolerance is the glue that holds a nation together. 123 Both Chandran Kukathas and
William Galston, for instance, argue that tolerance, rather than autonomy, is the
fundamental value of the liberal government. Chandran Kukathas says "toleration
is important, [as an independent value].' 24 Likewise, William Galston declares,
"properly understood, liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the
valorization of choice.'
125
Second, affirming group identities is also good for participation. As George
Mead has noted, "one has to be a member of a community to be a self."' 126 Joseph
Raz concurs, "membership in [a] cultural group is a major determinant of [an
individual's] sense of who [she is]; it provides a strong focus of identification; it
contributes to what we have come to call [an individual's] sense of [her] own
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 208.
122. See IRAQ CONST. pmbl. ("We the sons of Mesopotamia . .
123. There are, of course, others who argue that the liberal states should not afford groups
qua groups rights. Emile Durkheim, Individualism and the Intellectuals, in ON MORALITY AND
SOCIETY (Robert N. Bellah ed., University of Chicago Press 1973). However, it is hard to see how a
state can avoid doing so, at least to some extent. See Naomi Mezey, The Common Place of Law Out of
the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture, and the Commonplace, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 145, 152 (2001);
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Liberalism and Illiberalism: The Return of the Repressed: Illiberal Groups in
a Liberal State, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 897, 899 (2002) ("[The] reverse critique maintains that
the exercise of individual rights produces group rights.")
124. Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 69, 79 (lan
Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., New York University Press 1997).
125. William A. Galston, Two Concepts ofLiberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 523 (1995).
126. GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL
BEHAVIORIST 162 (Charles W. Morris ed., University of Chicago Press 1972).
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identity.' 27  Choices, and legal actions, are only meaningful when made or
rendered against a rich backdrop of intersubjective norms. 128 As one theoretician
has summarized, "[c]ultural freedom is . . . a precondition of liberal self-
invention.
' 129
But what is the link between cooperation and the establishment of a tolerant
government willing to affirm group identities? In fact, cooperation demonstrates,
entrenches, and begets tolerance. First, it is a visible sign that a government
welcomes dissent. To demonstrate that this is so, I will briefly compare Israel and
Turkey. Israel has a notoriously cooperative government (Israel plots as a
favoritism-cooperation regime); Turkey, on the other hand, has a notoriously
uncooperative government (Turkey plots as a favoritism-hostility regime). Gary
Jacobson has said of Israel, "ethnoreligious groups compete with the state for the
right to exercise coercive authority over individuals whom the group views as its
members and whom the state recognizes as citizens."'
30 By contrast, Ran Hirschl
has said of Turkey that courts found it "problematic that pro-hijab [pro-female-
head-covering] groups based their arguments on religious freedom grounds."''
Rather, "[t]he FP [had to] present[] the head scarf ban as a human rights violation
and a suppression of personal liberties, rather than as a matter 
of religion."'' 32
While members of belief associations have been able to dissent in cooperative
Israel, 133 it has been historically quite hard for them to do so in hostile Turkey. In
fact, Turkey routinely disbands political parties. 134 This has provoked widespread
disaffection. Indeed, an anti-secular, anti-government trend began in 1946 when
two "conservative deputies suggested th[e] reintroduction of religious education
into the public schools."'' 35 The trend grew stronger when Necmettin Erbakan left
the Justice Party in 1969 to found his own political party, and came to full national
127. Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
178 (Clardendon Press rev. ed. 1995).
128. Free Speech and Community: Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
473,475 (1997).
129. Eric J. Mitnick, Three Models of Group-Differentiated Rights, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 215, 234-35, 217 (2004); see Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of
Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 643 (1992) ("The individualist claims that her
objective is to treat individuals equally, and that she does so by treating them as abstract individuals
rather than as members of a group. In reality, for members of minority ethnic groups, having equal
treatment turns out to be merely the right to be turned into some version of the members of the
dominant culture. One can treat individuals equally only if one is comparing them from a given point
of view. That point of view is not the abstract individual, for there is not such a creature, but rather the
individual who is located in and defined by the dominant culture and tradition.")
130. JACOBSOHN, supra note 88, at 27.
131. Ran Hirschl Constitutional Courts in the Field of Power Politics: Constitutional Courts
vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819, 1850 (2004).
132. Nilufer Narli, The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey, in REVOLUTIONARIES AND
REFORMERS: CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 132 (Barry Rubin ed., State
University of New York Press 2003) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARIES].
133. Israel has, however, banned certain outrageous political parties (like the Kach Party).
134. See United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998 -I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available at
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1998/I .html..
135. Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in
Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 72 (2002).
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flower when Turgut Ozal proclaimed "Turkish-Islamist Synthesis" in 1983.136 The
trend culminated with the recent election that brought the Justice and Development
Party to power. 137 As Hakan Yavuz puts it, Turkey's "uncritical modernization
ideology prevents open discussion that would lead to a new and inclusive social
contract that recognizes the cultural diversity of Turkey."'138 Cooperation therefore
performs a signaling function; it shows that a government welcomes dissent.
Not only is cooperation a signal, but it also may entrench tolerance, at least in
Iraq and the Middle East. Several of the most prominent liberal Islamists 139 rely on
notions of cooperation to buttress their theories. When a government cooperates, it
empowers liberal Islamists like them. When they are empowered, the government
is in turn more likely to remain cooperative. 140  Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 14 1
Abdol Karim Soroush, and Rachid Ghannouchi, for instance, require
cooperation. 142 Both Qaradawi and Soroush believe that strong opposition from
non-Muslim belief associations is necessary to progress. Qaradawi urges Islamic
states to use what he calls the "fiqh of balances" to answer knotty contemporary
questions-like whether one should assume public office in a corrupt state. 143 Fiqh
"is, to a large extent, a road map of what the law is, how it is to be applied, and
136. Ely Karmon, Radical Islamist Movements in Turkey, in REVOLUTIONARIES, supra note
132, at 46.
137. "[T]he intensity of secularization in Turkey implemented under Kemal Ataturk in the1930s and 1940s ultimately precipitated a fundamentalist response by various Islamist groups in that
country." Charles McDaniel, Islam and the Global Society: A Religious Approach to Modernity, 2003
BYU L. REV. 507, 522.
138. M. Hakan Yavuz, Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,
http://interact.sunnirazvi.org/forurnread.php? 14,1 165,1165 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
139. By "liberal Islamists" I mean Islamists who argue for democratic participation in the
government of their countries. I find some of the other positions taken by 'liberal Islamists' personally
and morally reprehensible. See infra note 141 (noting that Qaradawi, while an advocate of democracy,
has also supported bombing civilians in Israel).
140. AMR HAMZAWY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE KEY TO
ARAB REFORM: MODERATE ISLAMISTS (2005), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb4.hamzawy.FINAL.pdf, BASSMA KODMANI, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE DANGERS OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION: EGYPT'S
ISLAMIST PROBLEM, available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/CP63.Kodmani.FINAL.pdf.
Crucial to the process of reclaiming a political space would be the
legalization of Islamic parties as a less dangerous alternative to the domination
by the supposedly apolitical religious establishment. A political party or
movement is a recognizable player. If it seeks to be legalized, it registers under a
name, has an address, publicizes the names of its leaders, and spells out its
agenda.
141. Qaradawi is a controversial figure. Cf AFTER JIHAD, supra note 23, at 64 ("Qaradawi
is a complex, problematic figure. He wrote an influential fatwa declaring Islam and democracy
compatible .... [he] was one of the first and most important Muslim clerics to condemn the killing of
civilians at the World Trade Center ... [b]ut Qaradawi also advises Hamas").
142. For an opposing liberal Islamist view, see Mohamed Talbi, Religious Liberty, in
LIBERAL ISLAM: A SOURCEBOOK 162 (Charles Kurzman ed., Oxford University Press 1998)("[R]eligious liberty is basically the right to decide for one's self, without any kind of pressure ... to
espouse the faith of one's choice.").
143. YUSUF QARADAWI, PRIORITIES OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN THE COMING PHASE 34
(1992).
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where necessary, how law can be discovered."' 44 But since the 'fiqh of balances,'
according to Qaradawi, is "a rather positivistic [fiqh based on the study of
contemporary reality,"'' 45 those who would use it need to be able to bounce their
ideas off those who disagree with them. 146  Indeed, Qaradawi explains
"[a]ppreciating the other view and respecting the opinions of those who adopt
contradictory attitudes," including on questions of religion, is a requirement for
those who would use thisfiqh.1
47
Likewise, Soroush believes that opposition is necessary to ensure that
religious knowledge itself continues to expand. He explains, "[i]n a religious
society, it is not religion per se that arbitrates, but some understanding of religion
which is, in turn, changing, rational, and in harmony with the consensual and
accepted extrareligious criteria." 148
Finally, Rachid Ghannouchi, unlike Qaradawi and Soroush who value
cooperation for second-order reasons, makes cooperation the centerpiece of his
theory of Islamic democracy. 149 He calls for "an Islamic system that features...
protection of minorities, equality of all secular and religious parties."'
50  A
government that embraces views like theirs is more likely to remain tolerant than
one that does not, and their views require cooperation.
Nor are Qaradawi, Soroush and Ghannouchi members of a lunatic fringe.
Within Islamic communities, the concept of shura (consultation) has been much
discussed in recent years. Muhammad Iqbal, for instance, has averred:
The transfer of the power of Ijtihad [interpretation] from individual
representatives of schools to a ... legislative assembly which, in view of
the growth of opposing sects, is the only form Ijma [or shura] can take
in modem times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from
laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs.'
51
However, shura requires freedom of belief and of thought.1
52
Third and finally, cooperation begets tolerance. When there are more, and
144. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and
Rule-making, I U.C.L.A. J. ISLAMIC &NEAR E. L. 135, 137 (2002).
145. QARADAWI, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. ABD AL-KARIM SURUSH, REASON, FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN ISLAM: ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS OF ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH 132 (Mahmoud Sadri & Ahmad Sadri eds. & trans., Oxford
University Press 2000).
149. Soli Ozel, Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, in ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 164 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., Johns Hopkins University Press 2003).
150. Id.
151. John L. Esposito & John 0. Voll, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 28 (Oxford University Press
1996) (emphasis added); see also Islamic Foundation, The Political Framework of Islam,
http://www.jamaat.org/islam/HumanRightsPolitical.html (Ahmed Said Khan & Khurshid Ahmad trans.)
(last visited June 15, 2003) (based on interview with Syed Abul A'la Maudoodi).
152. Ali R. Abootalebi, Islam, Islamists, and Democracy, 3 MIDDLE E. REV. INT'L AFF. J. 14,
17 (1999) ("An indispensable element in building such [an Islamic society] is freedom of thought and
expression, including freedom from govemment control and suppression."), available at,
http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/1999/issuel/abootalebi.pdf.
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more equal, belief associations, tolerance is more likely than when there is a
dominant belief association and only a handful of weak non-dominant belief
associations. In the United States, for example, the proliferation of religious sects
antedated the entrenchment of a culture of religious tolerance. As Noah Feldman
has argued, in nineteenth century America, when those who sought to teach
morality in public schools confronted the fact of religious heterogeneity, they
adopted non-sectarian curricula.153 Feldman explains:
[When] religious heterogeneity [arose alongside] the strong sense
among American elites . . . that education was necessary to produce
citizens capable of virtuous political action .. [and that] it must include
... moral virtues... the solution.., had to be a non-sectarian stance. 154
Indeed, it was only when Catholics grew sufficiently strong to challenge
Protestants that Protestants began aggressively to push for disestablishment. 5 5 To
take one famous example, Justice Douglas is said to have passed a note to Justice
Black that read "if the Catholics get public money to finance their religious
schools, we better insist on getting some good prayers in public schools or we
Protestants are out of business."' 15 6 What Justice Douglas meant was, the fact of
competition compelled Protestants to make one of two moves: either they had to
fight Catholics for believers, and establish more and more religious Protestant
schools, or both Catholics and Protestants had to agree to tone down the religious
rhetoric in public schools.
What this means for Iraq is that if the government cooperates with and affirms
belief associations, belief associations are likely to proliferate, and if such
associations proliferate, each will have to cooperate with the others, and the
government will become more tolerant. Belief associations that do not cooperate
and compete will become irrelevant in the court of public opinion. For instance,
radical Saudi ideologues have been the subject of ridicule because of theirfatwas
(religious decrees) banning soccer. 157 As Michael McConnell has summarized,
"protect[ing] the interests of religious minorities in conflict with the wider society.
encourages the proliferation of religious factions."'158
At this point, one might say, "stop, what about the Mormons and other
disfavored religious groups in the United States-wasn't polygamy outlawed, not
tolerated?" Indeed, in 1856, Republicans likened polygamy to slavery, calling
153. Symposium, Beyond Separatism: Church and State. Non-sectarianism Reconsidered,
18 J. L. & POLITICS 65, 71, 103 (2002).
154. Id.
155. For excellent discussion of this thesis, see Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities
and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 232(2003) [hereinafter Religious Minorities]. See also Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern
Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 123-51 (2001); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan,
A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 297-305 (2001).
156. Religious Minorities, supra note 155, at 234.
157. See Geoff D. Porter, God Is in the Rules, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2005 at 13. Cf
FRANKLIN FOER, How SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD: AN UNLIKELY THEORY OF GLOBALIZATION
(Harper Collins 2004).
158. McConnell, supra note 95, at 1515.
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them "twin relics of barbarism."15 9  In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld a law forbidding polygamy. 160 Yet the Mormon experience is not a
counter-example; rather, it reinforces my point. The Mormon Church resisted
these legal attacks. 161 Attempts to suppress Mormons and eradicate their faith
failed. Their continued vitality provoked some of their opponents to modulate
their views; they began to advocate the "strict separation of 
church and state."'162
Not only does cooperation demonstrate, entrench and beget tolerance, but it
also reinforces group identities. A cooperative government supports belief
associations, protects them, and affords them thick rights to opt-out of generally
applicable laws. Belief associations are stronger under cooperative governments
than under neutral governments, and members of such associations are therefore
more capable of political participation (inasmuch as they feel more secure).
Indeed, as Christopher Eisgruber has noted, "religion [and belief associations more
generally] [are] a source of especially virulent political factions . . .[and as such
are] a valuable haven for political and philosophical diversity.' 63
Some argue that cooperation discourages participation because it permits
legislators to adduce arguments that are not publicly accessible. The syllogism
that supports this argument goes as follows: if the government uses its power when
the use of that power cannot be justified by a reason that each citizen could
conceivably understand, it alienates some citizens64; a religious reason (or reason
provoked by belief of any kind) is a kind of reason that not all citizens can
understand165; therefore, cooperation fosters disaffection.
166 This argument goes
159. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641,659 (2005) (quoting SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION:
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 55 (The University
of North Carolina Press 2002)).
160. 98 U.S. 145, 167-68 (1879); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1, 46 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347-48 (1890).
161. Nathan B. Oman, The Story of a Forgotten Battle: Reviewing The Mormon Question:
Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth Century America, 2002 BYU L. REV. 745, 749
(2002) ("The Mormons responded [to persecution] by resisting.").
162. Sarah Barringer Gordon, 'Our National Hearthstone': Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the
Sentimental Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295,
337(1996).
163. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional
Order, 89 Nw. U.L. REV. 347, 349 (1995).
164. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 103 (1980); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (1993) ("[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their
common human reason.").
165. Cf. Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION 226,
234 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) ("[R]eligion often self-consciously revels in the insensible.").
Why this need be so is unclear. Cf William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, in LAW AND
RELIGION, supra, (discussing the assumption that reason enjoys epistemological pride of place).
166. Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, in
LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 165, at 77 ("If I am coerced on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a
rational informed person, to do the thing in question, I cannot come to identify with the deed and will
tend to resent having to do it.").
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too far. 167  First, it is not clear that cooperation permits legislators to rely
exclusively on religious reasons (or reasons provoked by belief) in passing laws. 168
Second, it is not clear that religious discussion might not be the best way of
framing the argument for or against a certain law. For instance, Ayatollah Ali
Sistani's fatwa calling for elections was considerably more effective than lay
lobbying could have been at democracy promotion in Iraq. 169 Nevertheless, I agree
that cooperation has its disadvantages. It is insufficiently sensitive to the claims of
the lone dissenter; and it requires the government to make judgments about what
counts as 'belief.' Both of these disadvantages could curtail participation.
Cooperation does not protect the lone dissenter. In the United States, no child
need hear prayer in school. Under a cooperative government, on the other hand,
children may have to study morality in schools. 170  Likewise, pacifists may be
compelled to participate in celebrations of military victories. 17 1 To cap it all off,
the European Commission of Human Rights has held that a cooperative
government may tax even those who are not members of any belief association to
pay for the 'secular' services provided by a belief association. 172 This problem
has, however, less bite in Iraq than it might elsewhere. Since insecurity prompts
individuals to join together,' 73 there are few lone dissenters at large. 174
Cooperation also requires the government to determine what counts as
'belief.' In England, for instance, a court of appeals had to decide whether the
Church of Scientology was a 'church.' It found that it was not. 175 Likewise, in
167. See, e.g., Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The
Establishment Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 870 (2005)("[lit cannot be the case that establishmentarianism is violative of liberal democracy even as we readily
count many western establishmentarian nations as liberal democracies. Of these two premises, one must
necessarily be untrue. It is the former.").
168. Cf KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 25 (1988)("[T]hough liberal democracy involves a limited commitment to publicly accessible reasons for
decision, it does not entail for the political realm either exclusive reliance on such reasons or an
unqualified acceptance of a narrow form of rationalism.").
169. See WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 40-41. Indeed, many prominent Islamist
reformers use religious reasons to endorse democracy. Abdullah an-Naim, for instance, advocates
revival of the doctrine of naskh. ABDUALLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION
34 (1990) ("[T]hat [principle] would permit applying some verses of Qur'an and accompanying Sunna
instead of others."). Moreover, Islamic reasons may be more accessible than reasons provoked by other
beliefs. Cf Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslims and Accessible Jurisprudence in Liberal Democracies: A
Response to Edward B. Foley's Jurisprudence and Theology, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1227, 1229-30
(1998) ("[T]he internal dynamics of Islamic law affirm the principle of accessibility [of reasons]. There
is no formal church in Islam. Furthermore, no single institution can define the correct view in Islamic
law.").
170. Bernard and others v. Luxembourg, No. 17187/90, 75 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
57(1993).
171. Cf. Valsamis v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 72.
172. Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1262
(2004).
173. NOZICK, supra note 98, at 12 ("Groups of individuals may form mutual-protection
associations.").
174. Cf WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 78-79.
175. See R v. Registrar General ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 Q.B. 697; see also McClean,
supra note 43, at 313; Peter Cumper, Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom, in WITTE, supra note
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Israel the Supreme Court struck down an organizational challenge to a budget
allocation because it found that the plaintiff organization (claiming it had not
received it fair share of 'Haredi ' 176 money) was not Haredi. 177  Such disparate
treatment has been upheld by the European Commission of Human Rights. 78 This
is not, however, an intractable problem. As one commentator has put it, "[t]he
case of the Church of Scientology in Sweden illustrates that there are possibilities
for overcoming traditional inequalities in the treatment of new or minority
religious communities." 179 Indeed, these two disadvantages, especially in the Iraqi
context, are outweighed by the advantages of cooperation.
The Psycho-Sociological Dimension
Citizenship is meaningful only if it "formaliz[es] an emotional attachment to... [a
country and] to its other citizens."' 180  Citizenship is at once a good that is
distributed to particular individuals' and the glue that holds a nation together.
82
As T. Alexander Aleinikoff has put the latter point, "[w]ithout a notion of
citizenship, sovereignty has no home."'183 In the United States, some have argued
that working with belief associations may be the only way for the government to
stem the tide of "individualism in American life and [frustrate] its continuing
potential to threaten other important democratic values."'184 Others have suggested
that our democratic system of government requires a kind of semi-devotional
commitment to our Constitution.' 85 Certainly, in Iraq, if the government were to
cooperate with belief associations, citizens would find at once that peculiar
benefits inured to them by virtue of their citizenship and that they would have
more in common with other citizens than they had thought.
When it is an incident to the distribution of useful goods, citizenship is
valued. This is, of course, a truism. But in Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East
41, at 220 ("The granting of tax exemption to religions ... has been accompanied by detailed
discussion of what actually constitutes a religion .... ).
176. Haredi describes any one of several sects of Judaism.
177. Shetreet, supra note 42, at 444.
178. See Scharffs, supra note 172, at 1266.
179. Thilo Marauhn, Status, Rights and Obligations of Religious Communities in a Human
Rights Context: A European Perspective, 34 ISR. L. REV. 600, 631 (2000) (the Church of Scientology
was recognized by Sweden after a series of constitutional and legislative changes that separated the
Church of Sweden from the state). Likewise, in Spain, a court struck down an attempt by the
government to impose stringent registration requirements on New Religious Movements (NRMs).
Augustin Motilla, Religious Pluralism in Spain: Striking the Balance Between Religious Freedom and
Constitutional Rights 2004 BYU L. REV. 575, 589-90 (2004).
180. Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279, 291 (1994).
181. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of
American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGRATION L.J. 1 (1989).
182. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National
Identity, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1504, 1504-05 (1986); Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in
BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 1-35 (P. Brown & H. Shue eds., 1981).
183. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 9, 14 (1990).
184. Maddigan, supra note 66, at 311.
185. Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the
Constitution?, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113, 119 (1987).
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where goods are scarce,1 86 if membership in a national community offers an
economic leg up, it will be much in demand. Indeed, when "[c]onfronted with a
feeling of impotence against dire economic and social forces, patronage allows
even the lowliest individual the possibility to survive and the recourse to be
heard." 187  But how and why does cooperation make citizenship a conduit for
economic goods? In fact, cooperation encourages the development of local
industries and sub-state groups, which are necessary to the creation of social
capital and to economic advances. 188  Robert Putnam has demonstrated,
commercial development and the existence of trusting and vibrant sub-
communities are inextricably linked. 8 9 And at a broader level Marcus Noland has
found, despite critics' assertions to the contrary, "[i]f anything, Islam promotes
growth."' 90 Under a cooperative government, therefore, individual members of
belief associations are likely to value citizenship more than they would under a
neutral government; as members of belief associations, they will be able to lay
better claim to shares of the growing pie.
Second, cooperation is congenial to Islam. Since the overwhelming majority
of Iraqis are Muslims, if the state is cooperative, rather than neutral, they are more
likely to see it as friend rather than foe. Islam has historically been, and remains, a
communitarian religion. 191 A cooperative government values belief associations
qua belief associations; a cooperative government is communitarian. A neutral
government values belief associations only insofar as citizens value them; it, unlike
a cooperative government, is individualistic.
Medieval Muslim religious thinkers, whether philosophers or jurists, have
described Islam as a set of principles that, if followed, would permit a community
to create the City of God on Earth. Al-Farabi, for instance, said, "there may be a
number of virtuous nations and virtuous cities whose religions are different, even
186. Cf Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and
Persistence (2005) (USC Law and Economics Paper No. 04-21; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C04-
16), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=585687.
187. HISHAM SHARABI, NEOPATRIARCHY: A THEORY OF DISTORTED CHANGE IN ARAB
SOCIETY 21, 46 (1988).
188. lan Ayres & Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic
Development in the Middle East, 30 YALE. J. INT'L. L. 397 (2005).
189. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIvIc TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 167-71 (1993); see also Marcus Noland, Religion, Culture, and Economic Performance 1 (2003)
(KDI Working Paper Series, Working Paper 03-13) (unpublished, on file with the author, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=497702) ("[S]ects ... provide for extra-legal means of establishing trust and
sanctioning miscreants in intragroup transactions,... reducing uncertainty and improving efficiency...
"1)
190. Noland, supra note 189, at 7.
191. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 1 (1982) ("The Islamic
community (ummah) is to be the dynamic vehicle for the realization of the divine pattern."); Ira M.
Lapidus, State and Religion in Islamic Societies, 151 PAST AND PRESENT 3, 9 (1996) ("No distinction
was made between the realm of religion and that of the state."); Jason Morgan-Foster, Third Generation
Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the International Human Rights Movement, 89 YALE H.R. &
DEV. L.J. 67, 82 (2005) ("Social virtue [in Islamic societies] is preeminently collective rather than inter-
individual."); David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate
Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 823 (1993) ("Sovereignty is divine, and therefore
the will of God, even regarding daily matters").
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though they. all pursue the very same kind of happiness. For religion is but the
impressions of these things or the impressions of their images, imprinted in the
soul.' 192  Likewise, AI-Ghazali, although he condemned philosophy for
"abandoning the [traditional] imitation of what is true by embarking on the
imitation of the false,"'193 urged that religion inform government. That neither
philosophers nor jurists questioned the community's need for a religious leader is
telling; as Patricia Crone has summarized:
[T]here were three views on what would happen to the community if
there ceased to be an imam [a religious leader]. The first was that it
would cease to exist altogether .. .The second position was that a
community without an imam ... would lose its public sphere .... The
third view was that the community would continue to exist... because
the imam's functions... would devolve to [other religious scholars].1
94
If religion were a personal matter, neither a religious leader nor religious scholars
would be necessary.
Modem Muslim thinkers hold similar views. Article X of the Universal
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights declares, "The Quranic principle 'There is no
compulsion in religion' shall govern the religious rights of non-Muslim countries.
In a Muslim country, religious minorities shall have the choice to be governed in
respect of their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law or by their own laws."'
19 5
Indeed, as one commentator has explained, "[m]odern Muslim writings on
pluralism .. .particularly stress that pluralism in Islam is conceived within a
framework of unity .... [This] reflects the distinctive attitude of these Muslim
thinkers toward prioritizing society over the individual."'
196
3. Does Cooperation Require Establishment?
I have argued up to this point that the ethics and pragmatics of state and
192. AI-Farabi, The Political Regime (Fauzi M. Najjar, tr.), in MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: A SOURCEBOOK 31, 41 (Ralph Lemer & Muhsin Mahdi eds., 1972) [hereinafter
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY].
193. AL-GHAZALI, THE INCOHERENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS 2 (Michael E. Marmura tr.,
2002).
194. CRONE, supra note 113, at 242-43.
195. Arzt, supra note 53, at 142.
196. Muhammad Khalid Masud, The Scope of Pluralism in Islamic Moral Traditions, in
ISLAMIC POLITICAL ETHICS 135 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 2002) (emphasis added); see MOHAMMAD
HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN ISLAM 8 (Islamic Texts Soc'y 2002) (1999)
("Freedom in Islam finds its meaning in 'belonging to the community and participating with the
people."'). Indeed, this sentiment is at the root of Muslim attitudes toward apostasy. Abu aI-A'la
Mawdudi, a contemporary Islamist, expressed a common attitude when he said, "opposition of different
political parties is ruled out [because] ... [i]n a properly constituted Islamic state, interests and needs
are reconciled." L. CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS 153
(2000). See, e.g., Avempace, The Governance of the Solitary (Lawrence Berman tr.), in MEDIEVAL
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 192, at 127 ("[l]t is, then, evident that every opinion arising in the
perfect city [the City of God] that is different from the opinions of its citizens is false .... ); see also
AHMAD S. MOUSSALLI, THE ISLAMIC QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY, PLURALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6
(2001) ("[A]postasy is distinguished from freedom of (un)belief, since it also implies treason against an
Islamic state.").
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nation building mean the Iraqi government should cooperate with belief
associations. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the ethics and pragmatics of
state- and nation-building require as afirst order matter the establishment of Islam
in Iraq. Yet, in this sub-section I explain that in order for cooperation to stand a
chance, Iraq should establish Islam; establishment is required because it is a
prerequisite to cooperation.197
Indeed, it seems ironic but is probably true that the establishment of Islam as
the religion of the government in Iraq would conduce to cooperation with other
belief associations. 198  When a state has a substantial Christian population, a
government may be agnostic yet cooperative. Because Christianity conceives of
the aims of church and state as distinct-"[t]he aim and function of the secular law
is to secure outward peace and earthly welfare, whereas the law of the churches
serves the preaching of the word of God"199-cooperation often entails separation
of church and government. As one scholar has argued, Christianity makes "claims
of absoluteness" that are "incompatible with and opposed to their integration into
any secular concept. ... 200 However, when a country has a substantial Muslim
population, a government will find it much harder to be agnostic yet cooperative.
Islam is a communitarian religion that purports to govern everyday affairs.
Cooperation with Muslim belief associations requires integration, not separation.
20 1
Moreover, the establishment of Islam as the religion of the government may
conduce to its moderation, permitting greater cooperation. As one journalist has
reported, those clerics who have involved themselves in the drafting of the
Constitution, and who might participate in the subsequent government of Iraq
(including even firebrands like Muqtada al-Sadr), have "compromise[d] their
vision. 2 °2 In England, for instance, Parliament may reject measures passed by the
clerical Synod,20 3 and the Queen has the power to appoint some high church
officials. The same could become true in Iraq. Indeed, Ahmad Moussalli, a
197. 1 do not bear a brief in this article for any particular form of establishment. See supra
notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing different forms of establishment). Certainly, I do not
mean to suggest, to give but one example, that all government employees in Iraq should be Muslim.
Rather, I mean only to argue that Iraq should favor Islam over other religions in some limited respects.
198. This is somewhat counterintuitive. Some have argued that establishment and
cooperation are incompatible. Cf Cumper, supra note 172, at 228 (discussing the treatment of Sikhs in
the United Kingdom). Blasphemy laws in the U.K., for instance, protect only Christianity. Arzt, supra
note 53, at 117 ("Blasphemy is generally defined as denial of the truth of Christian doctrine or the
Bible, using words which are 'scurrilous, abusive or offensive to vilify the Christian religion."'); Haim
H. Cohn, The Law of Religious Dissidents: A Comparative Historical Survey, 34 ISR. L. REV. 39, 91
(2000) ("[Tlhe attack on Christianity or the Scriptures must be calculated to outrage the feelings of the
general body of the community."). Yet establishment and cooperation are compatible. Israel serves as
an excellent example of this truth. Maoz, supra note 42, at 359 (discussing the penalties imposed on
those who malign any belief association).
199. Heckel, supra note 73, at 192 (italics omitted).
200. Id. at 197 (emphasis added). Such is reflected in the biblical aphorism "[g]ive to
Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's." Mark 12:17.
201. As Garlicki has said, "Islam, from its very origins, has been aligned with the state...
Garlicki, supra note 28, at 468.
202. Tavemise & Wong, supra note 6.
203. McClean, supra note 43, at 312.
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prominent Muslim theorist, argues:
[W]hen... religious views are projected as political matters, then there
is a possibility for compromise . . . [f]or . . . politics is the art of the
possible . . . . For instance, when Mu'awiya and Ali looked at their
differences as political in nature, it was possible to find a
compromise.
204
Finally, the establishment of Islam as the religion of the government may be
conducive to the production of negative constitutional culture, also a necessary
prerequisite to effective cooperation. A constitution may be written for many
reasons, not only in an effort to restrict the ability of government to act in certain
ways. For instance, Nathan Brown has argued that many Middle Eastern
constitutions are intended to serve as affirmative grants of power, not restrictive
205limits on government. Yet the Constitution of Iraq should limit the power of the
government if cooperation is to succeed. This idea of limiting the power of
government is what I call negative constitutionalism. And in the Middle East,
negative constitutionalism derives from Islam.
Indeed, medieval Muslim philosophers believed that religion limited the
power of the king. Either the Philosopher King could be trusted to limit his own
power-because of his proximity to the Active Intellect 206 --or religious law would
limit it for him.207 Other early Muslim thinkers articulated a contractarian view of
government. Ibn Khaldun, for instance, distinguished religious law from secular
law by arguing that the former was a chosen restraint and therefore compatible
with assabiyya (communal solidarity). "When the Muslims got their religion from
the Lawgiver (Muhammad), the restraining influence came from themselves."2 °8
Assabiyya, was "the restraining influence that had been Islam., 20 9 When secular
law was imposed unilaterally and, subverting assabiyya, "[came from] the sword"
dynasties began to fall. 2'0 For such thinkers, if the government did not live up to
211its promises, the people had the right to rescind their offer to participate.
Secular law, because it was not contractarian and did not afford the dissatisfied a
right to revoke, was unacceptable; religious law, on the other hand, was endorsed.
204. MOUSSALLI, supra note 196, at 159.
205. BROWN, supra note 25, at 92 (asserting that "[t]he final motivation adduced for issuing
constitutional texts in the absence of constitutionalist intentions was the desire to organize or augment
state authority"). Cf Stephen Holmes, Precommittment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 196 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (noting that
constitutions do not "merely hobble majorities and officials .... [they] also assign[] powers").
206. Al-Farabi, supra note 192, at 37 (explaining, for instance, that only "if it does not
happen that a man exists with [the appropriate] qualifications .... [should one] adopt the Laws
prescribed by the earlier [Kings]").
207. CRONE, supra note 113, at 263 (summarizing that "God was the ... source of
legal/moral obligations").
208. IBN KHALD-UN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY 260 (N. J.
Dawood ed. & Franz Rosenthal trans. 1969) (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 427.
210. Id.
211. Cf NIZAM AL-MULK, THE BOOK OF GOVERNMENT; OR, RULES FOR KINGS 24 ff.
(Hubert Darke trans. 1960).
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Finally, for a third set of early thinkers, the interpretation of religious law was a
task the executive should not and could not shoulder. During the ninth century, the
Caliph al-Ma'mun sought to persuade the Muslim community of the 'createdness'
of the Qu'ran.212 Many jurists resisted. Although the Caliph persecuted those who
refused to accept his interpretation of the Qu'ran, the jurists won out in the end.213
Islam entitled them to hold their own opinions.
However conceived, therefore, whether as an immanent, contractarian, or
jurisdictional limit on government, negative constitutionalism in the Middle East
derives from Islam and Islamic thought. Moreover, such is still the state of affairs
today. For all its faults, the Saudi Arabian monarch is genuinely constrained,214 in
part because the Saudi Basic Law enshrines Islamic law,215 whereas the Moroccan
King is not, in part because the Constitution of Morocco does not.216
B. The New Iraqi Constitution: An Assessment
The new Iraqi Constitution (in its treatment of religion) is congruent with the
privilege paradigm in that it has the potential to facilitate state and nation
construction. First, it ensures that Iraq will cooperate with non-dominant belief
associations. It does so by explicitly extending its protection to all religious
believers, including "Christians, Yazidis, [and] Sabaean Mandeans, 2 17  by
forbidding the establishment of parties that advocate takfir (the practice of
declaring someone an infidel), 218 and by ensuring that believers are free not only to
assert but also to practice their faiths. 219 Like that most cooperative of countries,
the Netherlands, the Iraqi Constitution permits not only Muslims but also
Christians to leave work on their holy days.220 It explicitly affirms that members
of belief associations are entitled to form legally recognized groups to advance
their goals 221 (and notes that Iraq is "keen to strengthen the role of civil society
groups" 22 2). The Iraqi Constitution uses the Arabic word mumarisa - meaning
212. See generally Hayrettin Yucesoy, Between Nationalism and the Social Sciences: An
Examination of Modern Scholarship on the 'Abbasid Civil War and the Reign of al-Ma'mun, 8
MEDIEVAL ENCOUNTERS 56, 62-65 (2002) (discussing the source, development, and role of the doctrine
of the createdness of the Qur'an).
213. See generally Lapidus, supra note 191, at 6-7.
214. Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of
Governance, 30 YALE J. INT'L L 375 (2005). ("[T]he [Saudi] Basic Law treats the king as neither
sacrosanct nor an interpreter of Islam.").
215. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Conundrums in Constitutionalism: Islamic Monarchies in an
Era of Transition, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 183, 192-93 (2002) (highlighting that while the
Shari'a is the Constitution, the Basic Law is merely a nizam asasi (basic regulation)).
216. Mayer, supra note 215, at 208 (describing draftsmanship of the Saudi Basic Law as
"amateurish, muddled" and praising the "clarity" of the Moroccan Constitution).
217. See IRAQ CONST. art. 2(2).
218. Id. at art. 7(1).
219. Id. at art. 10 (holding that "[Ihe. state is committed to maintain and protect their sanctity
and ensure the exercising of (religious) rites freely in them"); id. at art. 40(1 )(a) (recognizing that "[t]he
followers of every religion and sect are free in: the practice of their religious rites, including the (Shiite)
Husseiniya Rites").
220. Cf id. at art. 12(2) (declaring that "official holidays... shall be fixed by law").
221. Id. at art. 40(l)(b).
222. Id. at art. 43(1).
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'practicing' (as in a profession) - in describing the freedoms afforded belief
223
associations.
The words used and promises made in the Iraqi Constitution are significant.
The constitutions of many predominantly Muslim countries do not permit members
of belief associations to perform their 'rites' ;224 and some restrict the freedoms of
religion to members of particular sects.225 For instance, in Brunei "[n]o person
shall be appointed to be Prime Minister ... [unless he] belong[s] to the [Shafeite]
sect., 22 6 Even the Afghan Constitution, promulgated recently with U.S. assistance,
permits ordinary legislation to override religious rights.227  This the Iraqi
Constitution explicitly forbids.
Second, the Constitution's articulation of the place of Islam in Iraq is
conducive to the moderation of Islam and the creation of a negative constitutional
culture (two of the three goals that establishment of Islam might achieve). The
Constitution reads, "[n]o law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of
Islam. ' ,228 The words used for "undisputed rules" are thawabit ahkam. These
words mean something like the "fixed stars as adjudged." By using a derivative of
hakama, the root of the Arabic word for government, the Constitution may suggest
that the meaning of 'Islam' is for the people and their representatives, not the
clerics, to define.229 Indeed, unlike the Afghan Constitution, which requires jurists
to adhere to the "provisions" of Islam, the Iraqi Constitution seems to contemplate
popular involvement in the interpretation of Islam. 230 That religious leaders will
have to enter politics is triply assured-not only by the use of the words thawabit
ahkam but also by the number of legal questions the Constitution reserves for
resolution by subsequent legislation 231 and by the spur to populism offered in
223. Cf NATHAN J. BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE
FINAL DRAFT OF THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 5 (2005), available at
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSeptI6.pdf [hereinafter ANALYSIS AND
COMMENTARY] (underscoring that "[tihe Iraqi Constitution phrases religious rights in communal rather
than individual terms").
224. See, e.g., MOROCCO CONST. art. 6, available at http://confinder.richmond.edu.
225. See, e.g., IRAN CONST. ch. 1, art. 13. (holding that "Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian
Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities"), available at http://confinder.richmond.edu.
226. BRUNEI CONST. art. 4(5).
227. AFG. CONST. ch. I, art. 2, available at
http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
228. IRAQ CONST.art. 2(l)(a).
229. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 3 (asserting that this formula "[t]he
primary [interpretive] burden ... on the parliament"). Some have argued, on the other hand, that the
phrase thawabit ahkam, implies that a decision by a judge (huqm) would prevail were it to conflict with
will of parliament. Mark Levine, And the Winner Is ... The United States?, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-levine/iraqs-constitution-and-_b_6471 .html.
230. See AFG. CONST. art. 3; see also Hamida Ghafour, Afghanistan Gets New Name and a
Constitution, Jan. 6, 2004 (noting that no law under the Constitution can contradict Islamic beliefs),
available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/01/05/l073267970952.html. Of course, choosing the
wrong man or woman to serve as Chief Justice of the Iraqi Supreme Court would render this distinction
moot. Cf Alex Spillius, Afghans to Carry On Stoning Criminals, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 25,
2002 (discussing statements by the Afghan Chief Justice that stoning will continue in order to combat
crime).
231. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 5 (pointing out that significant
details needed to define and protect rights have not been addressed in the Constitution, but are reserved
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Article 5.232 Moreover, when religious leaders have to take account of politics and
popular sentiment, as Ali and Mu'awiya did, their views moderate. Indeed, as
several prominent legal theorists have argued, when a legislature and a court are in
dialogue about the content of constitutional rights, those rights are likely to be
interpreted broadly, 233 and both the legislature and the court are likely to be
responsive to popular sentiment.234
Moreover, the Constitution affirms, "[n]o law can be passed that contradicts
the principles of democracy. 235 It thereby hints at the powerful role Islam and its
principles can play in checking executive and legislative power. As in Saudi
Arabia, where the religion clauses of the Basic Law are the only limits on the
monarch's power, in Iraq, those provisions of the new Constitution that deal with
religion ensure that no leader may rule by fiat.
III. THE PROTECTION PARADIGM
A. The Feminist Critique
The argument I elucidated in Parts I and II, like the Iraqi Constitution, is
subject to criticism. When the government cooperates with belief associations it
empowers the leaders of those associations. Many such associations, however,
subordinate women. In Pakistan, for instance, some families in remote areas have
been known to kill women that have "dishonored them."236 Likewise, under the
Pashtunwali, the tribal code of some Afghans, when one group needs to make
for parliamentary legislation). E.g. IRAQ CONST.art. 4(2) (noting that "[T]he scope of the phrase
'official language' and the manner of implementing the rules of this article will be defined by ... law..
."1).
232. IRAQ CONST. art. 5 ("The law is sovereign, the people are the source of authority and its
legitimacy").
233. Indeed, by using a word that connotes indisputability (thawabit), the Constitution
suggests that laws may only be stricken when their interference with Islam is crystal clear. See, e.g.
infra note 307 (highlighting that Egypt's Supreme Court generally strikes down laws only when there is
clear interference with Islam's fundamental principles and that the Court has tentatively forwareded
liberalism and democracy). But see Mark Levine, And the Winner Is . . . The United States?, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-levine/iraqs-constitution-and-
_b_6471.html.
(suggesting that thawabit ahkam would include morality rules like those in force in Iran). This
interpretation seems implausible because the prior version of the clause used the words mujmuaa aleihi
to describe the rules the Iraqi framers considered 'fixed.' Mujmuaa is a derivative of the word jamaa,
which in turn is a term-of-art in Islamic law that connotes popular participation.
234. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REv.
959, 982-83 (2004); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1950,
1983, 2003 (2003). Cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act on the logic that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is"). See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on
the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410 (1993) (providing a more precise
explanation of why coordinate construction - dialogue between Congress and the courts - has permitted
the elaboration of expansive individual rights).
235. IRAQ CONST. art. 2(I)(b).
236. Rachel A. Ruane, Comment, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women
in Jordan and Pakistan 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1523, 1534-60 (2000)
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restitution to another it may supply them with virgin women.2 37 Finally, even in
Europe churches are able to impose loyalty tests on their employees and affiliates.
In Germany, where churches employ 600,000 people,238 each employee is subject
to dangerous ideological control. 239  The potential for oppression of women is
therefore deepened when the government permits associations to promulgate their
own personal status laws. Cooperation might also be a problem. As Susan Moller
Okin argues, women might be better off if the power of belief associations were
diminished.24 ° If there is no response to this feminist critique then perhaps the
United States cannot and should not endorse either cooperation or establishment.
If women are oppressed, neither a state nor a nation will likely be built in Iraq.
In this Part, I articulate what I call the protection paradigm. The protection
paradigm is a necessary corollary to the privilege paradigm. The protection
paradigm imposes three requirements on government, each intended to ensure that
women, or other members of groups subject to oppression, are able to express
dissent or dissatisfaction from within belief associations. The protection paradigm
flows from the duty Feldman suggests the United States should undertake and that
I have argued the United States must undertake. For the Iraqi government to
establish a state and build a nation, it should adopt not only the privilege paradigm
but also the protection paradigm.
The first requirement of the protection paradigm is that Iraq should adopt a
jurisdictional arrangement that ensures local Muslim courts will have to compete
with national secular courts for business. The second requirement is that Iraq
should offer financial support to those members of belief associations who wish to
express disfavored opinions-e.g. the orthodox Muslim women who want to
explain why the Qu'ran forbids polygamy. Finally, the third requirement is that
the Iraqis should either force each school to offer a modem civics class or establish
a uniform curriculum. Both the civics class and the uniform curriculum are
designed to ensure that all students are willing and able to question the beliefs of
their parents. Before launching into a detailed description of the protection
paradigm, however, I will explain why other responses to the feminist critique are
unsatisfactory.24'
B. Responses to the Feminist Critique
237. Mark A Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women
of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 384-85 (2004). See generally Niloufer Qasim Mahdi,
Pukhtunwali: Ostracism and Honor Among the Pathan Hill Tribes, 7 ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY
295-304 (1986) (discussing the functions of ostracism and honor in Pathan society), available at
http://www.bepress.com/context/gruterclassics/article/1036/viewcontent.
238. Robbers, note 49, at 66.
239. Id. at 67 (describing a Federal Constitutional Court decision upholding termination of a
physician employed at a Catholic hospital who publicly supported abortion); Van Bijsterveld, supra
note 50, 219 (noting that the same is true of the Netherlands, where religious schools may impose
loyalty conditions on their staff).
240. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN? 22-23 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
241. For an excellent recent discussion of the difficulty in responding to the feminist critique
in a developing country, see Pratibha Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 201 (2005).
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Feminists are reluctant to embrace Okin's view.242 Understandably, they may
not want to embrace what Iris Marion Young calls a "progressively individualistic
social ontology. 243  Therefore, they seek compromise. Some feminists believe
that the autonomy of belief associations should be contingent upon observation of
universal rights norms.24 4 Others distinguish between the relationship of a belief
association to the state and to its members; they demand that belief associations be
protected against the state while members be protected against the association.245
Finally, yet others suggest that government should permit belief associations a
margin of appreciation246 in dealing with its members.247 This section analyzes
these responses to the feminist critiques and finds them lacking.
The first two suggestions-what one might call the universal liberal and the
autonomy approaches-are untenable. The universal liberal approach, and by this
I mean any attempt to condition group recognition on the ability and desire of the
group to respect liberal principles, 248 is imperialistic 249 and orientalist.250 As Rama
Mani has said, "[i]f ideas and institutions about as fundamental and personal a
value as justice are imposed from the outside without an internal resonance, they
may flounder, notwithstanding their assertions of universality. 251  Indeed, one
candidate who stood in the January Iraqi election powerfully remarked, "[i]f I
believe my right is to wear this black robe and you ban it, then my right has been
242. In fact, some argue that these are 'unavoidable costs' of multiculturalism. But see
Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of Jurisdictional
Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 404 (2000) [hereinafter The Puzzle] (arguing that such a
notion "overessentializes the distance between minority group cultures and the dominant state culture,
thereby denying the inevitable interplay between them").
243. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 28 (1990).
244. See, e.g., Okin, supra note 241, at 23.
245. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS
883, 894-96 (1989).
246. 1 borrow this term from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The
Court affords national governments a 'margin of appreciation,' and will not invalidate national action
without good reason. For instance, even though the French policy of discriminating between gay and
straight parents who wish to adopt plausibly violates the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the Court did not strike it down. See Thomas Willoughby Stone, Margin of
Appreciation Gone Awry: The European Court of Human Rights' Implicit Use of the Precautionary
Principle in Frette v. France to Backtrack on Protection from Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271 (2003).
247. Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation:
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 391,
450-51 (2001).
248. Ayelet Shachar calls this the "re-universalized citizenship" approach. The Puzzle, supra
note 243, at 403 (2000) (arguing that such an approach "fails to provide room for women (or any other
group members facing systemic risk of internal maltreatment) to maintain their cultural identity").
249. See, e.g., Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority
Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 483 (2002).
250. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1195-96
(2001).
251. RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR 49
(2002)
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taken away. 252
The autonomy approach, and by this I mean respect for belief associations
only to the extent that such respect does not interfere with the autonomy of any
individual member,253 is somewhat, but not much, more difficult to impugn. First,
it reifies culture, suggesting that it cannot be changed but only 
corrected.254
Second, it is unjust; it deprives female members of 'oppressive' belief associations
the option of preserving their concomitant membership in the belief association
and in the nation.255 As one female scholar of Islam has commented, "[t]he
majority of Muslim women who are attached to their religion will not be liberated
through the use of a secular approach., 256 And third, it may in fact perpetuate the
oppression of women. In a fascinating study of Shari'a courts, Amira Sorbol has
found, "[o]ne of the main reasons for the change in treatment of women in modem
Shari'ah courts is .... [the] replace[ment][of flexible traditional methodology] by
particular laws suitable to nineteenth-century Nation-State patriarchal
hegemony."2 57
The third approach-the margin of appreciation approach-has more merit.
Israel has implemented the margin of appreciation approach. As Ran Hirschl
describes it, "the Israeli state ... [works to ensure] the right of each community to
demarcate its membership boundaries. 258 While it is possible that this approach
would satisfy both feminists and multiculturalists, especially if it is true that
Islamic law is more feminist than it appears,259 the margin of appreciation
252. Hannah Allam, Iraqi women divided about whether to vote conservative and lose
rights, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE, Jan. 11, 2005.
253. The autonomy approach differs from the universal liberal approach in as much as the
autonomy approach does not presume that all women want, for instance, to throw off veils. However,
as soon as a group member expresses dissatisfaction with group norms, any rights the group may hold
fade away.
254. Volpp, supra note 251, at 1192 ("These assumptions [that third-world cultures are
sexist] preclude the understanding that minority cultures, like all cultures, undergo constant
transformation and reshaping."). Madhavi Sunder has persuasively disputed this idea. Madhavi Sunder,
Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 507-508 (2001) [hereinafter Cultural Dissent] ("[W]hile
anthropology evolves, law remains stuck in a century-old understanding of culture. Premised on a
theoretical model that posits and normatively prefers cultural pluralism across groups, law seeks to help
groups maintain their cultural distinctiveness.")
255. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399 (2003) [hereinafter
Piercing the Veil]; Catherine A. Hardee, Note, Balancing Acts: The Rights of Women and Cultural
Minorities in Kenyan Marital Law, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 712, 717 (2004) ("[T]he right to choose one's
cultural or religious beliefs is part of maintaining human dignity.").
256. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1,3 (1997) [hereinafter Islam, Law and Custom].
257. Amira Sonbol, Women in Shari'ah Courts: A Historical and Methodological
Discussion, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 225, 232-33 (2003). Indeed, that study found that in pre-modem
times, "women came to court for all sorts of reasons. For example, women went to court to record
marriagecontracts and added any conditions they pleased." Id. at 248.
258. Hirschl, supra note 131, at 1840.
259. See Joelle Entelis, Note, International Human Rights: Islam's Friend or Foe?, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1251, 1281-87 (1997); Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the
Treatment of Women: An Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 311 (1995);
Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Law of Pakistan from a Woman-Sensitive
Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 287 (1997).
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approach is probably inadequate. When a practice of a belief association is not
within the margin of appreciation, women and other in-group minorities must still
decide between their identity as member of the belief association and their identity
as member of the nation, just as they must when the government adopts an
autonomy approach. Madhavi Sunder, who has made an extensive study of
Afghan women, says, "[the Afghan women's] campaigns present powerful
critiques of current law, which offers women a right to religious freedom (on
leaders' terms) or to equality (within the public sphere), but no right to both. 26 °
Others advocate a twist on the margin of appreciation approach, what one
might call the multiple identity approach. If a government permits a variety of
sub-state groups, including belief associations, significant autonomy, the argument
goes, individuals will be able to construct their identities out of many component
parts and the chances of oppression will be reduced.261 If they are able to draw on
resources by virtue of some component parts of their identities, they will not face
subjugation.
In Iraq there are two axes of potential additional identity formation: tribal and
federal. First, as in Kenya, where "it is not uncommon for a Kenyan to have
multiple identities ... to consider herself a Kenyan, a Masaii, and a Christian, 262 it
is not uncommon for an Iraqi to be at once an Iraqi, a Tikriti, and a Sunni.263
Second, Iraq is, and will likely remain, a federal state; so just as an American may
consider herself an Iowan or a Californian (or indeed an Angelino), so an Iraqi
might consider herself a resident of Anbar or Basra.2 4 However, it is not clear that
feminists would want to encourage the reification of tribal identities. Nor is it
clear, as Peter Schuck has noted, that "[flederalism [will] resolve the political
conflicts generated by diversity . . . [instead of] deepen[ing] and harden[ing]
them, 265 especially since federal division in Iraq more or less tracks sectarian
division. 266 Although there are nuances to this argument-inasmuch as external
pressure may exert more leverage over some component parts of identities than
over others (e.g. no province is likely to want to do without foreign
assistance) 26 7-the multiple identity approach seems little better than the liberal
universal or autonomy approaches.
C. The Design of the Protection Paradigm
260. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1404 (emphasis added).
261. As Peter Spiro has argued, "members of a disadvantaged ethnic group may also be
members of religious, corporate, and other communities that command substantial resources of their
own." Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 632
(1997).
262. Hardee, supra note 256, at 720.
263. On the continuing importance of tribal law throughout the Middle East, and in
Palestine, see lfrah Zilberman, Palestinian Customary Law in the Jerusalem Area, 45 CATH. U.L. REV.
795 (1996).
264. See Schauer, supra note 182, at 1516 (discussing how Americans consider themselves
at once 'black or white,' 'rich or poor,' and American).
265. Schuck, supra note 117, at 212.
266. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Bush Hails Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at Al(discussing low turnout in the three mainly Sunni provinces).
267. Peter J. Spiro, supra note 262; see also AFG. CONST. art. 7.
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None of the four responses described in the prior section seems adequate.
Rather than focusing on the rights of women and the rights of belief associations,
the better way to blunt the feminist criticism is to focus thoroughly on the rights of
women within groups. That is what the protection paradigm strives to do.
26 8
Women will be secure within belief associations when they have a prominent
role in defining the rules of such associations .269 They must be 
allowed exit. 270
Yet they must also be allowed to remain and redefine the group. The goal of this
section is to articulate "a normative theory of cultural change that allows
individuals a way of imagining autonomous and egalitarian lives outside the
secular, bureaucratic freedom of traditional liberalism [and within groups].",27' To
that end, this section argues that if Iraq complements the privilege paradigm
described in Part II with a system designed to ensure that dissident voices within
belief associations are heard, the feminist critique will not obtain, and the United
States will be able to recommend and commend cooperation, establishment, and
the Constitution itself.
Rather than only resolving disputes when a dissenter brings a particular claim
to the attention of a government decision-maker, the protection paradigm aims to
encourage dissent.27 2 It does so first by using innovative jurisdictional structures
to discipline the courts of belief associations; second by affording members of
belief associations an affirmative right to resources; and third by promulgating
rules for schools that encourage open-mindedness. If dissenters are to be able to
make their voices heard in meaningful ways, belief associations will welcome
complaint and dissenters may feel sufficiently empowered to complain.
1. Jurisdictional Tinkering
Non-traditional jurisdictional structures may provide incentives for the courts
of belief associations to welcome complaint. A court may have independent
268. As I was thinking through the protection paradigm, I drew substantially on the
innovative work of Madhavi Sunder. See Cultural Dissent, supra note 255. Her work persuaded me
that "cultures now more than ever are characterized by cultural dissent," id. at 498, and that those
dissenters require protection. Nevertheless, her work on how best to protect cultural dissent is
remarkably thin. She argues that a "state [sh]ould refuse to reinforce a culture's traditional boundaries
where leaders cannot control the norms of the community on their own." Id. at 558. But of course it is
difficult to determine who is 'in' and who is 'out.' Cf id at 558 n. 353 ("The cultural dissent approach
to freedom of association law I describe deals exclusively with internal challenges made by a group's
members."). For instance, this might require parsing the formal rules and informal norms of expressive
associations to determine the legitimacy of dissenters' claims to membership. Additionally, her
argument is premised on the assumption that dissenters will be confident enough to speak out.
269. See generally The Puzzle, supra note 243; Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1404;
Hardee, supra note 256, at 718 ("[A]II members of a culture should be part of the voice that speaks for
the group.").
270. Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right to Freedom
of Religion or Belief 2000 BYU L. REv. 967, 970 (2000) ("[F]reedom means that women should be
free, at any time, to explore other beliefs and to ... avoid or openly reject a religion or belief if so
inclined.").
271. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1462.
272. But cf Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1466 ("[L]egal decision makers [sh]ould
cease privileging the norms of religious elites and [sh]ould instead place elites and dissenters on an
equal footing - but only when a specific dispute is brought before a decision maker.").
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jurisdiction, it may be subordinate to another court, it may share jurisdiction with
another court over some aspects of a case, but not others,273 or it may exercise
some fourth, ill-defined form of jurisdiction. If the courts of belief associations
exercise independent jurisdiction, dissenters will have no recourse. There will be
no reason for the belief association to welcome complaint.
Hierarchical systems are better. If a court knows that its decisions are subject
to review, it is more likely to welcome complaint. However, a hierarchical system
pits government against belief association, and is subject to the criticism suggested
of the universal liberal and autonomy approaches. Indeed, in the United States for
instance, the Supreme Court will not intervene to resolve religious disputes
precisely because it knows that to do so risks giving grave offense.274 As Frederick
Mark Gedicks has put it, "courts may not resolve disputes among the members of
religious organizations when doing so requires interpretation of the organizations'
dogma or theology, even though courts are free to resolve internal disputes in
secular organizations. ' '275
Fragmented systems-where several courts share jurisdiction over a case-
are better yet. This is the design perfected in the United States. In the United
States, state supreme courts remain the ultimate arbiters of state law, yet the
Supreme Court may review their decisions for compliance with the federal
Constitution. Likewise, the Supreme Court tends to defer to the judgments of
Indian courts unless doing so would result in harm.276 The courts of belief
associations under such a system would be disciplined because they would fear
that if they did not decide cases in responsive fashion, plaintiffs would frequent
rival courts (e.g. in the U.S. context state court plaintiffs would move to federal
court or vice-versa). Such a system "critically challenges discriminatory and
subordinating internal norms and practices by delegating to the group's [courts] the
power to decide whether to risk alienation and exit by upholding [oppressive]
traditions. 277 Indeed, as one commentator has noted, in states like Kenya, where
there are many ways to marry,278 "women [have a] way to express their
preferences and to amplify their voice. 279 The threat of exit is powerful.
Israel has such a fragmented design, and it has worked more or less as
scholars might have predicted 280 : the secular and religious courts have competed
273. These are what Shachar calls hierarchical and fragmented jurisdiction. The Puzzle,
supra note 243, at 409-411.
274. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280
U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
275. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 1071, 1074 (2002).
276. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 717 (1989).
277. The Puzzle, supra note 243, at 421.
278. Hardee, supra note 256, at 72 1.
279. Id. at 731.
280. For instance, Moussa Abou Ramadan has explained, "[w]ithin [any given legal] field,
there are struggles among the [interpretive] agents themselves .... The agents thereby contribute to the
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with each other for business, and each court has been responsive to the concerns of
those before it. After the passage of Amendment No. 5 to the Family Court Laws,
"disputes concerning custody could be adjudicated in either civil [Israeli] or
Islamic courts."281 Although "the Supreme Court [could] only overturn religious
court rulings which [we]re ultra vires by reason of a denial of natural justice or in
exceptional cases .. .the Supreme Court [wa]s authorized to interpret [religious
law]., 282 This meant that when cases presented questions of both Shari'a and
secular law, both Shari'a courts and the Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction.
Because the Shari'a court knew the Supreme could reverse their decisions on
Islamic grounds, it began to hand down increasingly liberal and Islamic opinions.
As Abou Moussa Ramadan has explained, "[t]he Shari'a Appeals Court [sought] to
restrict the intervention of the High Court of Justice. 283 This is the advantage of a
fragmented system. It promotes competition between court systems.
Consider another example: Malaysia. Although there is no appeal from the
decisions of the highest Shari'a courts in Malaysia, each federal state is entitled to
set up its own religious courts, and Malaysians are well able to 'jurisdiction shop.'
Some state Shari'a courts permit a man to marry a second wife upon the
declaration of a qadi, whereas others require a full hearing with both the present
and future wife present. 284 Not only have Shari'a courts modernized and
liberalized-they now use procedural rules that are derived in part from the
principles of Islam (including, for instance, the requirement that two witness testify
to an out of court statement) and in part from colonial law (including, for instance,
permitting women to testify)285-but they have done so by updating Islamic law.
286
Ayelet Shachar has suggested a fourth alternative. She believes that
'transformative accommodation' systems might be better than hierarchical or even
287fragmented systems. According to Shachar, such systems are more flexible than
fragmented systems.288 Rather than assigning one court jurisdiction over, say,
ongoing process of change and maintenance of the structures of which they are a part." Moussa Abou
Ramadan, The Transition from Tradition to Reform: The Shari'a Appeals Court Rulings on Child
Custody, 26 FORDHAM. INT'L L.J. 595, 620 (2003). Likewise, Ayelet Shachar has said, when there is no
jurisdictional 'monopoly,' "decision-makers .... benefit from a simultaneously cooperative and
competitive situation ... [and they have] to work that much harder to win the support of their
constituents." AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 121 (2001) [hereinafter MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS].
281. Ramadan, supra note 281, at 596.
282. Id. at 622.
283. Id. at 623.
284. Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the
Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233, 285 (1994) [hereinafter Horowitz I].
285. Id. at 270-71; see also Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic
Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42. AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 545 (1994) [hereinafter
Horowitz 2] ("[D]ecisions of ... appellate bodies are replete with secular methods of statutory
interpretation, applied even to sacred sources, with common law incrementalism.").
286. Horowitz 2, supra note 286, at 559.
287. See MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 281, at 118.
288. She maintains, "transformative accommodation .... guarantees that [both] the state
[and] the group .... [must] abandon their perfectionist and maximalist jurisdictional aspirations."
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 281, at 143.
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family law, and the other court jurisdiction over claims to equality, both courts
could have concurrent jurisdiction over family law, but over different features of
any given case. Shachar offers the following example:
Assume that a divorcing couple has entered marriage through a
religious solemnization. This couple has no children and the only issue
that they have to resolve is how to divide the $10,000 that they
accumulated during the marriage. Suppose that it were clear that the
state distributive rules would award one-half of the sum to each spouse.
This property allocation rule would kick in as soon as proof was
established that the couple has been separated for a minimum period
(perhaps one year), even if the parties are still considered married by the
group's demarcation rules .... [W]ithout the separation of demarcation
and distribution sub-matters, this divorce could degenerate into an
unnecessary legal battle where group-specific gender-biased status
demarcation rules are used to achieve material gain. 289
She suggests, if only a religious court may solemnize divorces, the husband,
who alone may be legally entitled to seek that divorce, might hold out for more
than his fair share of the $10,000.290 Yet if the "woman ... [can] pursue basic
capacities and freedoms in the wake of a separation [under secular rules], some of
her husband's exclusive power will be dissolved., 291 Like fragmented systems,
'transformative accommodation' systems may discipline the courts of belief
associations. But unlike fragmented systems, a transformative accommodation
system permits a group to retain total control "over sub-matters [the group] views
as crucial for cultural survival. 292
Although I agree with much of what Shachar says, I think she goes too far.
The protection paradigm requires the adoption of a fragmented system, not a
transformative accommodation system. I can best explain my skepticism of
transformative accommodation by first describing the jurisdictional structure of
Pakistan. In Pakistan, Shari'a courts have exclusive jurisdiction in certain subject
areas.2 93 Their decisions in other subject areas are amenable to review by the
Supreme Court.294 The problems are, first, that no one is quite clear on who has
the power to declare laws un-Islamic (i.e. unconstitutional), and second, that it is
even less clear who gets to decide who has that power.
By a series of presidential orders promulgated between 1980 and 1985, the
Pakistani government endowed the Federal Shariat Court with the power to hear
289. The Puzzle, supra note 243, at 420.
290. MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 281, at 134 ("[Tjhis divorce could
degenerate into an unnecessary legal battle where group-specific gender-biased demarcating-status rules
are used to achieve material gain.").
291. Id.
292. Id. at 144.
293. See Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 759, 772 (2004).
294. See id at 771.
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constitutional/Islamic challenges to laws.295 The court has used this power, for
instance, by ruling un-Islamic laws permitting banks to charge interest on their
loans.296 However, the Supreme Court has fought back. It has argued that the
Federal Shariat Court may not rule constitutional provisions un-Islamic; the Court
suggests this is foreclosed by Article 203-B of the Pakistani Constitution. 97
Shari'a judges have offered a sur-reply. They contend that the incorporation into
the Constitution of the Objectives Resolution, which says that Islam is the
'Grundnorm' of society, authorizes them to declare any law, whether statutory or
constitutional, un-Islamic.298
So return to Shachar's hypothetical. What if the husband were to challenge
the state rule requiring equal division of marital assets? Who would decide
whether the rule comported with religious principles? Moreover, if there was
dispute on this question, who would decide who could decide? A fragmented
system, because it has clearer lines of authority, is a better choice for a nation like
Iraq, already embroiled in considerable chaos.
There is no reason to think that a fragmented system would be inimical to
Islam. In fact, there are four juridical schools of Muslim legal scholarship299 and
these schools developed and grew strong by competing with each other for
adherents. Originally, there were "no less than nineteen schools of fiqh (fiqh
madhhabs). 30 0 As George Makdisi has put it:
[D]isagreement (khildj) leads to disputation (mundzara) the purpose of
which [was] to defend the validity of one's own opinion ... and to
convince the opponent of its validity, or reduce him to silence by
destroying his thesis ... legal opinions were pitted against one another,
and the best-defended opinion survived. °1
He calculates, "[s]ome five hundred schools of law . .. disappeared at or
about the beginning of the third/ninth century." 302  Even once the number of
madhab had been narrowed to four, those four remained in stiff competition with
each other. As Chibli Mallat has explained, the Egyptian sultan "Baybars (ruled
295. Charles H. Kennedy, Repugnancy to Islam-Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in
Pakistan, 41 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 769, 772 (1992).
296. See id at 783-84; Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between
Classical Transactions and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81, 126 (2000).
297. Kennedy, supra note 295, at 772.
298. Id. at 780.
299. See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 144, at 138. If you count Shi'ism, there are five such
schools.
300. Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC
L. & CULTURE 27,38 (2002).
301. George Makdisi, The Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic Religious
History, 10 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 1,3 (1979).
302. Id. see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Globalization and Jurisprudence: An Islamic
Law Perspective, 54 EMORY L.J. 25, 43 (2005) ("[T]he subsequent development and spread of these
schools has been influenced by a variety of political, social, and demographic factors. These factors
sometimes resulted in shifting the influence of some schools from one region to another, confining them
to certain parts, as is the case with Shi'ah schools at present, or even the total extinction of some schools
like those of al-Thawri and al-Tabari in the Sunni tradition.").
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from 658-675 & 1260-1277) ... appointed qadis ... along strict quadripartite lines
of the judiciary." 30 3 The situation remains unchanged today. Indeed, "in most
other countries, several schools co-exist, and the integration efforts attempted by
the state [are] carried out through the process of takhayyur (choice, eclecticism),
and not through the imposition of any one school. ' 3°
Competition is not only theoretically congenial to Islam, but it has also been
adopted in Muslim countries. Indeed, Egypt has a de facto fragmented jurisdiction
system. In 1980, Egypt amended its Constitution and began to require that laws
conform to the Shari'a. If a citizen believes that a law is un-Islamic, he may bring
suit in the Supreme Court.30 5 On the one hand, the Supreme Court must consider
such suits carefully, since many jurists believe that only they are competent to say
what the Shari'a requires; 30 6 the Supreme Court has acknowledged, its
"interpretations of the Qur'an are supposed to be validated by the agreement of the
[Islamic] schools. 30 7 On the other hand, the Court may not strike down laws
willy-nilly since to do so would be to reject the people's will, expressed by the
legislature; Supreme Court justices are aware of the "malleability of the [Shari'a]"
and are leery of anointing themselves all powerful arbiters of Egypt's laws. 30 8 The
Court, therefore, has struck "a balance between 'normative Islamic principles' and
Egypt's 'democratic character.' 30 9  Disciplined by the Islamists and the
legislature, it has sought to retain its constituents by rendering opinions that are at
once Islamic but also liberal. In fact, it has taken the same tack as that taken by the
Shari'a courts in Israel.
Consider first the claim of a woman whose husband refused to pay the
alimony required by the Personal Status Laws of Egypt because he believed the
Personal Status Laws were un-Islamic. The Court said, "legislation should not
contradict those Islamic Sharia principles that [are] derived from definitive sources
and which representf] the religious foundations of Egyptian society., 310 The Court
explained that it would "make sure that the peremptory provisions of the Shari'a
are applied on all laws .... [and also] make sure that ijtihad [interpretation of
303. Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field (Part
.1), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 209,270 (2004).
304. ld. at 275.
305. See Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global
Trend, 15 CANADIAN J.L. &JURISPRUDENCE 191, 197 & n.21 (2002).
306. Clark Benner Lombardi, Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt:
The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modem Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 115(1998) ("Islamists generally insist that only professional Islamic scholars can properly identify and
apply the principles of the Sharia. Such scholars alone have the training required to interpret properly
the Qur'an and Sunna."). In fact, one prominent law professor has proposed that Egypt empanel a
number ofjurists to review Supreme Court interpretations of Islamic law. Id. at 116.
307. Id. at 116.
308. Id. at 122.
309. Scott Kent Brown 11, Note, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A Comment on Protecting
Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 BYU L. REv. 1049, 1085.
310. Hatem Aly Labib Gabr, The Interpretation of Article Two of the Egyptian Constitution
by the Supreme Constitutional Court, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT 217, 221 (Kevin Boyle & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1996)
(emphasis added).
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Shari'a] in the non-peremptory provisions are achieving the interest of the
people., 311  In one fell swoop, the Court combined Islamic and democratic
principles. It defined Shari'a for constitutional purposes as only those Islamic laws
the Egyptian people could agree upon. As Clark Benner Lombardi has put it, the
Court held, "fundamental principles are [those] laid down in the Qur'an and [that]
have been accepted, at least implicitly, by all schools of Islamic law over the
years. 312 Only laws that are incongruent to those principles are to be struck down.
On another occasion, the Egyptian Supreme Court "was presented with the
issue of the constitutionality of Article 11 of the 1929 Law on the family, which
gives the judge the right to grant a woman a divorce upon a determination that
reconciliation with the spouse is impossible. 313  The plaintiff argued that the
Qur'an establishes that divorce is a male prerogative.3 14 The Court agreed.31 5
Nevertheless, the Court contended, "there [is] another determinate rule in the
Quran that [is] relevant to the dispute, the rule requiring the appointment of an
arbitrator from each spouse's family to reconcile the spouses in the case of
dispute." 316 Because the Court did not believe the principle the plaintiff had cited
to be one to which Egyptian society had acquiesced, it refused to strike down the
law.
2. Affirmative Rights
Jurisdictional tinkering is not enough. Eric Mitnick has explained, "a model
premised on individual agency in a multicultural context must, at a minimum,
provide for the sort of social, educational, and financial resources at-risk group
members require to recognize, and take advantage of, jurisdictional options. 317
Madhavi Sunder likewise notes, "[i]n many cases, communities may lack serious
dissent. 3 18 Additionally, "practical and cultural constraints... may indeed be so
deep and powerful as to block individuals from exercising any choice., 319 Finally,
Sally Engle Merry has said, although "state law penetrates and restructures other
normative orders through symbols and through direct coercion .... at the same
time ... non-state normative orders resist and circumvent penetration or even
capture and use the symbolic capital of state law." 320 The protection paradigm,
therefore, requires the government to take affirmative steps to ensure that those
who wish to dissent from within their belief associations are able to do so. This is
311. John Murray & Mohamed EI-Molla, Islamic Shari'a and Constitutional Interpretation
in Egypt, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM 507, 513 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif
eds., 1999) (emphasis added).
312. Lombardi, supra note 307, at 97.
313. Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1139 (2004).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Eric J. Mitnick, Individual Vulnerability and Cultural Transformation, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1635, 1660 (2003) (book review).
318. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1467.
319. Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for
Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1553 (1991).
320. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 869, 881 (1988).
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the second component of the protection paradigm. In this sub-subsection, I argue
that the Iraqi government should financially support dissenters.
I argue that a government adopting the protection paradigm should adopt a
variant of the model of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
proposed by Owen Fiss. Fiss has urged that instead of "a shield, . . . [as] a means
of protecting the individual speaker from being silenced by the state," 321 courts
should understand the First Amendment as endowing individuals with the ability to
make affirmative claims on the state, demanding the use of state power to "resist
the pressures of the market and thus to enlarge and invigorate our politics. '322 A
government adopting the protection paradigm should ensure that those whose
voices are marginalized within a belief association are vested with the right to
make affirmative claims on state resources in order to permit them better to raise
their voices and visibility.
323
I will offer two examples to explain what I mean. First, consider the history
of campaign finance reform in the United States. Sensible to the fact that many
believe "restrictions on the speech of some [are permitted] in order to prevent a
few from drowning out the many,, 32 4 the U.S. government has permitted "massive
subsidies of a wide variety of sorts. 325 These subsidies are intended to facilitate
the popular participation that is the necessary precondition to democracy.32 6 Even
Robert Post, who in general has been skeptical of Fiss's interpretation of the First
Amendment, admits "the possibility that the achievement of democratic values
may, in discrete circumstances, require carefully bounded structures of managerial
control. The narrow objective of such structures should be the correction of
conditions which cause disabling citizen disaffection. 32 7 These subsidies have
taken several forms. To name two, the government has required TV stations to be
even-handed in the distribution of airtime328 and the government continues to fund
the political campaigns of candidates who might not otherwise be able to afford to
321. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1986).
322. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781, 794 (1987).
323. See Shane O'Neill, The Equalization of Effective Communicative Freedom: Democratic
Justice in the Constitutional State and Beyond, 17 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 83, 87 (2004)
("The flow of undistorted communication that originates in [the] 'wild' public sphere must be protected
by a set of constitutional rights that makes equal citizenship socially effective for all .... [including]
[]equal access to the sources of communicative power.")
324. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
For a recent description of the equality goal, see Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance Reform and the Social
Inequality Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955 (2004). Justice Stephen Breyer is its most prominent
champion on the bench; he has said of campaign finance reform, it "helps to maintain a form of
government open to participation .... [by] democratiz[ing] the influence that money can bring to bear."
Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002).
325. Guy Pessach, Media, Markets, and Democracy: Revisiting an Eternal Triangle, 17
CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 209, 212 (2004) (quoting C. Edwin Baker).
326. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1948-49 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH (1993)).
327. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (1993).
328. Cf Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding right of
reply regulations imposed on television broadcasters).
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329
Consider next the case of Mukhtaran Bibi, a woman gang-raped in Pakistan.
Her case might not have come to light if not for the New York Times. 330  But
international donors have delivered significant money to her. She has started a
school. 33 1  Furthermore, "[s]he has also emerged as a ferocious spokeswoman
against honor killings, rapes and acid attacks on women." 332  If a government
wishes to adhere to the protection paradigm, it, rather than Mercy Corps, should
deliver funds to dissenters.333
3. Liberal Education
Not only should a government establish a competitive jurisdictional structure
and help dissenters express themselves, it should also open the eyes of belief
association members to their options. This requires the government to assist
potential dissenters in developing "the necessary cognitive skills that allow them to
evaluate critically a variety of competing claims. 334 As Leila Sayeg and Adriaen
Morse note, "no single right is as important as education, as it alone forms the
basis of women's ability to affect Muslim society and determine for themselves the
correct application of Islam to their needs. 335 Sunder concurs. She says, unless a
state ensures "women equal access to educational ... institutions ... at all levels"
women are unlikely ever to exercise their right to complain about repressive belief
association behavior.
336
There is no doubt that those most capable of criticizing themselves and others
are those who are at once culturally grounded3 37 and yet who have also been
exposed to a variety of opinions at an early age.3 38 Most agree that an effective
329. See generally John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 591 (2005).
330. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, The 11-Year-Old Wife, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at
A21; Nicholas D. Kristof, A Free Woman, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 413.
331. Nicholas D. Kristof, Raped, Kidnapped and Silenced, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at
A23.
332. Id.
333. Nor is this a pipedream. With United States prodding, the TNA has funded and assisted
in the development of new radio stations, television stations, and other media outlets. See Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq, at 8 (Oct. 2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d2005l0l3iraq.pdf (noting that "[flrom no independent
media under Saddam, there are now 44 commercial television stations, 72 commercial radio stations,
and more than 100 independent newspapers and magazines that represent all points of Iraq's political
spectrum")
334. O'Neill, supra note 324, at 93.
335. Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An
Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 311, 324 (1995).
336. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1468.
337. Yael Tamir suggests, "individuals are members of particular human communities.
Outside such communities they cannot develop a language and a culture, or set themselves aims." YAEL
TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 7 (1993).
338. In a state that has adopted the privilege paradigm, the concern of Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg that "schools' seemingly objective appeal to individual reason plainly inculcate[s] the
values of individual choice, toleration, and reason -- values that, rather than transcending culture, derive
from and reproduce a liberal, pluralist society," simply has no bite. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew
A Circle That Shut Me Out ": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106
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school system is the best way of developing citizens who share these two
characteristics. 339 As Meira Levinson has explained, the state must endow children
with "a plurality of constitutive desires and values .... [Such] enables individuals
to question any particular value without suffering a wholesale loss of identity. 34 °
But what kind of school system could an overtly Islamic state adopt that would do
so? The answer I give is that the protection paradigm requires the Iraqi
government either to ensure that all schools teach what we might call "civics" or to
establish a uniform national curriculum, permitting each school to deviate from
that curriculum only to the extent necessary to teach the religion it supports.
Two additional points are important at this juncture. First, religious schools
are not necessarily incapable of serving a liberal educational function.341
Rosemary Salomone has argued, "[t]he assertion that [a] religious orientation
impairs [one's] ability to participate effectively in the democratic process or to
engage in republican deliberation is purely speculative. 342 Second, the notion of
universal education is entirely compatible with Islam. 343  In fact, Imam Shafi'i
once said that a ruler has a duty to ensure that all the people in a province are
HARV. L. REV. 581, 612-13 (1993). Stanley Ingber's concern, that "[c]hildren are unlikely to
internalize the value of and a belief in individual autonomy if their schools appear to trivialize and
ignore it systematically," is a deeper one. Stanley lngber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of
Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 73 (1987). However, at
root, the state must privilege "the . . . political community." Stephen Macedo, Transformative
Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism,
POLITICAL THEORY 26 No. 1, at 59 (1998).
339. Schools are effective arena for the communication of ideas. See MARK G. YUDOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 213 (1983) ("[P]ublic schools are a communications theorist's dream: the
audience is captive and immature ... and a system of rewards and punishments is available to reinforce
the messages."). Moreover, as Bruce Ackerman has explained, "[a] system of liberal education
provides children with a sense of the very different lives that could be theirs ... [while insuring that
their] need for cultural coherence [is met]." ACKERMAN, supra note 164, at 139; see also MEIRA
LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 31 (1999) [hereinafter THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION] ("[A] coherent, attractive conception of autonomy must incorporate .... a commitment to
the development and preservation of cultural coherence ... [and] develop[ment] ... of a wide range of
faculties."). Cf Amy Gutmann, Children Paternalism, and Education, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 9 No. 4, at 349 (1980) (the state must ensure that children are "capable of choosing between
alternative conceptions of the good and of participating intelligently in democratic politics")
340. THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION, supra note 340, at 33; see also Amy Gutmann,
Civic Education and Social Diversity, ETHICS 105 No. 3, at 557 (1995) ("At issue here is not mere
exposure to different ways of life for the sake of giving children more choices among good lives but,
rather, teaching future citizens to evaluate different political perspectives that are often associated with
different ways of life.").
341. As Rosemary Salomone has explained, we should not assume that "accommodating
religious views in the curriculum would necessarily compromise liberal autonomy, democratic
citizenship, or republican deliberation." Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values:
Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 215 (1996). In fact, nationalizing and
centralizing the madrasa school system would create many positive externalities. Some madrasas in
peripheral provinces, little supervised by national authorities, are havens for fundamentalists and
terrorists. Children who went to state-run religious schools, rather than such madrasas, might be less
susceptble to terrorist recruiters.
342. Id. at 216.
343. Asma Afasaruddin, Religious Education and the Liberal State: Muslim Views on
Education: Parameters, Purview, and Possibilities, 44 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 143, 178 (2005) ("[T]he
project of regenerating and revamping faith-based schools in Islamic societies-existing alongside
secular schools-is quite feasible based on religiously-mandated core principles.").
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educated.3 " Moreover, the Afghan Constitution recognizes that education should
be universal.345 A recent empirical study has found that in Lebanon, Muslim girls
have received more education than their male counterparts.
346
But how would either version of the protection paradigm look? Consider first
the contemporary experience of Germany (and several other European states).
German public schools teach religion where "religion classes are treated as
ordinary subjects. They are taught on equivalent terms as other classes, are totally
integrated in the school's curriculum and schedule, and are graded like other
subjects. '347 As one commentator has summarized, at some schools "grades for
religion classes are not listed on school report cards. [At other schools,] grades are
listed but do not affect graduation or further education, and [at yet a third set of
schools], religion grades are treated the same as grades for other subjects. 348 The
"[s]tate authorities are entitled to request reports and information from schools and
have the power to lustrate the operation of the school., 349 Thus, in this version,
Iraqi public schools could each teach their own brands of religion, alongside a
uniform secular curriculum.
Consider next madrasas in Pakistan. The Pakistani government has slowly
begun to press madrasas to teach what we might call civics. 350 While this has
provoked some resistance, the plan is entirely consistent with the history and
development of madrasas in Pakistan and throughout the Middle East.
Historically, "madaris [madrasas] ...were used to propagate state ideology.
3 51
More recently, as Pervez Hoodbhoy has explained, madrasas have been "an
instrument for forging a ...national identity. 352 In this version, Iraqi schools
would teach civics classes in addition to giving religious instruction.
IV. THE NEW IRAQI CONSTITUTION: A SECOND ASSESSMENT
I have praised the Iraqi Constitution because it ensures the government will
cooperate with belief associations and because it establishes Islam (a necessary
corollary to cooperation). Yet Iraq should also cleave to the protection paradigm.
First, the Iraqi government should interpret the ambiguous provisions of the
Constitution describing the future judicial structure of the country to provide for
fragmented jurisdiction. Article 90 requires that members of the Supreme Court be
344. Islam, Law and Custom, supra note 257, at 37. Likewise, Abu Hanifah argued in
favor of broad education. Id.
345. AFG. CONST. art. 44.
346. Mandana Hajj, Islam and Female Education: Evidence from Individual-Level Data *3-
4 (unpublished) (on file with the author and available through SSRN).
347. Garlicki, supra note 28, at 505.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 497.
350. See generally International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the
Military (29 July 2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org.
351. Aziz Talbani, Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education,
COMP. EDUC. REV. 40, No. 1, at 71 (1996).
352. PEREZ HOODBHOY, IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FOR SCIENCE IN PAKISTAN, IN ISLAM,
POLITICS AND THE STATES 174 (Asghar Khan ed., 1985); id at 76.
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"experts in (Islamic Jurisprudence) and law." 353 From the Arabic, it is not clear
whether all judges must be experts in both kinds of law or whether some must be
experts in Islamic law and some in secular law. The distinction is an important
one. If it is the former, the court could look something like the Egyptian Supreme
Court. If the latter, it would look more like the Pakistani Supreme Court. The
former is far preferable.
In crafting and implementing legislation establishing the Federal Supreme
Court, Iraqis should take care that the Supreme Court shares jurisdiction with local
courts, both religious and regional. Article 39 provides, "Iraqis are free in their
adherence to their personal status according to their own religion, sect, belief and
choice, and that will be organized by law.' 0 54 Some have read this to mean that
Shi'a, Sunnis, Christians, and members of other belief associations are free to
organize independent court systems.3 55 The Iraqi government should endorse this
reading and strive to spur competition between sectarian and federal courts in ways
that conduce to the moderation of both. Iraq, as Afghanistan has not, should
ensure that multiple religious viewpoints can successfully be presented in court.
3 56
The Constitution also permits Iraqi provinces to establish their own legal
systems.357 Indeed, the Kurds are apparently in the process of drafting a regional
Constitution. 58 This is to the good, and the government should encourage it.
Indeed, the establishment of regional legal systems and courts may provoke the
kind of jurisdictional competition that has arisen in Malaysia. As one Malaysian
scholar has explained by way of example, when "the Gombak district Syariah
[court] declared that the male privilege of pronouncing unilateral divorce upon his
wife . . . was permissible even if effected by short messaging service . . . [the
353. IRAQ CONST. art. 90.
354. Id. at art. 39.
355. See ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224 ("[lI]t is clear that individuals must be
offered the option of following sectarian law.")
356. The new Afghan Constitution "requires that courts render decisions based on
'provisions of the Hanafi jurisprudence' when 'there is no provision in the Constitution or the laws with
respect to a case."' Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly
Muslim Countries *I I (unpublished) (on file with the author and available through SSRN). An
analogous provision of the 1964 Afghan Constitution was one the roots of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Hanafi jurisprudence is particularly strict; see Bharathi A. Venkatraman, Islamic States
and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Are the Shari'a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1970-71 (1995), and it had
no competition, see Travis, supra note 9, at 22 (the 1964 Constitution "required Afghan court[s] to
render justice in cases not controlled by the Constitution or statutory law 'by following the basic
principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shari'a of Islam"')
357. See ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224 ("By regional standards, the list of
those areas that are exclusively the responsibility of the central government is remarkably short."). Cf
United States Institute of Peace, Iraq at a Juncture (Sept. 2005)
http://www.usip.org/newsmedia/releases/2005/1005-iraq.html (quoting Peter Galbraith to the effect that
Shia leaders initially negotiated for an Iranian-style Guardian Council, despite objections over the use
of the court solely as a vehicle to ensure legislative alignment with Islam; as a compromise, Galbraith
noted, the Court was stripped of its power to review regional legislation.)
358. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224. Cf IRAQ CONST. art. 116.
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decision inspired] both ire and endorsement., 359  Just as Malaysian courts have
imposed different conditions upon a husband who wishes to take a second wife,
"from relatively more demanding to almost negligible, 360 so courts have freely
chosen either to adhere to the Gombak precedent or reject it. Iraq should foster
this kind of competition between regional courts; it is a recipe for dissent within
belief associations.
36 1
Not only should it strive to promote jurisdictional competition, but the Iraqi
government should also vest the Supreme Court with a responsibility to promote
ijtihad (independent interpretation of Islamic precepts).362 The Iraqi government
should also explicitly grant the government the ability to refer constitutional
questions to the Supreme Court363 since it is generally true that as the number of
constitutional references goes up so too does judicial responsiveness to rights
364assertions.
Second, the Iraqi government should take affirmative steps to insure that
(potential) dissenters have all the resources they need to express their opinions.365
Although Article 36 of the Constitution affirms the freedom of the press and of
opinion, it leaves open how these freedoms are to be realized.366 The legislature
should immediately offer subsidies to those wishing to express disfavored
opinions.3 67 This is not a farfetched proposal. Iraq is one of the few countries in
the world that requires that a certain proportion of its elected officials be
women.368 Iraqis clearly have no aversion to principled affirmative action.
Third and finally, Article 34 affirms the importance of a national educational
scheme, but provides no details. The Iraqi government should, as soon as
practicable, pass a law either establishing a uniform national educational system,
359. Jacelyn Ling-Chien Neo, "Anti-God, Anti-Islam and Anti-Quran ": Expanding the
Range of Participants and Parameters Over Women's Rights and Islam in Malaysia *33 (unpublished)
(on file with the author and available through SSRN).
360. Id. at *56.
361. Cf supra text accompanying note 286.
362. ALGERIA CONST. art. 171.
363. Cf AFG. CONST. ch. 7 art. 121.
364. Cf Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Politics in France and Germany *203-207 (on file
with the author).
365. Other Middle Eastern countries have constitutional or legal provisions that impose such
a requirement on the government. See, e.g., SYRIA CONST. ART. 45 (requiring the government to insure
that women have "all opportunities enabling them to fully and effectively participate in the social,
cultural, and economic life.")
366. IRAQ CONST. art. 36(2).
367. The Iraqi government eliminated what had been Article 44 of the August draft from the
Constitution it presented to the people on October 15. Cf ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note
224. That article provided, "[a]ll individuals shall have the right to enjoy all the rights mentioned in the
international treaties and agreements concerned with human rights." If possible, the substance of this
article should also be restored, as lawsuits brought by human rights groups may be an effective way to
insure that dissenters within belief associations are given the resources and opportunities the protection
paradigm counsels that Iraq assure them. Cf Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1229 (2005) (suggesting that discrete and insular minorities have turned to international law
and norms to secure vindication of their rights in national courts).
368. IRAQ CONST. art. 48(1).
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as the Afghans have, 3 69 or requiring all schools, whether public or private, to teach
a civics class.
The Iraqis need not do this alone. These measures are preconditions to United
States support for the Constitution (and to U.S. withdrawal); the United States
should use its influence to ensure that Iraqis put them into effect. Indeed, this
article has argued that the ethics and practicalities of state-and-nation-building
require the United States to endorse efforts by the Iraqi government to cooperate
with belief associations. It has also sought to demonstrate that this commitment
entails a corollary endorsement of establishment. But the privilege paradigm is
meaningless without insuring protection for those who might dissent from within
belief associations. That should be the next U.S. priority.
369. See supra text accompanying note 340.
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
BY JAMES C. KRASKA*
"How we decide and who gets to decide often determines what we decide."'
I. THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ORTHODOXY
2
Nearly one hundred years ago, Roscoe Pound discerned between "law in the
books" and "law in action." 3 Roscoe Pound was a Dean and Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School. Prophesying the emergence of legal realism, Dean Pound
was a pragmatist who was concerned that lawyers were hiding behind deductive
models disconnected from reality. Pound also was a botanist. He understood that
the sciences had long since abandoned such deductive modes of thinking in search
of inductive reasoning and empirical verification. The "law in the books" was too
often at variance with how the law actually unfolds in the real world.
4 Lawyers
were admonished by Pound not to behave as "legal monks," disconnected from the
real world.5 Dean Pound worried about the application of unrealistic models of law
and how they confounded the attainment of social justice in the United States, but
his wisdom carries valuable lessons for today's international lawyers and
policymakers who are busily constructing the global legal architecture of
. An earlier version of this article was prepared for the capstone Seminar in Contemporary Legal
Thought, The Rule of Law: Controlling Government, at the University of Virginia Law School, while
the author was assigned there on active duty to earn the Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree. The seminar
was led by Professor John Norton Moore, and the author is deeply indebted to him for his invaluable
review and comments, and especially for his generous mentoring on the rule of law. The views
expressed in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. The author may be reached at
james.kraska@gmail.com.
1. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 2002-2004: DECISIONS FOR EARTH:
BALANCE, VOICE AND POWER (2004), available at http://governance.wri.org/worldresources
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4
-
pub-3764.html.
2. Inspiration for this article began during the author's participation with the Academic Council
on the United Nations System & American Society of International Law (ACUNS/ASIL) Workshop on
International Organization Studies at the University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia and the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa, Aug.-Sep., 2002.
3. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 12-15 (1910).
4. Id. at 25.
5. Id. at 36.
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sustainable development.
There is no doubt that Dean Pound, who dedicated a career to realizing socialjustice in action, would today be disappointed to cast his gaze at the widening gulf
between carefully designed international economic, environmental and human
rights regimes on the one hand, and the appalling human condition and
environmental degradation that pervades much of the globe, on the other. This
article is devoted to better understanding the variance between international policy
and law "in the books" and how those international rules are developed and
applied "in action" within the sphere of global sustainable development.
Understanding the nature of this disconnection produces important insights and has
critical implications for global governance.
This article rejects the widely accepted international development orthodoxy
and supports a new discourse emerging in development thought that argues that
democracy promotion is the best way to achieve sustainable development. Part I
reviews the origins of the prevailing orthodoxy of sustainable development. Part II
critiques the application of the orthodoxy and introduces fresh narratives and
empirical perspectives on sustainable development grounded in human freedom
and democracy. Part III concludes with a call to embrace the emerging democratic
development norm.
Since World War II, world development has been captive to an orthodox
approach emanating from two levels of analysis-at the international level, a
Marxist-derived world systems model, and at the state level, an authoritarian
regime model. World systems analysis contributes to the orthodoxy by suggesting
under-development is a function of world systemic or structural defects that
"cause" under-development. It originated in Marxist theory and goes by the names
dependency theory, neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism. At the state level of
analysis, modernization theory has celebrated the development virtues of
authoritarian regimes.
Global environmentalism, which harbors a deep skepticism, and even
hostility, toward economic growth and international trade, has reinforced the
dependency theorists' attack on the world system. The result is a powerful
international front that has sabotaged the development prospects of many under-
developed states. The state level of analysis has contributed to the orthodoxy by
positing that authoritarian regimes are better at producing development, when in
fact, they are not. The conventional state-level analysis holds that development is a
chaotic and unsettling affair; dictatorships are better at managing the period of
unstable transition. Democracy, which is also disruptive, can only come later, if at
all. This article suggests that the impact of these two approaches-one focusing on
the world system and the other on the state-has been counter-productive, actually
serving to defeat the goals of sustainable development for many of the poorest
nations. A far better approach-centered on democracy-has begun to emerge.
This alternative, challenging the conventional paradigm, should be nurtured and
promoted.
The orthodoxy has a controlling influence on national and international
approaches to sustainable development. Despite the avalanche of empirical
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research supporting the connection between democracy and development,
changing the consensus is not easy. The international law, global rules and
international programs that have sprung from the orthodoxy-the "law in the
books"-have failed Dean Pound's real world test of "law in action."
An alternative model of development focusing on democracy requires a
radical reassessment at the state level of analysis. Liberal democratic regimes
better promote vertical and horizontal economic development, and do so while
better managing and preserving the natural environment. Moreover, these systems
generate prosperity and stability that create the foundation for sustainable
development. The emergence of democracy in one country tends to facilitate trade
and economic growth regionally. A political system that promotes freedom spins
off positive externalities of peace and stability that have a positive impact on
neighboring states. Perhaps most importantly, democracy as a modality for
development departs from the prevailing approach by promoting a genuinely
liberal agenda that celebrates the centrality of individual human freedom, dignity
and self-actualization as the central goal of development.
Today we are in the midst of a new normative campaign on sustainable
development within the United Nations and around the world, comparable to the
campaign for decolonization in the 1960s and anti-apartheid in the 1980s
6 It is
particularly critical now that we shape the architecture of sustainable development
in a way that best achieves the objectives of economic growth, social development
and a secure environment. After thirty years of passionate effort, much well-guided
but plenty misguided, as well as some success and no small amount of abject
failure, it is worthwhile to take stock of the ideas that gave birth to sustainable
development, trace their evolution, and most importantly, to test their assumptions.
The interdisciplinary challenge of sustainable development has remained bounded
by prevailing normative political and economic assumptions marked by
ambivalence and hostility toward solutions based on human freedom. These
accepted conventions have weathered the collapse of the Soviet Union, including
the moribund notion of central planning. Over the last decade, however, the
growing appreciation for the productive power of human freedom and democracy
has frayed the orthodoxy. Consequently, now is a promising time in which to
engage in a fresh conversation to redefine modalities of sustainable development.
A. Development Paradigms and the Global Orthodoxy
This is the story of how the progressive idea of freedom as the dispositive
ingredient in human development slowly crept from the corners of polite debate on
sustainable development to challenge the orthodox view. Along the way, unlikely
allies including Democratic and Republican presidents in the United States, the
Pope, a labor leader in Poland and a dissident in Burma, all converged to engage
6. Mark F. Imber, The Environment and the United Nations, in THE ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 138 (John Vogler & Mark F. Imber eds., 1996); See Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. G.A. Res. 1514, Dec. 14, 1960 (Doc
A/RES/I 514/XV) at 66-67 (1960) and International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, Nov. 30, 1973 (Doc A/RES/3068/XXVIII) at 75-77 (1973).
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the orthodoxy and enlarge the idea of democracy as a development norm.
Ironically, the very global institutions that should have been at the forefront of
this campaign were absent from its inception and are even now not entirely
committed to the enterprise. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the United Nations (UN) only recently have begun to nod in the right
direction. Their progress has been slow. Much of the hard work and immense
resources funneled through these organizations over previous decades has been
wasted, entwined in the grip of banal approaches to development.
Historically, the discourse of sustainable development has congregated
around a number of discrete themes springing from environmentalism and central
economic and social planning. The environmentalists' view that economic growth
is destructive to the environment was popularized by the Club of Rome study,
Limits to Growth.7 Grandiloquent French and German "meta-narratives" which
sought to reshape man and redesign society remain in vogue in modernization
theory, even after the fallacy of central planning lay threadbare. The redistribution
of wealth from the North to the South is a product of world systems theories, and
still a common feature in sustainable development.
The remainder of Part I discusses the history and maturity of the orthodoxy of
sustainable development. Part II turns away from the orthodoxy to explore the
interrelationship between democracy, economic growth, ecological sustainability
and regional security. The research suggests not just casual linkages among them,
but strong correlations, and even causality. Some of this research is new and
exciting and not well known; some is older but perhaps mostly ignored by many
because it does not complement the accepted paradigm. Liberal democratic
government is the fulcrum on which these concepts pivot.
The conclusion, Part III, advocates unapologetically for embracing economic
and political models of human freedom in pursuit of development. It is imperative
that we seek universal acceptance of the democratic development norm. It will be
especially challenging to dismantle the orthodoxy. The global sustainable
development movement is populated with a membership that shares a common
mind-set. Challenges to the conventional wisdom are excluded or rationalized as
mistaken. This article joins the few voices beginning to emerge from outside the
paradigm; thus, it has somewhat the quality of an outsider looking in.
While research suggests that everyone is susceptible to falling into the
cognitive coherence trap, what political scientists call "groupthink, ' '8 asking people
to "consider the opposite" reduces this tendency significantly.9 This article adds
value to the debate on sustainable development by asking those tied to the
orthodoxy to consider an alternative vision. This case for action is the functional
7. DONELLA H. MEADOWS, ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF
ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972) [hereinafter LIMITS TO GROWTH].
8. See generally Irving L. Janis, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES (2 d ed. 1982).
9. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making,
71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 544 (2004).
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opposite of much of the prevailing thought. In the words of the eminent historian
Arthur Schlesinger, there is value in intruding upon the "curious atmosphere of
assumed consensus."' 0 Doing so better informs the discourse and draws choices
into greater contrast.
By comparing the research about poverty and economic growth, the
environment, and regimes and war, we begin to give shape to an inductive model
for realizing sustainable development. That model shows that regime type is the
best indicator of a country's ability to progress toward sustainable development.
Liberal democratic regimes constitute the most effective systems for achieving
sustainable development.
B. Realism, Liberalism and Waltz "s Images
This analysis is necessarily interdisciplinary, involving a conversation among
comparative politics, international politics, economics and law. Louis Henkin
remarked once, "[t]he student of law and the student of politics.., purport to be
looking at the same world from the vantage point of important disciplines. It seems
unfortunate, indeed destructive, that they should not, at the least, hear each
other."'" Integrating international relations theory and comparative politics into
international law offers particular value.
Over the last decade, the prospect that interdisciplinary scholarship can
produce durable findings seems to have produced more clarion calls for such
collaboration than actual examples of combined methodology.
12 Working across
methodological and conceptual lines of demarcation poses special challenges,
causing some to abandon the task altogether. Prominent scholars say the divide
cannot be bridged. In mapping the terrain, Professor Greenberg of Stanford Law
School refers to the two opposing world views in international law and
international relations and suggests they cannot be reconciled.'
3 According to
Greenberg, liberal internationalism, which emphasizes the rule of law and the
centrality of the individual, and realism, which focuses on the struggle for power,
are mutually exclusive.14
Realism informs the foundation of international relations, and Greenberg
argues it is the polar opposite of liberal internationalism, to which international law
10. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE
FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 
37
(2004).
11. Louis Henkin, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (New York: Praeger,
1968).
12. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335-411 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205-239
(1993); TOWARD UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TOOLBOX I (Charlotte Ku and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., Acad. Council on
the U.N. Sys. Rep. & Papers, 1998), available at http://www.acuns.org.
13. Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1802 (2003).
14. Id.
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is secured.' 5 Combining the two approaches is akin to intellectual warfare, with
scholars on both sides willing to ignore or ridicule the other. Professor Greenberg
writes, "[t]hese opposing visions suggest a fundamental dialectic in human thought
and culture. This dialectic is our inheritance. It cannot be 'resolved'."' 6 This article
takes exception to that fatalistic conclusion. Both realism and liberalism reflect
some part of the complex world in which we live. In the cause of global
sustainable development, the risks of inaction, or of failure, are so great, and the
opportunities and potential for success so compelling, that we are driven to
leverage both perspectives.
One of the chief influences of realist political theory to this charge is found in
Kenneth N. Waltz's profound exegesis on the causes of interstate conflict, Man,
the State and War.' 7 Waltz approached his study of locating the cause of war
through three "images" or lenses-the individual, the state and the international
system. 18 According to Waltz's first image, the primary locus of the most
important causes of war resides in the aggressive, selfish and foolish nature of
man.
Second image analysis attempts to discern whether the causes of peace and
war are products of good and bad states and their governing regimes. 20 From the
vantage of Waltz' second image, the focus of progressive policy should be on
changing the present condition or character of states and their governments.
Sovereign states make their way in an anarchic world system, and Waltz's
third image posits that warfare is an inevitable consequence of their journey. In
classic third image analysis, Thucydides wrote that the cause of the Peloponnesian
War was, "the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm this inspired in
Sparta," which made war inevitable. 21 Although Waltz invested heavily in the third
image to explain international warfare, he also argued that no single image was
adequate to understanding international problems of war and peace. 22  It is
particularly fruitful to keep in mind Waltz's heuristic of three images in
considering the matter of global sustainable development.
Since World War II, many government bureaucrats, academics and activists
involved with Third World development 23 occupied the intellectual ramparts of the
15. Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?,5 INT'L SEC. 5, 8 (1999).
16. Greenberg, supra note 13, at 1804. Professor Greenberg prefers sustaining a "plurality of
voices" in order to fend off realist critiques of liberalism to preserve the dominant "efficacy and
influence of liberal international law discourse." Id. at 1803-04.
17. KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR 12 (1954).
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 165.
20. Id. at 114.
21. THUCYDIDES, BOOK I, para. 23, § 6, reprinted in THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 16 (Robert B. Strassler, ed., 1996).
22. WALTZ, supra note 17, at 158-161.
23. This article focuses most closely on areas that comprise the "Third World." The term "Third
World" ("Tiers Monde" in French) was initially coined by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy in
1952 as an analogy from the "third estate." The third estate described the commoners in France before
and during the French Revolution. The term was adopted by twenty-nine African and Asian nations at
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second and third image of Waltz's paradigm. Immediately after 1945, and
extending into the contemporary period, development thought moored to the world
system level of analysis and the state level of analysis. Together, the two images
have comprised the theoretical template for international development.
Although the second image is the most fruitful level of analysis for
sustainable development, most conventional second image analysis has gone
astray. Second image analysis acknowledges the controlling function states and
regimes play in the process of sustainable development. Government institutions
and the decisions of governing elites are strongly correlated to development. The
error in the conventional second image approach, howe ,er, is in the belief that
authoritarian regimes are preferential to (and certainly no worse than) democracies
in achieving development.
It is startling to recall that for decades this was the more liberal component of
the development orthodoxy. This approach was espoused by modernization
theorists in the 1950s and 1960s based on the apparent development successes
inside the communist bloc. It is disconcerting to note that this image has grown
more influential since the fall of the Berlin Wall, first because of the rise of the
Asian "tiger" economies. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese economic
miracle emerged as the most recent example; its greatest spokesperson is Lee Kuan
Yew, the former leader of Singapore.
The third image relies on a world systems approach to development. The
individual theoretical approaches within the world systems paradigm center on
neo-Marxism, neo-colonialism and structural dependency. Ironically, each of these
approaches emerged from Western thought, although they imbibe a rejection of
other Western approaches to development. Systems theories seek to explain
development in terms of powerful social or historical systemic forces that shape
the global structure, producing development for some countries while precluding
development in others. These approaches are popular in the Third World because
they commemorate a sense of independence, and assuage feelings of anger and
resentment left over from the experience of colonization. The dispiriting status of
permanent victim, however, has made this approach unsatisfying, even if going
through the motions has proved therapeutic.
The intellectual confluence of second and third image dynamics forms the
durable, but amazingly counterproductive, global sustainable development
orthodoxy. While third image theoretical architecture has been overbuilt, solutions
based on second image analysis have been woefully underexploited. The obstacles
of economic growth, poverty reduction and ecological well-being are
the Conference in Bandung, Java, Indonesia, in 1955, and came to denote those nations neutral to the
ideological divide during the Cold War. See The Asian Language, ASIAWEEK, Mar. 5, 1999, at 70.
Because the nations of the Third World encompass an immense diversity of culture, economic
development, and natural resources, as well as political systems, the term "Third World" is an
incomplete, if not inaccurate description. Sometimes, however, the term is useful shorthand for
describing nations with greater similarities than difference, particularly in relation to the more
developed nations. On the Third World as a collective, see generally, John Ravenhill, The North-South
Balance of Power, 66 INT'L AFF. 731 (1990).
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fundamentally political; they properly reside within the second image and can only
be fixed by democratic state regimes.24
C The World System Image-Dependency Theory
The term "international development" did not acquire solid currency in
foreign policy until World War II. In thinking about the aftermath of the war at a
reception in June of 1942, U.S. Vice President Henry A. Wallace remarked to
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov that industrialization and
improvement of nutrition in "India, China, Siberia and Latin America" would
prove to be one of the greatest challenges of the post-war order.2 5 Molotov
concurred. 26 But international development never became a shared East-West
enterprise; the East went its own way. While the theory and practice of
development was shaped not by the East-West divide, but by the North-South
relationship, the terms of the debate-autocracy and world system
dependency-were inherited from Karl Marx.2 7
In Europe, the field of development economics emerged from the post-war
work of intellectuals such as Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurkse, Tibor
Scitovsky and Albert Hirschman. These men were influenced largely by Keynsian
economics and ascribed to a general disdain for commercialism and markets. Their
ideas were infused with a romantic illusion of the potential for rapid economic
development through authoritarian planning. Consequently, early approaches to
international development coalesced around government-directed solutions. The
major focus was finding prescriptions for market failure, and analysis tended to
ignore the catastrophic effects of authoritarian government in sabotaging
development. 28 This early work laid the foundation for the ambivalent view of
regime type and institutions of governance which informs sustainable development
to this day.
At the time, there were a few dissenting voices, but they were pushed aside.
In 1951, for example, the UN published the UN Report on the Economic
Development for Under-developed Countries.29 The publication, which was
roundly criticized after its release, declared flatly that, "economic progress will not
occur unless the atmosphere is favorable to it. The people of a country must desire
24. LARRY DIAMOND, STANFORD INST. FOR INT'L STUDIES, CTR. ON DEMOCRACY, DEV. & THE
RULE OF LAW, MOVING UP OUT OF POVERTY: WHAT DOES DEMOCRACY HAVE TO DO WITH IT?
1(,2004), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20669/Moving_Up Out of Proverty.pdf.
25. JOHN TOYE & RICHARD TOYE, THE UN AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: TRADE,
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 17-18 (2004).
26. Id.
27. H. W. ARNDT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 36-39 (1987). Arndt
argues that it was another historical figure, Sun Yat-Sen of China, who first used the term "economic
development" in the modem sense of the term when he published his book, THE INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA in 1922. Id. at 16.
28. GERALD W. SCULLY, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7 (1992).
29. U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. AFFAIRS,, MEASURES FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNDER-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, U.N. DOC. ST/ECA/10, U.N. Sales No. 1951.II.B2 (1951). -.or a
contemporaneous analysis of the report, see S. Herbert Frankel, United Nations Primer for
Development, 66 Q. J. ECON. 301-326 (1952).
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progress, and their social, economic, legal and political institutions must be
favorable to it.30 The claim that "economic progress depends to a large extent on
governments of appropriate administrative and legislative action," 31 was
immediately attacked as implying that a lack of success in development displayed
a lack of social will.
32
From the late-1940s until well into the 1990s, neo-Marxist models had a
powerful and often controlling impact on development thought. These models
largely focused on problems within the international system; one consequence was
the emergence of international development law.3 3 The first major milestone in this
progression was the UN Convention on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in
1964.34
The conference was held in Geneva, and was attended by governments
representing three billion people. In classic Marxist metaphor, it was characterized
as a summit of collective bargaining between the nations of wealth and poverty.
35
For many, UNCTAD "exploded the myth that all countries are economically
equal. 36 The cause of underdevelopment lay outside, not within the borders of
individual states. Underdevelopment reflected basic structural differences in
economic and social organization, development and bargaining power; the system
should accommodate those differences in order to iron out inequalities. The theory
was that fundamentally, the global system was based on domination and
exploitation between industrialized countries and developing countries. Since the
global system is organized and enforced through international law, if only
international law could be changed, then the system could finally begin to heal.
Once the cause of underdevelopment is removed, development naturally will
occur.
As would become typical of the mega-conference, little was actually
accomplished at UNCTAD 37 other than the venting of pejorative references to a
"new order" by Third World representatives." 38 Undersecretary of State George W.
Ball, the U.S. representative to the conference, privately lamented, "less-developed
countries have been the victims of a high-class confidence game conducted in
elegant economic jargon."39
Lavish theories of dependency and world systems support the belief that
30. U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. AFFAIRS, supra note 29, 23.
31. Id. at . 39.
32. See Frankel, supra note 29 at 325-26.
33. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 15
(Francis Snyder and Peter Slinn, eds., 1987) (exploring trends in the theory and practice of development
law) [hereinafter SNYDER & SLINN].
34. G.A. Res. 1995, U.N. GAOR, 19" Sess., 1314th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/1995 (1965).
35. In Geneva, Global Collective Bargaining, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1965, at 25.
36. Diego Cordovez, The Making of UNCTAD: Institutional Background and Legislative History,
I J. WORLD TRADE L. 243-44 (1967).
37. TOYE & TOYE, supra note 25, at 205.
38. Id at 201.
39. Id..
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international economic dependence breeds the "development of
underdevelopment. ' '40 Dependency theorists argue foreign economic interests
inside the developing state and foreign capital inflows into the developing state
originating from the outside distort balanced and independent development.41 The
theory was captive to ideology which assumes foreign ownership of production
constitutes foreign control of the country, and that such ownership automatically
illustrates a global structure of domination by the core on the periphery. 42 Still,
dependency theory rose to dominate discussions in the 1960s and 1970s. If these
models were not completely accepted among Western political economists, they
were not firmly rejected, either. John Kenneth Galbraith wrote in a study in 1962
that, "... the most prominent fact about the very poor country is not that it has free
enterprise industry or socialist industry, but that it has no industry at all." 43
Dependency began to lose its allure only toward the end of the 1970s, as the
passage of time provided greater data for statistical analysis which disproved the
hypothesis that foreign capital impedes economic growth. 44
During its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s, the ideology was angry, fueling a
particularly vitriolic and messianic approach which held capital markets and the
developed world in bitter contempt. The acrimony of the North-South divide in the
UN General Assembly was leveraged 45 in order to gain concessions from the
developed world. The result was an emphasis on paternalistic, global socialism
which reached its pinnacle with the campaign to establish a New International
Economic Order (NIEO).
The NIEO was a product of the Group of 77 (G77), which was established
when developing countries signed a compact at the end of the first session of
UNCTAD to express unity and begin a dialogue to address structural inequalities
46in the global economy. In 1967, G77 adopted the Charter of Algiers at a
preparatory meeting for the second UNCTAD conference, which was scheduled
for New Delhi in 1968. The Charter set forth the grievances of G77, and included a
plan of action to restructure world commodity pricing, development financing and
the expansion of world trade.47 For the first time, the Charter of Algiers sought
discrimination in the global trading system wherein less advantaged states would
40. Christopher Chase-Dunn, The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development
and Inequality: A Cross-National Study, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 720, 720 (1975).
41. See generally ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR
REVOLUTION (1969); Chase-Dunn, supra, note 40.
42. Christopher Chase-Dunn,, Reply to Stumpp, Marsh and Lake, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 604, 604
(1978).
43. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 18 (1962).
44. Mark Stumpp, et al., The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development: A
Critique, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 600, 603 (Aug. 1978).
45. Howard R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, WORLD POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
231 (1965).
46. Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switzerland, Jun. 15, 1964, available
at http://www.g77.org/Docs/Joint%20Declaration.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
47. First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77: The Charter of Algiers, Algiers, Algeria, Oct.
10-25, 1967, available at http://www.g77.org/Docs/algier%/7E 1.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
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be granted more favorable terms.
In 1970, the UN General Assembly announced the Second Development
Decade, invoking apartheid, colonialism, and the "occupation of territories of any
State ' 8 as the essential obstacles to development. The resolution reiterated the
language included in the Charter of Algiers that primary responsibility for
development resided with the developing states, and it adopted some sensible
measures, such as encouraging the reduction in tariffs among developing
countries.49 The resolution, however, contained other provisions for developed
states to transfer, by 1972 and annually thereafter, 1% of their gross national
product to the developing world.50 Those states that were already meeting that
quota were encouraged to envisage an even greater direct transfer of wealth. A
special session of the General Assembly was conducted in April and May of 1974,
at which member states were called upon to study the problems of "raw materials
and development." '51 That session produced the Declaration on the Establishment
of the NIEO.5 '
With the NIEO declaration, the feeling that the international system was in a
state of severe imbalance was running at a feverish pitch. The solution was to erect
a new order based on sovereign equality, equity and interdependence, "irrespective
of their economic and social systems." 53 The declaration affirmed that vestiges of
racism, apartheid, foreign occupation and "neo-colonialism in all its forms" served
as the main impediments to development. 54 Announcing unity among developing
countries as a source of new global power, in "all fields of international activity,"
the declaration also called for full and equal participation of developing states in
formulating and applying decisions of the international community.
55
The declaration also demanded preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for
developing countries in international economic cooperation. 56 The proponent
governments, mostly dictatorships and other sundry autocrats, declined to make
distinctions among regimes and economic systems, unapologetically valuing the
right of "every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems most
appropriate for its own development, and not to be subjected to discrimination of
any kind as a result."
57
The principles set forth in the NIEO resolution of 1974 were codified by a
48. Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, G.A. Res. 2626,
25th Sess., 1883d mtg., 5 at 40, U.N. Doc. A/8124 (1970).
49. See id. at I .
50. Id. at 42.
51. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6th
Special Sess., 2229th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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complementary Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.58 The charter put
NIEO into operation by permitting nationalization and expropriation of multi-
national corporate property, with compensation paid in accordance with "all
circumstances the [expropriating] State considers pertinent., 59 Controversies over
expropriation would be settled by the tribunals and the domestic laws of the
nationalizing state. Further, every state inherited a right to benefit from advances
in science and technology to promote its economic and social development, which
meant that productive economies should subsidize those that were unproductive.
61
Finally, the charter mandated that developed nations expand measures to provide
special and more favorable treatment to developing states.
62
For all its indignant protest, many felt that the declaration and charter did not
go far enough. These hard-liners argued NIEO represented complicity with a
corrupt capitalist-dominated international system. 63 One alternative solution was to
take inspiration from the socialist countries' concept of collective autonomy by
disengaging from the world system.64 Developing countries could escape from
permanent status on the periphery by setting up their own detached system.
Disengagement from the global system would generate a new "sovereign space" or
parallel international system for developing countries.
65
By the inauguration of the Third UN Development Decade in 1980, little had
changed. The pronouncement for the Third Decade simply borrowed language
from the Second; the centerpiece of development was in restructuring the world
system, which was in disequilibrium. The solution was now familiar-redoubling
the effort to establish a NIEO. 66 The declaration for the Third decade, however,
67
evinced greater sophistication than earlier work. The World Bank and the IMF
were encouraged to conduct their affairs in a way that would accommodate
developing nations' strategies. Stable international exchange rates and currencies
were sought. 68 Developed states were urged to control rampant inflation, which
had a precarious effect on development. 69 In a nod to reality, the target for
development assistance from developed states fell from 1.0% to 0.7% of gross
domestic product by 1985; the goal of 1% was deferred indefinitely.
70
58. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29th Sess., 235th mtg.
at 50-55, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281/XXXIX (1974).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 52, art. 2.
61. Id. at 53, art. 13.
62. Id. at 54, art. 18.
63. SNYDER & SLINN, supra note 33, at 17-18.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id.
66. Intemational Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, G.A.
Res. 35/56, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 83d plen. mtg., at 106, U.N. Doe. A/35/56 (1980).
67. Id. at 120.
68. Id. at 115.
69. Id. at 108.
70. Id. at 108, 113.
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The next milestone was the UN Declaration on the Right to Development 71 in
1986. In many ways, it typified global development talk by looking to developed
states to provide the Third World with their "inalienable human right" to
development. 72 But the document was original and profound in other ways. First,
it recognized that the human person, and not the state, should be the subject and
beneficiary of development.73 Second, although the declaration continued to
expound NIEO language, it acknowledged for the first time that developing states
had a duty to formulate appropriate development policies. 74 While this standard
surely was vague, the door was now open to the importance of national policy in
development. It was the first glimmer into the "black box" of the state for
international development theorists, and a long-overdue recognition that regime
type, national economic systems and social modalities mattered.
Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, however, the NIEO model persisted.
One fuming neo-colonialist assessment which succinctly illustrates the stale state
of the paradigm was expressed by an African from Cameroon in 1991:
[I]nstead of development, it is my view that we are in the most vicious
stages of colonization. The so-called development strategies are ways to
exploit the riches of Africa. For industrialized countries, Africa is a vast
plantation, a huge market, innumerable sales points, an immense
dumping ground, a place for leisure, and a reservoir of labor and jobs.
She will therefore have to produce raw materials and export them to the
industrialized countries for pittance; and she will get so much poorer by
consuming manufactured goods purchased at incredibly high prices
from the very same countries.
75
The view is enduring, indicating that the depth of dependency theory and the
powerful narrative it invokes. In 1996, Philip Shabecoff, a former reporter for The
New York Times who served as historian to the Rio Earth Summit, said, "There can
be little doubt that the industrialized nations of North America, Europe, and Asia,
which control the lion's share of the planet's wealth and power, also bear the major
responsibility for inequitable distribution of its wealth, degradation of the
environment and heightened political tensions between North and South. 7 6 For
many today, world systems analysis extracted from Waltz's third image still holds
the key to understanding under-development.
D. "Fixing" the World System: The Era of the Mega-Conference
Once one accepts that development is caused by certain systemic world
71. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41, arts. 1, 2, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53 at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 186-87
74. Id.
75. PHILIP SHABECOFF, A NEw NAME FOR PEACE: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALISM,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY 54 (1996) (quoting Louisa Tappa, Theology of
Environment and Development, in SONED ON UNCED, A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CRISES 64(1991)).
76. Id.
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problems, it is inescapable to seek globally-mandated solutions. Globalism may be
described as the increasingly dense network of intercontinental and international
connections among state and non-state actors, mediated through the flow of
people, culture and ideas, information, goods and services, capital and basic
materials and raw resources. 77 Economies are globally interconnected, but the
temptation to search for global mandates often ignores local and state problems. In
considering global governance, many writers and practitioners fall into error
searching for global solutions and global government. Hedley Bull referred to this
trap as the "domestic analogy."
78
Domestic governance is so familiar that it is exceedingly tempting to hope
that the state order experienced in the developed world can be easily stretched to
encompass the globe. The sustainable development movement in particular has
been prone to succumb to the domestic analogy, in which local and state problems
are addressed in sweeping, but ineffective fashion, through global action. For
example, the UN Development program's Human Development Report 1999:
Globalization with a Human Face, illustrates how development theorists and
practitioners cling to the fatigued model of global government, while ignoring
policies that would enhance sustainable development. 79 That report advocates
transforming global governance architecture by creating a global central bank and
a world investment trust to redistribute wealth. 80 A two-chamber assembly would
be structured to allow global representation of civil society.81 Global advocates
claim, "[N]o single country or group of countries, however powerful, could
effectively solve the problem." 82 Over the long run, the report envisions "global
federalism"--a genuinely global government.
83
In his opening speech at the first UNCTAD more than forty years ago, U.S.
Undersecretary of State George W. Ball attempted to strike a note of realism into
the gathering. Instead, his presentation was received by many in attendance as
paternalistic-and some regarded it as hostile "negative blast.
84
The bitterness from the early days of international economic development was
fused with a parallel strand of environmental activism. If UNCTAD ignited
modern discourse on global economic development, it was Stockholm that did so
for global environmental protection. A "greening" of development economics
77. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 1-4 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue, eds., 2000); see also, U.N. DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999: GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE (1999)
[hereinafter, GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE].
78. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 46
(1977).
79. See generally GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 77.
80. Id. at 111.
81. Id.
82. RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET 4 (1998).
83. Dani Rodrik, Governance of Economic Globalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 362-63 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue, eds., 2000).
84. TOYE & TOYE, supra note 25, at 202.
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occurred in the 1970s, 85 and ecology would become formally fused to economics
in the 1980s to create the term "sustainable development." The merger did not
mature as ideology until the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The alliance
between the proponents of Third World development and Western environmental
activists would come to sustain anti-globalism into the 1990s. By the time of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002, it
was evident that the alliance was unraveling.
Although the era of the mega-conference began at UNCTAD in 1964, it was
not recognized as a new phenomenon until Stockholm in 1972. The age expired in
Johannesburg, where malaise captured the mood. The mega-conferences that were
features of this thirty years' expanse each served as powerful political symbols to
transmit the message of the orthodoxy. During the heyday, they served as focal
points to crystallize sentiment and strengthen the movement. The conferences are
remembered fondly by their participants as things accomplished, and opportunities
lost.
Political scientist Harold D. Lasswell wrote in his study of political symbols
that in non-democratic societies, the insistence of a ritual of action-such as the
conduct of elections-serves as a central symbol and reassures conformity. 86 In
such cases, discourse becomes highly stereotyped. The sustainable development
orthodoxy was caught up in this phenomenon. Measures of effectiveness were
gauged by the number of treaties and signatories, and the expressions of good
intention, rather than by the consequences flowing from compliance and
enforcement. The symbols became ornamental features of discourse at grand
summits in exotic locations, sometimes resulting in edifying signing ceremonies.
Lasswell wrote, "[b]y elaborating the trappings of an oracle, the ocular message
becomes a pronouncement that takes on an authoritative nimbus of mystery and
weight."
87
In 2002, the WSSD in Johannesburg signaled the end of an era and the demise
of expectations organic to the lavishly overwrought conferences. In the decades
between Stockholm and Johannesburg, a cadre of entrenched UN and international
bureaucrats, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government officials and
academicians had become steeped in the orthodoxy. It is axiomatic to regard the
time between Stockholm and Johannesburg as a sort of "golden age" of
enlightened cooperation on the environment and development. 88 There is a sense
that the early recognition of environment degradation embodied in Stockholm
deteriorated after the 1970s, and that chief responsibility for this condition lies
85. SCULLY, supra note 28, at 7-8.
86. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, ET AL., THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SYMBOLS: AN INTRODUCTION
24(1952).
87. Id. at 24.
88. Frederick A. B. Meyerson, Burning the Bridge to the 21" Century: The End of the Era of
Integrated Conferences?, 9 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT 6, 10 (Spring
2003), available at http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACF23C.pdf (last visited Sep. 21, 2004). The
Environmental Change and Security Project is part of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International
Scholars in Washington, D.C.
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with the developed nations. 89
Conference participants comprised a global network constructed from
alliances of likeminded representatives who share the same epistemological
assumptions. 9° Pursuing common goals, they delivered countless interventions at
the negotiating table and fashioned grandiose agreements, often with the effect of
advancing their careers. 91 The perpetual mobilization, coordination and technical
review embodied public diplomacy that skirted uncomfortably close to conflicts of
interest. 92
1. Stockholm-NGOs Get a Seat at the Table
During the 1960s, many began to realize that ecology would touch all aspects
of our lives, and that the environment would affect every comer of society. The
quality of the natural environment quickly became associated with quality of life in
a multitude of ways. In 1968, the UN General Assembly recognized the connection
between the quality of the natural environment and human rights.93 The resolution
set the stage for thinking about the environment in social and political terms,
although many of the ensuing prescriptions would prove wildly ineffective. That
same year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2398, which proposed to
convene a UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 for the purpose of
creating a framework within the UN for "comprehensive consideration" of the
problems of the human environment.
94
Writing before the conference, economist Barbara Ward and the
microbiologist Ren6 Dubos captured the alarming, if not apocalyptic, prognosis of
the times:
The two worlds of man-the biosphere of his inheritance, the techno-
sphere of his creation-are out of balance, indeed potentially in deep
conflict.... This is the hinge of history at which we stand, the door to
the future opening to a crises more sudden, more global, more
inescapable and more bewildering than ever encountered by the human
species....95
The Stockholm Conference met from November 5-16, 1972 and was the first
global intergovernmental conference dedicated solely to environmental issues. It
was attended by 113 states, including two heads of state. It concluded with the
adoption of a declaration which avoided specifics and instead found its influence
89. SHABECOFF, supra note 75, at 51.
90. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN. AFF. Sept.- Oct. 19, 1997, at
183.
91. PAMELA S. CHASEK, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS: ANALYZING THIRTY YEARS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 224 (2001).
92. FEN OSLER HAMPSON & MICHAEL HART,, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: LESSONS FROM
ARMS CONTROL, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 349 (1995).
93. Problems of Human Environment, G.A. Res. 2398, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1733dmtg. at 2
(1968).
94. Id.
95. BARBARA WARD & RENt DUBOS, ONLY ONE EARTH: THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF A
SMALL PLANET 16 (1972).
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and authority in tone, and in its celebratory dedication to establishing basic rules of
international environmental law.96  Embodying 26 general principles,
97 the
Stockholm Declaration was hortatory in its essence, but with the distinct hope that,
like the UN Declaration on Human Rights that preceded it, it would assume
increasing authority. 98 The power of the declaration was in its role as one of
Lasswell's symbols of inspiration.
99
Fundamental Principle 1 set forth in sweeping aspirational language the key
to the Declaration. It would have been a timeless statement on the condition of
man but for the addition of neo-colonial aura which quickly dated it:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and bears solemn responsibility to protect and
improve the environment for present and future generations. In this
respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation,
discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign
domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.l1°
Some delegates thought it more desirable that the Declaration start with an
apolitical and general affirmation of every human's "right to a wholesome
environment."' 0' This right already was recognized in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 10 2 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICCPR). 10 3 In the end, more politicized language prevailed. The Tanzanian
Amendment, later endorsed by twelve African states, wanted the principle to
denounce "expansionism, apartheid, colonialism and racism.
' 4 Other states felt
the political language was extraneous.'0 5 In the end, a compromise was reached,
with the Africans largely successful in their effort to shape the text.
The Declaration condemns certain forms of government abuse that deny
fundamental human rights, but the categories mentioned are vastly under-inclusive.
More general language indicting all autocratic forms of government and
government failure would have been more accurate, and more helpful, in a text
with such august aspirations.
96. Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L. J.
423, 513-15 (973).
97. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.48/14, 11, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (June 16, 1972) thereinafter Declaration on the Human
Environment].
98. Sohn, supra note 96, at 513-515.
99. Id. at 428.
100. Declaration on the Human Environment, supra note 97, at Part II, Principle 1.
101. Sohn, supra note 96, at 452.
102. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 19, 1948).
103. International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
11(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
104. Sohn, supra note 96, at 454.
105. Id.
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The global environmental movement gained sophistication and energy in the
early-1970s, and learned to effectively exercise political power in Western Europe
and North America. The groups made their mark at Stockholm. The Conference
signaled a shift away from the state-centered negotiation of previous international
environmental treaties and toward UN-centered negotiations. 10 6 This increased the
influence of the UN Secretariat and NGOs.107
Stockholm marked the first major foray by the global environmental
movement into international politics, 108 and it propelled NGOs into a permanent
place in international policy-making. 109 Principle 25 welcomed them to the table
by calling on states to ensure that international organizations play an "efficient,
coordinated and dynamic role."" 0 As a consequence, the goals of some of the
negotiations became disconnected from the states that would implement the
provisions, creating instruments that were unworkable."' This phenomenon would
incubate throughout UN conferences for thirty years, becoming painfully obvious
to NGOs and states alike only at Johannesburg.
At the time, Stockholm was seen as a major success in infusing language
concerning the environment with a new social and political content. What was
perhaps most interesting about the Declaration is that it gave rise to a sense that the
international community-by force of good will, public opinion and
activism-could penetrate the sovereign shell of the state and drag it toward
emerging normative aspirational goals. The declaration generated an optimistic
ambiance of international cooperation, and the bold confidence displayed in the
text was a powerful catalyst for generating change. In retrospect, one of the most
important observations to emerge from Stockholm was that most environmental
problems in the Third World were caused by under-development. Unfortunately,
this key tenet has been virtually lost among the cacophony of causes vying for
attention in the world environmental movement. 12
A side meeting at the conference concluded that development not only solves
the crises of human poverty, but also is an effective mechanism for environmental
conservation. The meeting included only about 30 participants to the Stockholm
Conference and met in Founex, Switzerland, located outside of Geneva. The group
produced a report which suggested economic development was the only realistic
method of achieving ecological protection."1 3 Unfortunately, contrary views
expressed at the conference had greater influence in shaping international
106. Oran R. Young, Perspective on International Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 244, 250 (Gunnar Sj6stedt, ed. 1993).
107. Some of the more state-centered negotiations were the London Convention (1972), the
MARPOL Protocol (1978), CITES (1973) and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (1979). CHASEK, supra note 91, at 223-24.
108. Sohn, supra note 96, at 513.
109. SHABECOFF, supra note 75, at 39.
110. Declaration on the Human Environment, supra note 97, at pt. II, principle 25.
111. Young, supra note 106, at 251.
112. Declaration on the Human Environment, supra note 97, pt. I, para. 4.
113. See THE FOUNEX GROUP, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE FOUNEx REPORT 3-5
(1971).
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environmentalism. Abhorring economic development, some viewed economic
growth as the cause of environmental degradation, rather than a possible cure. This
approach cautioned against the pursuit of development, not just because it
perpetuates structural inequalities, but because it endangers the Earth-and the
safety of us all.'
14
The Club of Rome's Limits to Growth is the most articulate exposition of the
latter approach."15 Published in 1972, Limits to Growth worried about the world
bumping up against finite limitations of economic and 
societal growth. 116
Continued economic growth eventually would precipitate a "sudden,
uncontrollable collapse" in global ecology. 1
7 Limits to Growth argued that Earth
was in disequilibrium; in order to enter a state of equilibrium, all input rates, and
particularly human population and investments of capital, must be minimized."
8
As late as 2000, the Club of Rome was still talking about Malthusian models of
finite growth and warning of an impending "ecological 
holocaust."' 19
2. The Brundtland Report-'Sustainable' Development
By the end of the 1980s, there was worry that nations had strayed from the
multilateralism of Stockholm, and there was a push to recapture the waning spirit
of global environmentalism. In writing the Chairman's Foreword to his report,
former Norwegian Environmental Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland pleaded that a
return to multilateralism was the "most urgent task today."'
120 He argued that the
years between 1972 and 1987 had seen deterioration in 
global cooperation. 12
1
Modern usage of the term "sustainable development" emerged from the
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).
122
The WCED was established by the UN General Assembly in 1983 with a mandate
to re-examine critical assumptions on the environment and development. The title
of the report was, Our Common Future. Referred to as the Brundtland Report, the
final document of the commission was delivered to the UN General Assembly in
1987.123
The report defined "sustainable development" as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
114. GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO GLOBAL FAITH
x (2d ed. 2002).
115. See LIMITS TO GROWTH, supra note 7, at 9.
116. ld. at 24.
117. Id. at 158.
118. See id. at 171-76.
119. See RAM6NE TAMAMES, WORLD ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ORDER 25-27 (final
amended ed. UNESCO, Dec. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.clubofrome.org/archive/publications/tamames%
2 0eolss-racm% 2 0 2 4 .01.01 .pdf (last visited
on April. 11, 2006).
120. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE x
(1987) [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND REPORT].
121. See id. at xi.
122. See id. at 43.
123. Id. at xv.
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their own needs.' 24 Significantly, the report acknowledged a commitment to
economic growth based on "policies that sustain and expand the environmental
resource base."'125 The report also took sides on the duel between the Founex
Report and Limits to Growth by recognizing that economic growth was essential to
turn back deepening poverty in the developing world. 126
The Brundtland Report represented a clear break from the idea that
environmental problems had become so unmanageable that the only way out was
to stop development through zero-growth solutions. Instead, the report realized that
"[m]any essential human needs can only be met through goods and services
provided by industry... 2 7 The report said the terms "environment" and
"development" were "inseparable," placing the two, for the first time, on equal
footing. 128 The report was much more optimistic than its predecessors, concluding
that "humanity has the ability to make development sustainable.' ' 29 Departing
from the Limits to Growth, it claimed that the concept of sustainable development
does not imply limits; present limitations were elastic and could be remade through
advances in technology' 30 and social reorganization. 131
The report also rejected the inevitability of poverty, calling it an "evil in
itself."' 132 Population growth and the high proportion of young people throughout
the Third World meant that there was a larger labor force seeking jobs, and the
agricultural sector could not absorb all of them. 133 Industry was called on to
provide employment, and to deliver consumer goods and material comforts. The
new goal was to fulfill the burgeoning rise in human needs and expectations
through economic development. Limits to Growth was repudiated.
Despite recognition of the importance of markets, the Brundtland Report
retained components dependency theory baggage, and in some ways this
reinforced the development orthodoxy. Employing Waltz's third image, the report
perpetuated neo-colonial solutions. It advocated a vertical, top-down focus to force
global systemic repair, stating that the basis of exchange in world trade must be
rebalanced to satisfy developing countries. Moreover, the report ignored the most
important lessons that would emerge from second image analysis-that a nation's
political regime often determined the level of development.
124. Id. at 43. The term "sustainable development" as a sociopolitical concept is thought to have
originated from a 1980 IUCN report, WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY (1980), and popularized by
Lester R. Brown's book, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY (1982). See MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER
SEGGER, ET AL., WEAVING THE RULES FOR OUR COMMON FUTURE: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND
PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW 11-13 (2002) [hereinafter
WEAVING THE RULES].
125. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 120, at I.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 206.
128. See id. at xi.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 217-218.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 213-214.
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3. The Earth Summit at Rio
The next major milestone was Rio. Ninety heads of state attended the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, in 1992.134 The Earth Summit was the first major international conference
after the Cold War and the apex of optimism. Maurice Strong, who was appointed
Secretary-General, had high hope, billing the event, "the most important
international conference ever convened."'
135
By the time of Rio, the international environmental movement had moved
from the periphery to the center of decision-making. Their presence further
deepened political rifts. The four preparatory committees (PrepComs) became a
virtual combat zone as blocs of countries and NGOs worked to fashion the
capstone documents, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.136 By the Fourth
PrepCom, dispute and deadlock characterized every single document, chapter,
paragraph, comma, and period. 137 Whereas the NGOs had a place at the table at
Stockholm, at Rio often they were driving the agenda. For the first time, NGOs
participated in substantial numbers to shape the program. There were over 1,000
accredited organizations at the table. Since many of them lacked familiarity with
the labyrinthine UN negotiation process, they slowed negotiations 
considerably.' 38
Many organizations had militantly sharp and competing positions.
139 Even when
they agreed in substance, they divided over language, style and strategy. Barbara
Bramble of the National Wildlife Federation captured the rancor:
[W]hen we talk about 'reallocation,' we mean a good thing-like taking
away fiscal incentives to cut down rain forests for cattle ranches. They
use the word to mean a bad thing-taking current official development
aid and re-labeling it for the environment. We are asking for reforms of
financial institutions. They are just asking for more money. They don't
know that in the United States, 'wise use' is a code for the destruction
of natural resources by big corporations. The split is a mile wide and 60
miles deep. 140
Bringing NGOs to the forefront of negotiation was part of an enlightened plan
134. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/REV.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (June 13, 1992).
135. SHABECOFF, supra note 75, at 128.
136. Id. at 142.
137. Id. at 146.
138. Id. at 149.
139. The prevalence of some more extreme positions inspired more than 250 scientists world wide,
including 27 Nobel Prize winners, to issue the "Heidelberg Appeal," a letter to heads of state attending
the conference to resist the "irrational ideology which is opposed to scientific and industrial progress,"
impeding economic and social development. They contended, "a natural State, sometimes idealized by
movements with a tendency to look to the past, does not exist and has probably never existed since
man's first appearance in the biosphere, insofar as humanity has always progressed by increasingly
harnessing Nature to its needs and not the reverse." Beware of False Gods in Rio, WALL ST. J., Jun. 1,
1992, at A12.
140. SHABECOFF, supra note 75, at 150 (Interview conducted by Shabecoff with Barbara Bramble
in March 1992).
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to nurture civil society. The central assumption was that the organizations were a
critical segment, perhaps the most critical segment, of civil society because they
engage in democratic processes and could challenge the state. 4 1 At least in some
cases, this assumption appears questionable. The organizations generally held
strong and narrow views, serving to Balkanize the negotiations. In some countries,
participation by broader groups may have been more representative and effective
at building civil society. In South Africa, for example, a social movement, rather
than advocacy organizations, brought down apartheid. 42 The sanctimonious
behavior of some of the groups at Rio created pause about their expansive role.
Shifting power to vocal, savvy, unelected, well-funded and well-organized
advocacy groups actually could diminish public representation by empowering
special political interests.
The summit was a massive affair, hosting 100 heads of state and 178
countries. Rio is a party city; outside the meetings, the event produced a carnival
atmosphere populated by a camp-following of anarchy. The summit even featured
a rock music concert and had its own theme song. 143 In contrast, the level of
seriousness sometimes was palpable, as normal logistical decisions about the
summit acquired greater meaning. In the final days of planning for the event,
organizers were forced to make a fateful decision between ensuring present
comfort and risking future environmental well-being. Planners finally decided in
favor of cooling the conference with potentially ozone-depleting air conditioning,
leading the Wall Street Journal to question whether "AC is PC."' 44 The choice
served as a metaphor for the decisions made at the negotiating table.
Of the five major agreements to emerge from the conference, the Rio
Declaration and Agenda 21145 were the most comprehensive. The composite Rio
Declaration formed a short statement of sustainable development. Principle 4
declares, "in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be
considered in isolation from it.' 146 Of the few human rights dispensed in the
141. Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Toward Civil Society Realism, in FUNDING VIRTUE:
CIVIL SOCIETY AID AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 295 (Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, eds.
2000).
142. Marina Ottaway, Social Movements, Professionalization of Reform, and Democracy in Africa,
in FUNDING VIRTUE: CIVIL SOCIETY AID AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 77, 95 (Marina Ottaway &
Thomas Carothers, eds. 2000).
143. Robert S. Greenberger, North-South Split: With Cold War Over, Poorer Nations Face Neglect
by the Rich, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1992, at Al.
144. Thomas Kamm, Rio Eco-Fest: Some Big Problems Await World Leaders At the Earth Summit,
WALL ST. J., May 29, 1992, at Al.
145. Agenda 21 is a blockbuster 40-chapter volume spanning 800-pages of goals and potential
programs outlining sustainable development for the world. The full text of Agenda 21 is available on
the Internet website of the UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda2l/english/agenda2ltoc.htm. (last visited May. 19,
2006).
146. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development June 3-14,
1992, U.N. Doc. A//CONF.151/26 (I) (Aug. 12, 1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51 /aconfl 5126- I annex I .htm.
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declaration is entitlement to a "healthy and productive life in harmony with
nature," in Principle 1, a standard so vague as to be essentially meaningless.147
The rather lengthy Principle 10 alludes to a right of access to the public of
information concerning the environment, 148 a right that is not unimportant, but
tangential to the far more critical rights delineated years earlier at Copenhagen as
part of the Helsinki Process.
The declaration preserved dependency themes developed in the heady days of
the NIEO. Principles 2 and 3 assure states that they have the "sovereign right to
exploit their own resources," as though that idea were in dispute, while indicating
that the "right to development" should be fulfilled "equitably.' '149 Principle 6
resurrects the call for giving "special consideration" and "special priority" to
developing states, without ever defining what the scope of the preference. 
150
Overall, the gaping deficit of the Rio Declaration is a lack of any mention of
democracy or the rule of law, let alone anything so avant garde as a right to own
property or enter markets. Curiously, it even omits the usual amorphous neo-
colonial euphemisms for democracy, such as human freedom and self-
determination. Working in the shadow of the Copenhagen Document, these
omissions only typify the sway that third image themes-systemic neo-colonialism
and dependency-held over much of the global body politic.
4. Millennium Goals, But Not Means to Achieve Them
Eight years after Rio, at the time of the Millennium Summit in New York in
early September, 2000, democracy had gained currency. In the intervening years,
a host of democracies had emerged throughout the world. Some of these
democratic states, materializing from decades of communist dictatorship, were
particularly strong voices for human freedom and the rule of law.
During this time in the United States, the Clinton Administration had settled
into an unapologetic but sensitive campaign of democracy promotion throughout
the world. Months before the summit, in June of 2000, the Council for a
Community of Democracies was launched in Warsaw, Poland, with 106 member
governments. 15' The combination of these events refreshed the global normative
foundations of liberal democracy.
The Millennium Declaration was an omnibus template for addressing the
world's greatest challenges over the next fifteen years.' 52 The document was
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Michael J. Glennon, There's A Point to Going it Alone: Unilateralism Has Often Served Us
Well, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2001 at B2. Among democracies throughout the world at the time, France
was the sole unilateral hold-out to participating at the founding of the Community of Democracies in
Warsaw.
152. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 8th Plenary
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
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divided into eight sections.' 53 Democracy, which should be a central theme of the
entire document, is inexplicably absent from sections II, III, and VI, which address
peace and security, development and poverty reduction, and protecting the
vulnerable. 1
54
Section I contains some brief, hortatory language about freedom, but it is not
a direct reference to liberalism as a system in which the individual has rights
enforceable as against the state. 5 5 Rather, the section calls for freedom from
hunger, freedom from fear, freedom from oppression and freedom from injustice,
an amorphous directory of aspirations. 5 6  Still, the declaration declared,
"democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people best
assures these rights."'157 In section V, the declaration asserted that "no effort" will
be spared to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, and it resolved to
strive for "civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all."' 5 8 While
those aspirations are essential, section V, unlike all the other sections, is devoid of
detailed requirements and specific objectives. 59 The opportunity to enlarge the
boundaries of democracy and the rule of law into the realm of sustainable
development was squandered.
The accompanying 80-page report, We the Peoples'6° failed even a single
mention of democracy in its chapter on governance. In fact, amazingly, the report
of the UN Secretary-General mentioned democracy only once, saying,
"Democracy, once challenged by authoritarianism in various guises, has not only
prevailed in much of the world, but is now generally seen as the most legitimate
and desirable form of government."' 161 It is remarkable that the Millennium
Declaration, which endured the process of negotiation and compromise in the
General Assembly, has far stronger language about democracy than the feckless
book prepared for the summit by the UN Secretariat and released under the
signature of the Secretary-General. Publication of We the Peoples presented an
optimal opportunity for the Secretary-General to make a strong and detailed
statement about democracy, but it was not seized. In the first annual report on
progress of the Millennium Declaration, there were signs of improvement. 62
Democracy was mentioned 13 times, but the citations were rote and democracy
153. These sections are: I Values and Principles; II Peace, security and disarmament; III
Development and poverty eradication; IV Protecting the environment; V Human rights, democracy and
good governance; VI Protecting the vulnerable; VII Meeting the special needs of Africa; and, VIII
Strengthening the United Nations.
154. United Nations Millennium Declaration, supra note 152.
155. Id. at sec. I.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at sec. V.
159. Id.
160. Kofi Annan, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 2 1s" CENTURY(United Nations 2000), (http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm) (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
161. Id. at 68.
162. Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the United Nations
Millennium Declaration, U.N. GAOR 57th mtg, U.N. Doe. A/57/270 (2002).
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certainly was not central to the text. Democracy was never invoked with effect;
rather, it featured as just one malleable aspiration on a menu-peace, security,
democracy, development and human rights.
163
To obtain greater relevancy, the Millennium Goals should have emphasized
the value of increasing political and economic freedom. By 2000 it had become
clear that markets already had lifted much of the developing world out of poverty.
Primarily as a benefit of greater political economic freedom, global human poverty
had decreased dramatically over the previous fifty years. Incomes had risen nearly
throughout the entire world since 1950, when the per capita income of the average
inhabitant of Earth was only $1,872. By 1990, per capita income world-wide had
leaped to $4,292.164 Of course, much of the increase came from strong growth in
the developed states, but even the poorest countries improved substantially. In
China, per capita income rose from $470 in 1961 to $1,324 in 1990. In India, it
rose from $559 in 1961 to $1,262 in 1990; both nations have experienced even
greater growth since then.
Many regions, however, were unresponsive. From 1990 to 1999, the number
of Africans living in extreme poverty-living on less than $1 (U.S.) per day-was
barely reduced from 47.7% in 1990 to 46.7% in 1999.165 In order to have a realistic
chance of meeting the goals of the Millennium Declaration of cutting poverty and
unemployment in half by 2015, the countries of the African Union must generate
economic growth rates of 7% or greater. 166 Establishing aggressive goals is
laudable; indeed, anything less is immoral. But the Millennium meeting never
bridged the chasm between goals, and the economic and political freedoms that
could serve as the means to achieve them.
5. Johannesburg, the World Summit & 'Conference Fatigue'
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was held in
Johannesburg South Africa, in 2002, ten years after UNCED in Rio de Janeiro. The
event included over 100 heads of state and nearly 25,000 governmental, business
and NGOs centered at the Sandton Convention Centre and sprinkled at side events
throughout the city. The goal was not to forge a new agenda or introduce new
treaties, but to move toward a strategy for implementing Agenda 21.167
163. Implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary General, UNGA
57/270, Jul. 31, 2002, UN Doc. A/57/270 (2002).
164. Adam Przeworski, et. al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND
WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990 272 (2000), hereafter, Przeworski, et. al, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT.
165. SADC Executive Secretary Says Africa Has 'Little Hope' of Achieving Millennium
Development Goal, JOHANNESBURG SAPA (SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS AssoC.), Jun. 12, 2003 (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Document. Id. No. AFP 2003612000112, reproduced from original
publication at www.sapa.org.za) (Copy on file with author).
166. Juliette Bastin, Desperately Seeking Employment, PARIS JEUNE AFRIQUE L'INTELLIGENT 74-
75 (Sep. 5, 2004), African Growth, Development, Fight Against Poverty Said Dependent on
Employment (Trans., FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, Document. Id. No. AFP
20040926000001) (Copy on file with author).
167. Paul Wapner, World Summit on Sustainable Development: Toward a Post Jo-burg
Environmentalism, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 1-2 (Feb. 2003).
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Unfortunately, the conference never gained the momentum to accomplish that
goal, and instead disintegrated into a series of ad hoc affairs.
The event marks the end of the age of the mega-conference.
Environmentalism was under siege, engaged in a desperate fight to prevent a
weakening of existing agreements. 168 Like past summits, much of the business at
the conference was shrouded in the Byzantine system of UN parliamentary
procedure and played out in hallways and side rooms. For the first time at such a
conference, there was an effort to reach beyond the bureaucracy and NGOs and
invite business interests to the table. 169 The businesses were judge fairly
exclusively by their "green pedigree, rather than a more balanced assessment that
could have included the value of the jobs and the benefit of the products they
produced. The assessment was one dimensional, and the outreach effort that
included business interests and the value of economic growth only undermined the
unity enjoyed at prior conferences.
Part of the problem with Johannesburg was that even the firmest believers in
the conference believed there was very little that was new to discuss. The UN had
held a major conference each decade going back to UNCTAD, and a less elaborate
conference nearly every year in the period between Rio and Johannesburg, so the
ground was fairly well tilled. By the time of Johannesburg, the world community
was suffering "conference fatigue,"'170 as the glaring gap between the rhetoric of
"law in the books" and the evident failure of "law in action" widened.
The mega-conferences were becoming momentary media events. Although
they continued to serve as powerful symbols for the true believers, for the rest they
were disintegrating into "sound-bite opportunities without lasting effects on
policies or the quality of the environment." 171 It was no wonder that prior to
Johannesburg, the chairman of the summit remarked that it likely would be the last
of its kind.172 It had been a long road from Stockholm.
Despite the prominently placed corporate exhibits at Sandton, such as a
sparkling, high-technology BMW pavilion, the summit was unable to escape
inherent disconnects from its orthodox roots. While First World leaders and NGOs
spoke about the environment, many Third World leaders focused on economic
growth and free trade, assailing rampant Western agricultural protectionism.
173
Lebohang Ntsinya, the environment minister of Lesotho, argued, "the whole
'sustainable' concept is an invention of the affluent, whose prosperity allows them
a margin for mistakes or acts of nature. In Africa, there is no margin, and so [we]
168. Powell is Jeered as Divided Summit Comes to an End, WALL. ST. J., Sep. 5, 2002, at A12
(2002 WL-WSJ 3405271).
169. Jeffrey Ball, At Environmental Summit, UN Fails to Shed Cloak of Secrecy, WALL. ST. J.,
Sep. 4, 2002, at A18 (2002 WL-WSJ 3405149).
170. Comments of Daniel Magraw, Symposium: The Road from Johannesburg, GEO. INT'L L.
REV. 809, 839 (Summer 2003).
171. Peter M. Haas, UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment, 8
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 73-91 (2002).
172. Meyerson, at 6, supra note 71.
173. Editorial, Third World Wisdom, WALL. ST. J., Sep. 3, 2002, at A20 (2002 WL-WSJ 340941).
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can't afford to put nice-sounding adjectives in front of... 'development'.' 74 The
conference adjourned with most participants, including your author, greatly
disappointed.
E. The State Image-Rethinking Modernization Theory
Explanations of sustainable development resident in Waltz's second image
are much more accurate and more powerful than deductive third image models.
But most of the prevailing second image analysis on sustainable development is
stubbornly at odds with the empirical evidence. Cognitive psychology helps to
explain why this is so. When people sort through issues of daunting complexity,
they tend to reconstruct them into easy and simple models. In the words of Graham
Allison, they reflect "assumptions about the character of puzzles, the categories in
which problems should be considered, the types of evidence that are relevant and
the determinants of occurrences."' 175 These themes, moreover, serve as a mutually
reinforcing and collective basket of beliefs which perpetuate a paradigm.
The problem is that people who hold strong views on one subject are far more
likely to distort evidence in seemingly unrelated areas that support or cohere with
that belief, even while perceiving that they are exercising objectivity in their
analysis.176 The strength of the initial belief has a strong and positive correlation
with the magnitude of distortion on the evidence that follows. 177 This makes it
particularly important that we separate what has worked in sustainable
development from what has failed by subjecting policy biases to empirical testing,
when possible.
Introducing outside perspectives can raise issues that otherwise would be
overlooked, averting disaster. During President Kennedy's attempted invasion of
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, for example, the administration conducted its
operation without consulting outside perspectives. The same people who planned
the operation were the ones who were asked to evaluate it. 178 The operation
quickly became embroiled in failure, the result of a bizarre neglect to consider the
popularity of Fidel Castro, the strength of the Cuban Army, the size of the island
and the number of troops required for a successful operation.' 79 In order to prevent
reoccurrence of this sort of thinking, the military now conducts war-games in
which friendly forces are pitted against an opposing, well-positioned and
174. Id.
175. Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crises, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
689, 689 (Sep., 1969).
176. This phenomenon is explained by cognitive coherence in psychology. People assimilate
evidence into coherent models. For example, psychological studies indicate that people with strong pro-
death penalty attitudes were more likely to convict a defendant than people with anti-death penalty
attitudes, who are more likely to acquit. Of course, the question of guilt and the punishment are
unrelated cognitive exercises, but people have a general tendency to make the two "fit." Simon, at 542,
supra note 7. "[M]ental modes of the evidence and beliefs cohered with the corresponding verdicts, so
that people with strong pro- or anti-death penalty attitudes interpreted all the evidence in the case in a
way that cohered with conviction and acquittal, respectively. Id.
177. Id. at 545.
178. Surowiecki, WISDOM OF CROWDS, at 37, supra note 8.
179. Id.
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intelligent "red team."' 80 The red team's job is to find fault and exploit weakness in
the plans and operations of friendly forces. The red team startles the complacency
at work in groupthink-which occurs not so much because dissent is being
censored, but because alternative paradigms are understood by everyone within the
system to be improbable.' 81 Subsection E of Part I, infra, discusses the dominant
second image paradigm in development thought, which is modernization theory.
Part II, infra, offers the outside perspective-second image analysis rooted in
liberal democracy and human freedom.
1. Economic Preconditions for Democracy-Lipset
Second image theories of modernization originated in the European fascist
dictatorships of the 1930s, and were given modern currency by academics and
officials in developed countries and in post-colonial Africa, Asia and Latin
America. 182 One of the earliest thinkers in this regard is the eminent political
sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset. In 1959, Lipset argued that economic
development increased the general level of education, which then enabled
democracy by advancing changes in political attitudes and advancing political
culture. 83 Lipset's research on the relationship between democracy and
development had a colossal effect, generating the largest body of academic
research of any topic in comparative politics. 184 More importantly, his work
influenced the course of modernization and development policy in the decades
since, affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people across the globe.
Lipset compared data on proxies for economic development, including per
capita income, education and levels of industrialization, with regime types in
Europe and Latin America. 185 In each country, the indices of wealth-including
income, but also the number of physicians, motor vehicles, radios, telephones and
newspapers per capita-were higher in democratic states. 186 There were sharp
distinctions on all indicators of development between democratic and authoritarian
governments, and these results were valid throughout the range, with the most
democratic states being the wealthiest and the least democratic states being the
least wealthy.
The strong correlation between democracy and high levels of educational
achievement convinced Lipset that education was a necessary precondition for
180. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessment, 17 JOINT FORCE Q. 47-
49. (Autumn/Winter 1997/1998)
181. Surowiecki, at 37, supra note 8. See also, Thomas S. Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d. ed. 1970).
182. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46,
49 (Jan. 1992).
183. Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 69-105 (Mar. 1959).
184. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theory and Facts, 49 WORLD POL.
155-183, at 156 (1997). Over the years, Lipset's work has been "supported and contested, revised and
extended, buried and resuscitated." Przeworski, et. al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT at 79, supra,
note 131.
185. Lipset, at 74-76, supra, at note 150.
186. See, Table II, Id. at 76.
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democracy to flourish. 87 In poorer democracies, he argued, populism and corrupt
leaders manipulate the masses and divert national energies into unproductive
endeavors. Lipset concluded that democracy could thrive only in states that
successfully created a rising middle class. Economic growth immunizes the
population against the appeal of anti-democratic radicalism, especially class and
ethnically-based ideologies. 188 These findings suggested that states first must
develop economically before they can think about democratizing. Lipset launched
the "development first" thesis, which remains a powerful doctrine of state-centered
economic development to this day.
189
2. Modernization Theory-Huntington
Lipset's theory was extended by the distinguished political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington. In his classic 1968 study, Political Order in Changing Societies,
Huntington asserted that autocratic regimes were better than democracies at
governing low-income countries because they maintain order.' 90 In less developed
states, dominant political parties and the military served as unifying institutions.
1 91
Huntington was a regime agnostic, declaring the most important political
distinction among countries was not their form of government, but their degree of
government and the regime's ability to establish order. 192 The real divide among
regimes, he contended, was between effective governments in the United States
and the Soviet Union, for example, and ineffective governments in Asia, Africa
and Latin America, where the political community was fragmented. 193 Huntington
downplayed the differences between democracy and dictatorship, arguing that both
embodied consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness and
stability. 1
94
In a later study on political participation for the Agency for International
Development, Huntington outlined the parameters of a "technocratic model" of
development. In this model, "[p]olitical participation must be held down, at least
temporarily, in order to promote economic development.' 95 Political participation
187. For example, the only Middle Eastern country that was a democracy, Lebanon, also had the
highest levels of education, with literacy at about 80%. Id. at 80. "Given the existence of poverty-
stricken masses, low levels of education, an elongated pyramid class structure, and the 'premature'
triumph of the democratic left, the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia and
Africa are bleak." Id. at 101.
188. Id. at 83-84. See also, G. John Ikenberry, Why Export Democracy?, 79, 82 in STRATEGY AND
FORCE PLANNING (Security, Strategy and Forces Faculty, Naval War Coll., eds., 4"' ed. 2004).
189. Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and Morton H. Halperin, Why Democracies Excel,
83 FOR. AFF. 57, 57-58 (Sep./Oct. 2004).
190. Samuel P. Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 8 (1968). "History shows
conclusively that communist governments are no better than free governments in alleviating famine,
improving health, expanding national product, creating industry, and maximizing welfare. But the one
thing communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide effective authority ..... They may
not provide liberty, but they do provide authority." Id.
191. Id. 198-208.
192. Id. at 1.
193. Id. at 2.
194. Id. at 1-2.
195. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, NO EASY CHOICE: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
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was merely a by-product of development, rather than an independent goal. 96
Increases in the socio-economic level were believed to encourage higher levels of
political participation, and more diverse and complex forms of political
participation. 197 These findings helped to develop the basic assumption of
modernization theory, which is that there is a trade-off between democracy and
development. Generally, dictatorship is needed to generate development.
9 8
Societies advance along a single linear plane, with the attainment of democracy but
the final facet.' 99 The emergence of democracy would be an inexorable
consequence of the latter stages development. Dictatorship generates development,
and development eventually leads to democracy. The best route to democracy was
long and circumspect, passing through the theater of authoritarian rule.
20 0
Modernization theory convinced many that the countries of Western Europe
became democratic only after passing some opaque threshold of economic
development-generally measured in per capita income. 20 1 The search was
on-and continues to this day-to define the precise level of per capita income at
which democracy takes root. Spain was considered a typical case. Madrid
experienced rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Only in the 1970s,
after experiencing industrialization and urbanization, was Spain considered ripe for
the transition to democracy. By the early 1980s, however, two-thirds of middle-
income states had reached or surpassed the generally accepted threshold for
development of per capita income of $300-$500 (in 1960 dollars). Despite this,
most of them had not become democratic. The facts did not fit the theory, so the
threshold was raised and the theory was altered.20 2
Looking at the South American experience of having undergone economic
development, but only to turn toward autocracy, Guillermo A. O'Donnell argued
that the strains of economic liberalization and development, and particularly the
dislocations caused by import substitution, actually produced longer-lasting
authoritarian rule. 20 3 This new variant of the theory suggested democracy in poor
countries breeds economic stagnation and civil unrest. 204 In this rather unforgiving
view; democracy itself was the problem. Huntington argued that the apparent
relationship between poverty and under-development on the one hand, and
political instability and violence on the other, is spurious.20 5 "It is not the absence
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 23 (1976).
196. Id. at 167.
197. Id. at 166.
198. Adam Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, at 3, supra, at note 131.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Jonathan Sunshine, ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOCRACY: A STUDY IN
HISTORICAL STATISTICS (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), as cited in Samuel P.
Huntington, Will Countries Become More Democratic? 99 POL. SC1. Q. 193, 200 (Summer 1984).
202. Huntington, Will Countries Become More Democratic? at 200, supra, note 168.
203. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism 3-15 (1973).
204. Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and Morton H. Halperin, THE DEMOCRACY
ADVANTAGE: How DEMOCRACIES PROMOTE PROSPERITY AND PEACE 3 (2004).
205. Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES, at 41, supra, at note 157.
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of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder."
20 6
Modernization is the cause of violence.
20 7
At best, modernization theory suggests democracy is neither good nor bad,
but rather neutral.20 8 Hitler came to power within a democratic process, and the
Bolsheviks came to power amid a broad and liberalizing upheaval in the czarist
order. Modernization theory was open to the idea that struggling democracies such
as India, Kenya and Brazil could be caught in analogous circumstances.
20 9
In the end, modernization theory contends neither democracy nor
development generates stability, and political development can only be successful
after decades of ponderous social and economic progress under the direction of a
dictatorship. 2 1 Although the "development first" theory has suffered recent
setbacks due to new empirical research, it remains influential and has experienced
a revival in recent years. 21' The resurgence of modernization theory is rooted in the
success of the Asian "tiger" economies, and the economic rise of China, in
particular. The Asian-inspired adjunct to modernization theory is constructed
around the idea that economic development is best pursued under the tutelage of a
"benign" autocracy.
3. "Benign" Autocracy as an Adjunct to Modernization Theory
Former Singaporean premier Lee Kuan Yew often extols the virtues of his
model of autocratic development. His central notion is that autocratic government
is more disciplined than democracy. Internecine political battles inherent to
democracy are inimical to development, crippling decision-making and generating
public chaos.
212
Even some classic economists accept economic and political spheres can
remain separate superficially. Milton Friedman observed, "[i]t is... clearly possible
to have economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political
arrangements that are not free." 21 3 Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Fascist Spain,
Imperial Japan and even Tsarist Russia all featured capitalism as the primary
means of production. Up to a point, market mechanisms can be grafted on to an
authoritarian state, although none of the historical examples suggests that such a
"free" economy would provide a satisfactory level of economic growth. The new,
"benign" autocracies, however, would assert they are different.
206. Id.
207. Id. Huntington argues that not only does social and economic modernization produce political
instability, but the degree of instability correlates to the rate of modernization. Id. at 45.
208. Robert D. Kaplan, A Sense of the Tragic: Developmental Dangers in the Twenty-first
Century, JEROME E. LEVY OCCASIONAL PAPER, ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND WORLD ORDER NUMBER
2, at 6 and 9 (U.S. Naval War College Aug. 2001).
209. Id. at 6.
210. Id. at I.
211. Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 16 (Jan. 2002).
212. THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1994 at 15. See also, Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny, A
Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore's Senior Minister) (Interview) 73 FOR. AFF. 109-26
(Mar.-Apr. 1994) (1994 WL 13290253).
213. Milton Friedman, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9-10 (1962).
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Look at China today. Through the force of its astonishingly high level of
economic growth, China has inserted itself into the center of the development
debate. China is now the major engine for intraregional trade, with enormous
growth in exports and imports for Asia. 214 Following in the path of the Asian
"tigers" and their export-driven economic growth strategies of the 1970s, China's
economy is increasing at a breathtaking annual rate of more than 9%.215 Living
standards have continued to climb even after two decades of impressive gain. In
2003, household incomes in China increased more than 9% in urban areas 'and
more than 4% in rural areas.216 In recent years at least some authoritarian states
have done rather well economically. How do we account for the development
miracles of the "benign" autocracies?
First, for every development miracle, there have been several grandiose
authoritarian projects that have ended in catastrophe, with dictators stealing and
murdering on a massive scale. 217 It is true that the Asian tigers have tended to be
dictatorships, but it is also the case that dictatorships generally have not tended to
218be tigers. As a rule, autocratic governments have wrought untold misery. "Even
the economic collapse of communism pales in comparison with the destruction
caused by dictatorships in many African countries, or the squandering of resources
in the Middle East, or the havoc spawned by military governments in Central
America. ' 219 Second, we cannot be certain whether a free mainland China would
have experienced even higher growth at the beginning stages of its economic
trajectory. China started from such a low level, and it is still so poor, that quick
gains are not unexpected. Moreover, after being artificially held back for so long, it
is no wonder that the talents and industry of the Chinese people produced
explosive growth once the yoke of communism was lightened.
Third, autocracy comes with its own price that exacts a cost on human
security and well-being, undermining the whole point of development. If
development is achieved at the cost of countless lives ruined and even destroyed
by autocratic government, then the goal has been sacrificed for the means. If Lee
Kuan Yew is the global representative for "benign" autocracy, prominent Burmese
human rights dissident Aung San Suu Kyi is his intellectual opponent. She has
used her influence to admonish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) countries for privately invoking the adage that democracy represents a
Western value. "To the contrary, democracy simply means good government
rooted in responsibility, transparency and accountability. No authoritarian system
can assure good government because there is no accountability. The government
214. Asian Development Bank, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 4-6 (Oxford University Press,
2004). Exports from other Asian nations to China grew at an annual rate of almost 17 % from 1995-
2003, more than three times the world average. Id. at 5. China also was the export leader in Asia in
2003, with more than a 40 % increase in exports. Id. at 12.
215. Id. at 43.
216. Id. at 42.
217. Adam Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, at 4, supra, at note 131.
218. Id..
219. Id.
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can get away with whatever it does."
220
Fourth, if the objective is to achieve sustainable development, where the
economy and ecology co-exist and the goal is a wealthy and liberal society, then
the rosy assessment of authoritarian economic growth only shows part of the
picture. In many authoritarian states, the environmental bills have yet to come due.
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), created by the World Economic
Forum in collaboration with research centers at Columbia University and Yale
University, rates nations with the best and worst environmental index score. All of
the nations with the best ESI, as well as those nations displaying the best
improvement in their score over time, are democracies.
China's remarkable economic progress belies its location among the bottom
22few nations on the ESI. 221 Interestingly, the connection between democracy and the
environment appear to run both ways. Slipping from democracy to less freedom
seems to threaten the environment. There is good cause to worry that Hong Kong's
retrocession to China will undo environmental progress in that territory.
22 2 This is
because democracy tends to support efforts to conserve the environment. The
movement of Taiwan toward political liberalization, for example, encouraged a
new environmental activism that lead to greater government responsiveness on
environmental matters.223 The same is true with India. While uncertainty over
Chinese authoritarianism adds risk to its future environmental prospects, India's
democratic form of government reduces the risk to the environmental in that
country. 224 Democracies are more successful in their approach toward the
environment because they tend to promote a liberal view of the individual person
with a right, protected by the state, to enjoy a secure natural environment.
225
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, authoritarian state power is anathema to
a healthy civil society. It prevents the formation of the rule of law and threatens
individual freedom, even in autocratic nations with expanding economies. A CIA
panel of independent experts recently concluded that states governed by
exclusionary political elites are much less stable and likely will fare worse than
pluralistic societies in the future. In such states, mostly spread throughout Africa,
Asia and the Middle East, but also including Russia, Brazil, India and China, civil
220. Aung San Suu Kyi, Voicing My Thoughts, Jul. 13, 1999
(http://www.burmafund.org/Pathfinders/nld/ASSK/Nudge 20Burma/20toward%20democracy'htm)
(last visited Sep. 21, 2004).
221. World Economic Forum, ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDEX, ANNUAL MEETING 2002
at 3 (Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy 2002).
222. Bryan Bachner, Conserving a Legal heritage in Hong Kong: Environmental Regulation After
1997, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 363, 374-75 (1997).
223. Jiunn-rong Yeh, Institutional Capacity-building Toward Sustainable Development: Taiwan's
Environmental Protection in the Climate of Economic Development and Political Liberalization, 6
Duke J. COMP. & INT'L L. 229, 270-71 (1996).
224. GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENT EXPERTS,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NIC 2000-02 at pp.5
0 
and 53-54 (Dec. 2000), hereafter, GLOBAL
TRENDS 2015.
225. World Resources Institute, WORLD RESOURCES 2002-2004 at 2 and 15 (Washington, D.C.:
World Resources Institute, 2003).
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and minority rights are weak and power is not exercised in accordance with the
rule of law. 226 Over time, this corrosive effect will frustrate stability, as is evident
in China today, where the government fears protest easily could spin out of
control.
Authoritarian rule acts as a drag on every area of society and the economy
because it inhibits the proliferation of free ideas and hinders free association. For
example, an effective environmental movement is less likely in China than
Taiwan. Whereas Taiwan's government is responsive to public elections, the rulers
in Beijing are mostly concerned with the maintenance of political stability. The
typical response of authoritarian regimes to middle-class radicalism is repression,
not reform. Authoritarian governments realize that reforms that cater to the
demands of the rising middle class only increase their strength and radicalism,
rather than sating its demands.227
A classic example of this dynamic unfolded in the Dominican Republic in
1965. The Reid Cabral government was overthrown by an urban middle-class
insurrection only after it began to initiate serious reforms. The Cabral reforms
included reducing public corruption, expanding political liberty, and purging some
228of the most oppressive elements in the military. Yet it was, "precisely at the
moment of moderate upswing... that the revolution of April, 1965, broke out; it
seems ironic that Reid was ousted at least partially because of the reforms he began
to carry out. ' 229 The Dominican Republic highlights the dilemma faced by
autocracies-minimal steps toward reform merely remind the people of the basic
illegitimacy of the ruling regime. Because the regimes have no legitimacy, they
could implode quickly and unexpectedly.
Modernization theory still has wide appeal. In his influential book, The
Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, Fareed Zakaria
argues, "[t]he simplest explanation for a new democracy's political success is its
economic success-or, to be more specific, high per capita income. 2 30 He
contends that, with few exceptions, when poor countries become democracies,
those democracies die.
Zakaria also argues democracy was inappropriate, or even desirable, for many
of the emerging democratic states, such as Russia, Belarus and the Philippines. He
asserts these "illiberal" democracies are responsible for a "democratization of
violence." Such democracies, he contends, spread poverty, ethnic violence,
repression, and civil and interstate war. These charges generally are contrary to
empirical evidence supporting the "democratic peace," which is set forth in Part II.
226. GLOBAL TRENDS 2015, at 4 2-46, supra, note 191.
227. Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES, at 373, supra, at note 157.
228. Id.
229. Howard J. Wiarda, THE CONTEXT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC: BACKGROUND TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1965 (unpublished paper, Harvard University,
Center for International Affairs, 1966) at 30-31, as cited in Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES, at 373, supra, at note 157.
230. Fareed Zakaria, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD
69 (2003).
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D, infra. This thinking perpetuates destructive myths about democracy, creating a
dangerous ambivalence or even hostility toward liberalization. It also keeps alive
the view, expressed more than a decade ago by the UN Development Program,
that, "growth-oriented strategies can sometimes afford to be blind to
democracy."
231
Zakaria's claims also raise methodological challenges that help to prove the
point. The argument that democracy only flourishes at middle income levels is
difficult to test since few authoritarian states have achieved middle income status.
Since 1960, only 16 autocracies have had per capita incomes above $2,000. Of
these only six-Taiwan, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, Greece and,
debatably-Mexico-adopted democracy in the aftermath of economic
expansion.232 Moreover, if we accept $6,000 as the benchmark for full transition to
democracy, it raises a troubling normative suggestion that "all but 4 of the 87
countries currently undergoing democratic transition, including Brazil, Kenya, the
Philippines, Poland, and South Africa, are unfit for democracy."
233
II. ENHANCING SECOND IMAGE ANALYSIS
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor
more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer
has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders
in all those who would profit by the new order....
-Machiavelli
234
Over the last thirty years, an avalanche of empirical evidence has emerged
revealing that regime type and levels of freedom in a society control whether the
social order moves toward sustainable development. Governments with a high
degree of political freedom and a liberal democratic government and a market
economy are far more likely to achieve development success. Importantly,
economic development need not be purchased at the expense of the environment.
Liberal democracies actually promote better ecological protection and
environmental sustainability. Free societies also are more peaceful and develop
deeper and more extensive cultural, political and economic ties with one another.
Thus, freedom is interconnected to economic growth, environmental sustainability
and regional security, and each of these are mutually reinforcing. In the last five
years, the amount of information supporting the choice for freedom has become so
overwhelming, and the number of democracies growing so large, that we have
neared a "perfect storm" poised to overturn the development orthodoxy.
In Part II.A, infra, political freedom is discussed within the context of
231. UN Development Program, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 27 (Oxford University Press, 1992), hereafter, GLOBAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT.
232. Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and Morton H. Halperin, Why Democracies Excel, at
63, supra, note 156.
233. Id.
234. NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 9 (W.K. Marriott, trans.
University of Chicago, 1952).
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development. Contrary to modernization theory, there is strong empirical evidence
that shows that democracy causes development. In Part II.B, the connection
between market freedoms and economic development is reviewed. Since the
emergence of the Washington Consensus in the early 1990s, the relationship
between markets and economic growth has become widely-although by no means
universally-accepted.
Part II.C reviews the impact of political and economic freedom on ecology
and environmental sustainability. While all societies now face the challenge of
delivering greater environmental protection, the evidence indicates that free
societies best promotes conservation of the natural environment. In contrast, states
governed by autocratic regimes, and those with low levels of political and
economic freedom, have the poorest environmental records in the world.
Finally, Part II.D reviews how free societies generate positive externalities
that buttress regional peace and security throughout the international system.
Sustainable development cannot occur in settings torn by conflict and war, so the
"democratic peace" generated by democracies is a particularly important
component for achieving global progress in the world's poorest neighborhoods.
Democracies tend to be more peaceful in their interactions with neighboring states,
engaging in more international trade and being far less likely to initiate aggressive
war. The benefits of the democratic peace, however, also extend to individuals and
their relationship to the state. National security and regional stability, as well as
human security and the individual's right to be free from fear of the state, are better
protected by democratic governments than autocracies.
A. Political Freedom and Development
Many global development institutions now accept markets as an essential
prerogative for successful development, and the importance of economic freedom
to development is set forth in Part II.B, infra. Too often, the UN wanes agnostic on
the issue, but it is becoming difficult to disagree that markets are essential to
achieve development. Unfortunately, democracy has not realized the same level of
respectability, although it may be even more important than markets. As early as
1970, Dankwart Rustow published an incisive article in Comparative Politics in
which he warned against the futility of trying to discern "preconditions" for a
country's transformation to democracy.235 He criticized studies that tended to make
broad conclusions from correlations between democracy and often external, but
even internal, economic, social, cultural and psychological factors, while ignoring
decisive political factors.236 Nonetheless, an ambivalent view toward democracy
persists, even among many democracies. The U.S. Department of State, for
example, cited the Lipset-Huntington view that "economic development makes
democracy possible..." on its Internet website promoting democracy.237
235. Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, 2 COMP. POL.
337, 362 (1970).
236. Id. at 356-62.
237. See Howard Cincotta, WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? Chapter on Democratic Government (adopting
Huntington's thesis, Democracy's Third Wave) (online publication from International Information
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The democratization of much of the planet occurred through breaking waves
of liberalism. Democratic waves are periods in which groups of states transition
from autocracy to democracy. 238 The first or long wave of democratization began
in the early nineteenth century and ended in 1926.239 During that time span, which
extended nearly one hundred years, thirty democracies rose in North America,
Western Europe and certain overseas English dominions.240
This long wave was reversed between the world wars, as autocratic
governments emerged in Europe and South America. 241 The second, shorter wave
of democracy began after World War II, with the democratization of the axis
powers. 242 This short wave of democratization ended and the trend was reversed as
military governments seized control in South America and the Mediterranean from
about 1958-1975.
243
The third wave of democracy began in 1974, rolling back many of the
setbacks experienced in the Mediterranean and South America. It expanded to Asia
in the 1980s.244 The third wave was propelled by the "grand failure" of the Eastern
bloc in the 1990s. 245 Democratic waves can be reinforced, or even spurred, by
liberalization in the international system and the influence of global 
institutions.246
The achievement of democratic waves can also be reversed. For example, despite
the second wave, the world was no more democratic by 1984 than it had been in
1954.247
In 1950, 41% of the world's population lived in a democracy; by 1990, 48%
did, and the number has increased even more over the last fifteen years.
248 Between
1974 and 1990, more than thirty countries transformed from dictatorship to
democracy. 249 The third wave unfolded in an almost sequential manner.
250 First,
the fascist regimes of Southern Europe stepped aside in the early 1970s; next,
autocracy in Latin America and Asia dissolved in the later 1970s 
and 1980s.251
Freedom emerged in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in Africa in the 1990s.
252 In
1989, thirty of the forty-eight countries of sub-Saharan Africa were ruled by a
Programs, U.S. Department of State), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm 13.htm (last visited Sep. 21, 2004).
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military regime. 253 By 1995, there were only three regimes that were clear-cut
examples of military rule in the sub-Sahara region.25 4
1. Defining Democracy
There are as many definitions of democracy as there are democracies. Some
might draw the circle of democracy so broadly as to include the jirga in
Afghanistan, the panchayat in India, the shoora in Islamic societies, the mawi
tiplutmamk among Native Americans, and countless other community forms of
dialogue and decision-making. 255 While any effort to achieve societal consensus
can be applauded as a move in the right direction, a thriving liberal democracy is
not simply the triumph of a majority or adherence to a culturally-sensitive tribal
authority.
The foundation for liberal democracy is at least a thousand years old. The
cardinal principle of the Magna Carta was the idea, just beginning to germinate in
England at the end of the first millennium, that freemen of the kingdom had rights
as against the government, and that those rights should be secured to them by laws
binding on the king. 256 Montesquieu, writing in Spirit of the Laws, distinguished
between what he termed limited regimes and despotic regimes.257 The two
traditions-English and French-finally became confused when they merged in
the liberal movement of the nineteenth century. 258 The differences would reappear
in the twentieth century as a conflict between liberal democracy of the English
tradition and social or rationalist democracy of the French.
The French revolutionary thinkers were optimistic about human nature,
believing in the power of intellectuals to rearrange society. 259 The English were
more pessimistic, seeking to design institutions that would control human
nature. 26 Though these two schools are now often lumped together, they
demarcate separate philosophical space. The English view, derived from Scottish
moral philosophers led by David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and
Edmund Burke, is essentially empiricist. 26 The French approach is informed by
the French Enlightenment and Cartesian rationalism. Its most celebrated proponent
is Rousseau.
262
Although democracies need not fit a specific model, the more successful
approach falls squarely in the English tradition. The English found the essence of
253. Id.
254. John A. Wiseman, NEW STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 1-2 (1996).
255. GLOBAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 198, at 26.
256. MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER ADDRESSES 6 (William D. Guthrie, ed., Columbia University
Press 1916).
257. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, 12-13 (Thomas Nugent & J.V. Prichard, trans., William
Benton 1952).
258. F. A. Hayek, Freedom, Reason and Tradition, 68 ETHICS: INT'L J. OF SOC., POL. & LEG.
PHIL. 229, 229 (1958).
259. Id. at 233.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 230.
262. Id.
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freedom in spontaneity, organic growth in society and the absence of coercion; the
soul of the French approach lies in the pursuit and enforcement of an absolute and
collective purpose defined by doctrinaire deliberateness.263 While the English
concept formed a profound and valid theory that laid the indispensable foundation
of liberty, the French rationalist approach has been a disaster, leading many who
264
accepted it to the opposite of a free society.
The philosophical dichotomy was borne out in practice. By 1983, no former
French, Dutch or Belgian colony was rated "free" by Freedom House, yet several
former British colonies were. 265 Myron Weiner, writing at the time for the
American Enterprise Institute emphasized this point, "[E]very single country in the
Third World that emerged since the Second World War with a population of at
least one million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous
democratic experience is a former British colony."
266
A liberal democracy requires its leadership to remain accountable through an
elaborate system of checks and balances.267 It also must be designed to keep the
people safe, not only from the horizontal hazards of each other, but from the
vertical hazards of the rulers. This is something the French philosophers never
understood. 268 This safety function is made even more difficult as it unfolds in the
process of public choice, as horizontal hazards between groups (for example,
competitive greed or spite) are converted into vertical hazards through transposing
private claims as coercive government action.
A central feature of democracy is an electoral component; democracy is a
system in which incumbent parties actually lose elections and leave office when
the rules dictate. 269 In the United States, Schumpeter emphasized the importance of
electoral competition as a cornerstone of the "democratic method" in his 1942
classic, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.270 Robert Dahl describes
participatory political systems as those either directly or indirectly accountable to
271
the people. Elections serve that function.
Liberal democracy goes beyond mere elections and consists of structures,
relationships and ideas that celebrate and promote individual liberty. The
individual is protected from predatory groups in society, and from voracious state
263. Id. at 230.
264. Id. at 231.
265. Myron Weiner, Empirical Democratic Theory, in COMPARATIVE ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 26 (Myron Weiner & Ergun Ozbudun eds., 1983), cited in Huntington, supra note 168, at
206.
266. Id.
267. Jon Elster, Accountability in Athenian Politics, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
REPRESENTATION 253, 263-64 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
268. John Dunn, Situating Democratic Political Accountability, in DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABLITY, AND REPRESENTATION 329, 331 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
269. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10 (Jon Elster & Michael S. McPherson eds., 1991);
PRZEWORSKI, supra note 131, at 54.
270. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269, 273 (1943).
271. ROBERTA. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 2 (1971).
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power. As a form of government, liberal democracy may be defined in terms of
three elements: (1) the source of governing authority (generally derived from the
will of the people); (2) the purpose served by government (generally, pursuit of the
common good); and (3) procedures for constituting the government (generally,
popular elections).272 These broader concepts of liberal democracy include a
citizens instilled with civic virtue, effective popular control of the organs of
government, transparency in government, equal opportunity to participate in
government and promotion of the rule of law.
2 73
Open societies possess a multitude of advantages over autocratic societies. An
open society promotes discourse on shaping public value preferences regarding
government policy. Open societies maintain a healthy tension among contending
political forces, moderating extreme views. 274 Freedom of association, assembly,
speech and petition encourage the formation of diverse interest groups. Because
these groups appeal to wide-ranging and conflicting views and interests, they come
to encompass and represent most people in society. The groups, in turn, serve in
aggregate to cement rather than fragment civil society because most individuals
will come to identify with more than one group. In contrast, in tribal societies,
individual allegiance is dedicated solely to the tribe, rather than spread among
competing interest group factions.
[T]here is some positive probability that any majority [will contain]
individuals who identify for certain other purposes with the minority.
Members of the threatened minority who strongly prefer an alternative
will make their feelings known to those members of the tentative
majority who also, at some psychological level, identify with the
minority. Some of these sympathizers will shift their support away from
the majority alternative and the majority will crumble.275
Democracies also leverage the pragmatic benefits that are a product of
tolerating dissent.276 Dialogue creates the opportunity for public debate about
deeply held values of the good life, and this discourse and experimentation is more
likely to produce not only rapid economic progress, but also the stability that
comes with a moral consensus in society.277 This iterative process also helps
societies make better collective decisions.
[T]here's no real evidence that one can become expert in something as
broad as 'decision-making' or 'policy' or 'strategy.' Auto repair,
piloting, skiing, perhaps even management: these are skills that yield to
application, hard work and native talent. But forecasting an uncertain
future and deciding the best course of action in the face of that future are
272. HUNTINGTON, supra note 205, at 6.
273. Id. at 9-12.
274. Lipset, supra note 150 at 97.
275. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 104-05 (1956).
276. Scott A. Beaulier, Is Discourse Relevant for Economic Development?, 8 INDEP. REV. 343,
345-46 (2004).
277. Id. at 346.
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much less likely to do so.
278
To be effective, complex planning must exploit vigorous national debate that
only comes from democracy.
279
The most comprehensive exposition of international democracy arose from
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).280 The CSCE was
a complex negotiating process involving all of the thirty-five original states to the
world's largest regional security organization. 28 1 The Copenhagen Conference was
nothing short of profound, achieving the most dramatic and far-reaching document
on human rights and democracy ever concluded.282 According to Thomas
Burgenthal, a public member of the U.S. delegation, the Copenhagen Document
(Document) proclaimed a new public order based on democratic pluralism that was
as important as the Peace of Westphalia. 283 Never before had the principles of
political pluralism and human rights been laid out so explicitly or enumerated at
such length.
Among the more insightful points of agreement were these "elements of
justice" in paragraph 5 which were deemed essential to the full expression of the
inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all human beings:
Free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot;
The rule of law, which does not mean merely a formal legality which
assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement
of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full
acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality;
Genuinely representative government;
The duty of the government and public authorities to comply with the
constitution and the laws;
Human rights and fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by law and in
accordance with international law;
Legislation adopted at the end of a public procedure, and regulations
published;
Military authorities serving under, and accountable to, civil authorities;
Effective means of redress against administrative action of the state;
278. SUROWIECKI, supra note 8, at 32.
279. JAMES MEADOWCRAFT, PROSUS REPORT 1/97: DEMOCRATIC PLANNING AND THE
CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 18 (1997), available at
http://prosus.uio.no/publikasjoner/Rapporter/1997-01/97-01 -txt.html.
280. In December, 1994, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
281. The OSCE now has fifty-five member states, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
(Complete OSCE documentation is available at: http://www.osce.org/index.php). The Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/index.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
282. Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE,
Norms and the Construction of Security in Post-Cold War Europe, 53 INT'L ORG. 505, 515-16 (1999).
283. Id. at 516.
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Independent judiciary and independent legal practitioners; and,
Extensive and neutrally applied criminal procedures.
284
The OSCE states also declared that the will of the people, freely and fairly
expressed through periodic and genuine elections, was the basis of the authority
and legitimacy of all government. 285 Paragraph 7 of the Document contains
detailed requirements for free and fair elections; including universal suffrage,
secret ballots, the right to seek public office and the right of the winner of the
election to enter office after the election.
286
Among the other rights guaranteed are the right of free speech and thought,
free assembly, free association, the right to peaceful assembly and the right to
287organize. Fleshing out these and the other enumerated principles in fine detail,
the Document represents not just the establishment of the post-Cold War order, but
a "Magna Carta for the internationalization of democracy." 288 Other international
declarations about democracy have since added weight to the emerging global
democratic norm, especially the Harare Declaration of the Commonwealth
States289 and the Warsaw Declaration,290 but Copenhagen was there first and in
greater detail. Moreover, by announcing that democratic gains were irreversible,
the Document abruptly turned Brezhnev Doctrine on its head.29'
The Document was profound in one other sense. The preamble expressed the
conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedom based on the
rule of law and democracy is a prerequisite for the lasting order of peace, justice
and cooperation on the European continent. For the first time, the domestic order
was inextricably bound to the international order. This maxim lies at the center of
securing regional peace and sustainable development, and these linkages are
explored further in Part II.D, infra.
Scholars have developed various checklists to explain what triggered the
expansion of democracy in the 1990s, but there is a remarkable degree of
convergence on the most critical factors. Huntington and Przeworski, working
separately, both believe the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine by the Soviet
Union was a key variable in ending communist rule in Eastern Europe.2 92 Both
284. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of
the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1307-09.
285. Id. at 1309.
286. Id. at 1310.
287. Id. at 1311.
288. Professor John Norton Moore, Lecture: The Copenhagen Document, Toward the Rule of Law
and the Principle of Democratic Governance, University of Virginia School of Law, Nov. 29, 2004
(Notes on file with the author).
289. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration 1991, available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/intemal.asp?NodelD= 141099.
290. Toward a Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference: Final Warsaw Declaration:
Toward a Community of Democracies (2000), reprinted in ENHANCING U.S. LEADERSHIP AT THE
UNITED NATIONS 47 (2002) available at http://www.ccd21 .org/articles/warsaw declaration.htm.
291. Charles Sampford & Margaret Palmer, The Theory of Collective Response, in PROTECTING
DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 28-31 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic eds., 2005).
292. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE, supra note 205, at 44-45; ADAM PRZEWORSKI,
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scholars also cite "legitimacy crises" that eroded the authority of the Eastern
293European communist regimes as another fundamental condition,. Moreover, both
Przeworski and Huntington accept that a single democratic state produces a
"snowball" effect, stimulating neighboring populations to insist on democratic rule
after observing the freedom enjoyed next door.294 In Eastern Europe, the catalyst
was Solidarity in Poland. Democracy was set in motion by the union's resistance to
martial law in 1981, and it was emboldened by its unexpected victory in the upper
parliamentary elections in the summer of 1989.
211
2. Democracy at the United Nations
The UN had virtually no role in the two democratic waves occurring after
World War II. Indeed, it is not too much to say that these waves occurred in spite
of the drift of the UN's global institutions. Only in the last few years have those
institutions replaced their former hostility toward democracy, sometimes with
revisionist democratic rhetoric. The increasing influence of democracy in the third
wave was achieved often in the face of UN intransigence, rather than through its
encouragement and influence. It was not until December, 1988, that the UN
General Assembly declared that the authority to govern is based on the will of the
people, expressed in periodic and genuine free elections. 296 Armed with this
resolution, one might have expected the UN Secretariat to serve as a stronger
advocate of democracy over the last fifteen years.
Even after democracy entered the common lexicon, the UN has been more
sanguine than realistic about exactly what the term means. Rather than focusing on
democracy, and the representation of aggregate choices through state
representatives, the UN has set into the habit of promoting "participation" through
nongovernmental "interests. '" 297 Consequently, the biggest winners have been
NGOs, which have proliferated and become increasingly influential in shaping
global policy.298 After Rio, NGOs expanded their influence even further while
helping to craft global treaties such as the Ottawa Convention 299 and the Rome
Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court.
300
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Democracies, UN Secretary-General Annan said he was particularly gratified that
the new coalition of democracies was meeting to support tl;e founding values of
the United Nations, as "set out in the [UN] Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights." 30 1 But from its founding, the UN has had a rather mixed history
with democracy, fluctuating from mild support to active hostility, through stages of
ambivalence, and then only recently graduating to vague expressions of support
that are often devoid of content and rigor.
Contrary to the Secretary-General's platitudes, the word "democracy" does
not appear in the UN Charter, although it is surely embodied in its normative
force.302 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
0 3
never mentions the word. Nor does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
although the latter document is particularly important in making numerous
references to human freedom-freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom
of assembly and the right to life, liberty and security of the person.304 The Articles
of Agreement for each of the five organizations comprising the World Bank have
no mention of democracy.30 5 The charter of the IMF also does not mention
democracy. 30 6 Still, the UN Charter, the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights provide a powerful normative foundation for a leading UN role in
promoting democracy. Only very recently has the UN Secretariat begun to fulfill
that legacy.
By the end of the Cold War, glimmers of democracy began to surface in
orthodox development theory. The overview of the UN Development Program's
(UNDP) Human Development Report 1991: Financing Human Development,
stated: "the basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of
people's choices to make development more democratic and participatory." 30 7 The
document contained no other reference to democracy, which is a somewhat
301. UN Democracy Caucus: The UNA-USA National Convention, 2003, available at
http://www.ccd2I .org/news/una-usa_convention.htm (last visited on Nov. 6, 2004).
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GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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plen mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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startling omission, coming in the aftermath of Copenhagen. Instead, the report
provided grudging acknowledgement that there are new ways of thinking about
development, while taking a noncommittal position on which, if any, were
preferable.
The 1991 report suggested that two schools of thought now exist-the "self-
interest or public choice school of political economy" that argues that all
players-citizens, politicians and bureaucrats-seek to influence public policy to
their own ends, and the "platonic" theory of government, that maintains
government is an active, essential and benevolent guardian of the public welfare,
acting in a disinterested manner. 30 8 The UN's conclusion accommodated both
theories, saying there is "evidence on either side. ' 3°9 Unable to make a
determination on which course developing states should follow, the UNDP side-
stepped the issue, and offered this: "Political and economic transition is an art,
rather than a science. A successful strategy requires pragmatism, not ideological
stance."
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At the fifty-first session of the UN General Assembly in 1997, the world body
adopted what should have been a landmark, the Agenda for Development.3 1 This
resolution recognized that democracy, development and human rights are all
mutually reinforcing. The resolution also named democracy and fundamental
freedoms, as well as human rights and a right to transparent government, each as
essential to the realization of social and people-centered sustainable
development. 312 The central importance of democracy in development, however,
was ignored. Much like an outsider peering in, the UN acknowledged, "democracy
is spreading everywhere," without, however, attaching itself to the right side of
history.
3 1 3
The primary reason for the lackadaisical approach toward democracy remains
the power and influence of the development orthodoxy. Part of the problem also
lies, ironically enough, with the growth of American power in the late-1990s.
Because the United States is the most powerful nation, as well as the most forceful
proponent of democracy in the world, anti-Americanism has a tendency to generate
and reflect opposition to democracy more generally. 314 For example, public
opinion polls conducted in five Balkan countries in June, 2003, found that,
"hostility to the United States correlates with hostility to markets and democracy,
as well as hostility toward the Jews." 315 Members within those foreign publics that
308. Id. at 70.
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310. Id. at 74-75.
311. G.A. Res. 51/240, A/RES/51/240/Annex (Oct. 15, 1997).
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the unpopularity of the Bush administration or widespread hostility to the American-led war in Iraq.
There is growing consensus that anti-Americanism" is a 'master framework' with broad and flexible
appeal .... " Ivan Krastev, The Anti-American Century, 15 Journal for Democracy 5, 6 (2004).
315. Id. at 11.
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were the most pro-democratic tended also to be the most pro-American. 3 16 In many
countries, the rise of anti-Americanism is a major obstacle to democratization,
serving as a surrogate political movement for anti-market and anti-democratic
politics.
317
Anti-globalism is the final major contributor to agnosticism toward
democracy. The anti-globalists assert that democracy "limits choices" by
compelling governments to make decisions within constraints that are politically
feasible, whereas authoritarian states have the "benefit" of making choices without
regard for public preferences.318
3. Regimes Matter- Przeworski
The ambivalence and hostility toward democracy raises the question whether
regime type really matters. Recent statistical modeling by a team led by Adam
Przeworski at the University of Chicago has resolved the question-it does. In one
of the most comprehensive analyses on democracy and development, Przeworski
isolated statistical evidence of the impact of dictatorship and democracy. 31 9
Working inductively, Przeworski compared 1 11 variables against political regime
types for 135 countries for each year from 1950-1990.320 Although Przeworski
tends to give credence to the theory that minimum per capita income is essential
for democracy to take root, ultimately he rejects the dictator-to-development
model.321 Przeworski's research lies in a no-man's land beyond modernization
theory but not entirely committed to democracy promotion.
In an update of Lipset and Huntington, Przeworski argued that it is
demonstrable that democracies are more likely to be found in more highly
developed countries, but this is because democratic regimes never fall once per
capita incomes reach about $6,000.322 Per capita incomes rise in both democratic
and autocratic regimes, but once income reaches the $6,000 threshold, democratic
governance persists and democracy survives. 323 In 2003, Przeworski concluded,
"No democracy ever fell in a country with a per capita income higher than that of
Argentina in 1975, $6,055. "324 Above $6,055, "democracy lasts forever. 325
Przeworski went beyond modernization theory to challenge its central feature
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that democratic regimes are no better or worse than authoritarian regimes. Writing
in Democracy and Development, Przeworski argued that political regimes were not
dispositive of economic growth, but then concluded that because dictatorships
"depend on the will, and sometimes the whim, of a dictator, they exhibit a high
variance of economic performance.... ,,326 In the end, per capita incomes grow
slower and people's lives are shorter in dictatorships. '" 327 Przeworski's research is
valuable in showing that political regimes affect economic growth as well as
political liberty. Development is a process of government policy and not an
outcome of simple conditions.
The emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic
development. Democracy is... established by political actors
pursuing their goals, and it can be initiated at any level of
development. Only once it is established do economic constraints
play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are greater
when the country is richer.... If they succeed in generating
development, democracies can survive even in the poorest
nations.
Przeworski also showed that political stability is not transportable across
regime types. The very phenomena that constitute instability in
dictatorships-changes in rulers, strikes, demonstrations-are just part of everyday
life in a democracy." 329 In a dictatorship, any actual or anticipated change of
leadership or political opposition carries such uncertainty that it imposes special
social and economic costs on society, arresting development. Even though such
phenomena are much more common in a democracy, they are routine.330 By
permitting continual change at slow moving gradations and within accepted
political and legal parameters, democracies make change less unsettling.
4. Democracy Causes Development-Roll & Talbott
Many in the contemporary period are uncertain whether Lipset-Huntington
were correct or whether Rustow was on to something. For example, the UN's
Human Development Report of 1992: Global Dimension of Human Development
dedicated an entire chapter to political freedom.331 The report celebrated political
freedom as an essential element of human development, but argued that the link
between democracy and development could not be isolated. "The link between
freedom and development is seldom in dispute. What is often disputed the
causality-the direction of the arrow, whether more freedom leads to more
development or more development leads to more freedom."
332
Although Przeworski determined that regimes matter, his research is
sometimes equivocal on whether democracy produces economic growth. Richard
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Roll and John R. Talbott, two scholars at the University of California-Los Angeles,
provided a clearer picture of what is going on as a country transitions to
democracy, and they buried modernization theory.
Does political and democratic reform produce economic conditions that lead
to more rapid economic development? Or conversely, do exogenous improvements
in income and economic development precipitate citizen action to push for
democracy? Roll and Talbott employed an events-study method to reach some
quite dramatic findings on these questions. 3 33 The events-study method is a
statistical technique that financial economists have used for decades to isolate the
impact of a particular event, such as a stock split, in the life of a business
corporation.
334
Roll and Talbott examined the impact of events that represent a material
change in a country's level of political freedom to determine how a country's
political shift affects economic growth. There were two distinct event categories
which were derived from the 2001 CIA World Factbook. The first category
included "democratic" events that may be seen as proxies for increasing political
freedom, such as a country's first ever free elections, the removal of a dictator or
the addition to the ballot of a party other than the ruling party. 335 The second event
category included anti-democratic events, such as the establishment of military or
one-party rule, or suspension of the constitution.336
Roll and Talbott's findings indicated a rather vivid difference in GNIpc
following democratic versus anti-democratic events. The average sample country
experiencing a democratic event had essentially flat economic growth-0.67 % per
year-in the five years preceding the event.337 After a democratic event, the
economies of these same average countries grew quite rapidly, accelerating to
2.2% per year in the first five years after the event.
338
The growth rate for post-democratic event states fell to an annual rate of 1.7%
in the second five-year period after the event, before increasing to 2.7% in the
subsequent decade. 339 The average sample country experiencing an anti-democratic
event had a 1.6% average economic growth rate in the decade before the event, and
a rate of only .85% for the decade after the event. 34 It is not too much for the
authors to claim that their research "constitute[s] compelling evidence that
democracy-related changes by a country's government cause changes in per capita
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income."341
When countries undertake a democratic change, such as deposing a dictator,
they enjoy a rather dramatic spurt in economic growth. The growth spurt persists
for at least two decades. In contrast, an anti-democratic event is followed by a
reduction in economic growth. Democratic conditions are causes of cross-country
differences in wealth and not the endogenous effects of wealth.
342
B. The 'Discovery' of Markets and Economic Freedom
Economic freedom works to create wealth, but freedom should be valued as
an end in itself-as an unqualified human right. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948 stated that everyone has the right to own property alone or
in association with others, and no person may be arbitrarily deprived of
property. 343 This expressed a normative value independent of the power of
economic freedom to raise living standards. Market participation is a form of self-
actualization, affording people a basis for self-respect and 
human dignity.344
Economic human rights, as important as they are for economic growth and the
realization of human dignity, are often omitted from rights-based approaches to
development. 345 More than a decade ago, Mancur Olson, a former Distinguished
Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, remarked that the moral appeal of democracy
is almost universally appreciated, but its economic advantages are scarcely
understood.,
346
The UNDP reported in 1999 that intemational and national economic policies
shifted sharply toward markets beginning in the 1970s.
347 That assessment is
overly generous. The shift toward markets actually began with the Thatcher and
Reagan revolutions. 348 It was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which
laid out the devastating and embarrassing catastrophe of planned economies, that
market-oriented economic reform really gained currency outside of a few select
countries. Unfortunately, the UN was not at the forefront of change. The UNDP
summed up accurately the mood of old thinking that permeated development
thought in 1990, when it declared flatly, "[t]here is no automatic link between
economic growth and human progress."349 In that same UNDP report, the chapter
addressing economic growth did not mention the word "markets" 
once.350
341. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
342. Id. at 28.
343. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doe. A/810(Dec. 12,1948).
344. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEV. REPORT 1993 22 (1993) [hereinafter
PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION].
345. WEAVING THE RULES, supra note 103, at 96-99.
346. Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SC. REV. 567, 
575
(1993).
347. GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 61, at 29.
348. See BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 101, at 1 (giving passing mention of the importance of
economic growth).
349. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990: CONCEPTS 
AND
MEASUREMENT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 42 (Oxford University Press, 1990).
350. Id. at 42-60.
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The fall of the Soviet Union brought forth great introspection and triggered a
reassessment in world development, particularly among the developed countries
that dispense development aid. The implosion at the Kremlin resolved the debate
about whether there was something fatally wrong with a centrally-planned system.
Many were disappointed, thinking that beyond the absurdities of the Kafkaesque
communist state they could glimpse a genuine alternative to Western
approaches.351 When Soviet socialism failed economically, some scholars held on
tightly, producing even more complementary theories that explained development
in terms of exogenous factors, such as the availability of natural resources, levels
of educational achievement, physical proximity to world markets and, interestingly
enough, levels of economic development. Each of these explanation would prove
spurious.
1. The Washington Consensus
The international development organizations located in Washington, D.C.
were the first global players officially to adopt the centrality of markets in
economic growth. The World Bank and the IMF reached a consensus on advice
offered to the Latin American states in 1989.352 John Williamson coined the term
"Washington Consensus" to describe this set of market oriented reforms that the
state-directed economies of Latin America should adopt to spur economic
growth.353
Although the Consensus formula was geographically and historically specific,
it gained acceptance as a distillation of the policies emanating from the Thatcher
and Reagan administrations, and reached the intellectual mainstream.354 Later, the
Washington Consensus would be applied to development choices in Asia and
Africa.355 The checklist of principles includes fiscal discipline, tax reform that
lowered marginal rates and broadened the tax base, trade and investment
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, secure property rights and redirection of
public spending towards areas that offer higher investment return, such as
healthcare and education.356
The Washington Consensus provided an alternative to resource-based and
other exogenous models of development, and it filled the vacuum left by central
planning, which was discredited. 7 The Consensus soon became a shorthand
reference for globalization and neo-liberalism, transforming into a broader and less
doctrinaire theory of development. In 1992, even the UNDP would get on board,
proclaiming, "Markets are the means, human development is the end., 358 During
351. Rist, supra note 97, at 178.
352. John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus? 15
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, 251 (2000).
353. Id.
354. Id at 254.
355. Id. at 254-55.
356. Id. at 252-54. For the inception of the term "Washington Consensus," see, John Williamson,
Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus, '21 WORLD DEV. 1329-36 (1993).
357. Jeremy Clift, Beyond the Washington Consensus, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2003, at 1.
358. GLOBAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 198, at 1.
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the next year, 1993, the UNDP expanded its discussion to include the need for
markets to be able to work freely in a stable macroeconomic environment, and that
the economy should contain a fair tax system and offers rewards for 
enterprise. 359
Detractors would argue that individual policy components of the Washington
Consensus were not independently correlated with development. But econometric
analysis at the IMF showed that the policies were effective in promoting economic
development when used as a package of mutually reinforcing policies.
360 The core
policies of the Washington Consensus could be expected to greatly increase the
chance of a country experiencing rapid economic growth when put in place as a
comprehensive plan. The results were far less certain if a country adopted only a
single component, selected only some of the components in a cafeteria style, or
adopted components on a rolling basis one by one.
36 1 This suggested that those
hoping to cherry-pick a few components of economic liberalization and graft those
to an authoritarian system would be disappointed.
By the late 1990s, it had become tragically clear that four decades and billions
of dollars in development aid by donor nations to the developing states had been
largely wasted on nations lacking sound macroeconomic policies.
362 Without
economic reform, the ability of increased aid to make a dramatic difference in
developing countries was doubtful. For all the time and energy the developing
world expended wringing aid concessions from the developed countries, the means
to generate far greater wealth through adoption of market-oriented strategies was
already before them.
For example, in 2003, total official global development assistance from all
sources was $77 billion-including $16 billion from the United States.
363 In
comparison, total foreign investment by all Organization for Economic
Development (OECD) countries into developing countries was $192 billion,
worker remittances from the OECD to the developing states were $93 billion and
portfolio investments were more than $27 billion.364 To give a sense of scale to
these figures, it is instructive to note developing countries exported more than $3
trillion-more than 1/3 rd of their combined GDP during 2003.365
Developing countries could grow their aggregate income by $532 billion by
2015 if world trade barriers could be reduced. In a World Bank study of fifty-six
developing countries from 1970-1993, there was a strong correlation between
359. PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION, supra note 311, at 4.
360. Jahangir Aziz & Robert F. Wescott, Policy Complementaries and the Washington Consensus
18-19 (Working Paper of the Int'l Monetary Fund, WP/97/118, 1997).
361. Id.
362. Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid Spurs Growth-in a Sound Policy Environment, FIN. &
DEV., Dec. 1997, at 5-6.
363. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: FINANCIAL
FLOWS K EY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRY GROWTH, Oct. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/3 7162.htm.
364. ld. (Worker remittances from the United States alone account for $28 billion, almost twice the
amount of official development assistance).
365. Id.
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development assistance and economic growth, but only for those countries that
implemented open trade regimes and free markets and exercised fiscal
discipline. 366 The findings were particularly strong for the forty-one low-income
countries in the sample, which included Bolivia, El Salvador, Mali, Honduras and
Ghana. 367 Using market economics and fiscal responsibility, even the poorest
countries were able to leverage scarce aid dollars and generate growth.
2. Economic Freedom of the World-The Fraser Institute
Forty years ago, Milton Friedman's principles of free markets, individual
freedom and dispersed governmental power could not be tested empirically
because there was insufficient data. Since then, however, data has accumulated to
support his thesis. One of the most comprehensive and detailed studies on
economic freedom in the world is conducted each year by the Fraser Institute in
Vancouver, Canada. The Fraser data show that as levels of economic freedom
increase, so too does economic performance. 368 Unapologetically, the Fraser
economists aver, "[tihe key to changing policy in the world is changing the climate
of opinion about what works and what does not work in encouraging world
development. 369
The work of the Fraser Institute is collated into an index called Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW). EFW gauges the degree of economic freedom in
five areas: (1) size of government (government spending, taxes and government
enterprise); (2) stable legal structures and protection of property rights; (3) access
to sound money; (4) free international trade; and, (5) regulation of business, labor
and credit. 370 Each area is comprised of twenty-one components, and a number of
these components are themselves made up of several subcomponents.37'
In total, the index is constructed from thirty-eight subcomponents
comprised of economic data, such as the growth of the money supply. Qualitative
measures, such as the degree of independence of the judiciary and the integrity of
the legal system, are included.372 Rather than focusing solely on what might be
termed "corporate-friendly" practices, EFW is especially concerned with
understanding how individuals fare at the microeconomic level in society.373 In
order for individuals, as opposed to corporate entities, to prosper, the system must
366. Burnside & Dollar, supra note 329, at 1-3.
367. Id. at 2-3.
368. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT (2004). The report is co-published with nearly sixty policy and economic institutions from
virtually every area of the world.
369. Brief, Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report 2004, Fraser Institute, Jul. 15, 2004
(Copy on file with the author).
370. Gwartney and Lawson, supra note 337, at 28.
371. Id. at 6.
372. For example, Area 2, Sound Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, assembles
survey data from the International Country Risk Guide, compiled by a Fraser Institute panel of experts,
and the Global Competitiveness Report, created by business leaders. Together, these surveys are a
proxy for measuring a nation's legal structure and the security of property rights-whether the law
enforcement system protects the property rights of owners and enforces contracts in an even-handed
manner. Id. at 6-7.
373. Id. at 3.
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protect and promote individual economic rights as individual civil liberties.
Economic human rights include variables such as the extent of personal choice in
society, the ability of individuals to conduct voluntary exchanges, the freedom to
openly compete and enter markets, and the security of privately owned personal
property.374 The Fraser Institute has compiled an impressive report that chronicles
the correlation between freedom and development throughout the world.
3. Economic Freedom Causes Development-Roll & Talbott
Many people accept the correlation between wealth and freedom, but
finding what causes this correlation has not been easy. Analogous to the question
of political development is a parallel question of economic development. Do
market reforms bring about economic growth, or are there exogenous
improvements in the economy, such as higher incomes, that then generate
development? 375 In other words, does economic liberty make people prosper, or do
prosperous people seek out and then create a system of economic freedom?
As part of their work on the relationship between democratic and
authoritarian political events and GNIpc, Roll and Talbott also searched for
causative economic variables by comparing GNIpc as a broad and stable measure
of economic wellbeing against fourteen societal determinants
376. Among the
fourteen variables tested, property rights (positive), informal market activity (e.g.
black markets) (negative) and regulation (negative) had the highest levels of
statistical significance in relation to GNIpc.
377
The researchers' regression analysis indicated the critical ingredient of
successful development was an economic and political system that invites
profitable economic exchanges among individual market participants, without risk
of expropriation or repudiation.378 The variables had high levels of statistical
significance and directional impact.
The next three most significant variables correlating to economic
prosperity were political rights (positive) and civil liberties and freedom of the
press (positive), providing additional support for the proposition that economic and
political freedoms operate in tandem to make countries wealthy. A complementary
study from the World Bank found that there is a strong and consistent link between
the measure of civil liberties in a society and the extent of successful economic
performance derived from World Bank-sponsored projects.379
The weak property rights regimes in many Third World countries
discourages investment, diverts energy into black markets and smuggling, and
renders external assistance ineffective. 380 The powerful synergy between the rule
374. Id.
375. Roll and Talbott, supra note 300, at 81.
376. Id. at 76.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 76-77.
379. Lant Pritchett, Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of Government Projects,
1998 FIN. & DEV. 26, 27. This article draws from on the study, Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and
Lant Pritchett, Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of Government Projects, 11 WORLD
BANK ECON. REV. 219, 219-42 (1997).
380. Roll and Talbott, supra note 300, at 78.
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of law, democracy and economic freedom is illustrated by Peruvian economist and
brilliant maverick Hernando de Soto:
The poor inhabitants of [developing] nations-five-sixths of
humanity-do have things, but they lack the process to represent their
property and create capital. They have houses but not titles; crops but
not deeds; businesses but not statutes of incorporation. It is the
unavailability of these essential representations that explains why people
who have adopted every other Western invention, from the paper clip to
the nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficient capital to
make domestic capitalism work.38'
C. Environmental Sustainability & Democracy
The only realistic, feasible avenue to ecological political reform is
through the political institutions of an open society that respects human rights.
-H.J. McCloskey 382
Postmodern theorists suggest that sustainable development requires the
creation of a new democratic rationality, in which the preferences of "virtual
groupings," such as future generations, the distant poor, or other species, must be
identified and represented.383 Arriving at this new rationality operationally is non-
democratic. Post-modernists seek to develop mechanisms that can surmount the
public's tendency to assert citizen competence and to overcome the public's
384misguided common sense in complex ecological issues. In some cases,
democracy actually undermines sustainable development. "Pluralism's greatest
strength can become the ecosystem's greatest weakness...385
These theorists worry that the "ecological clock is ticking," and advocate
a rebalancing away from representative democracy toward "ecological
democracy. '386 Efforts at rebalancing power in a shift away from democracy are
strengthened by voices of authoritarian regimes. The composition of the major
environmental conferences, as well as the UN Environmental Program, is rife with
autocratic member governments. 387 The views of autocracies magnify those of
extreme environmentalists who approach their calling as something akin to a
religion. 388
381. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6-7 (2000).
382. H. J. MCCLOSKEY, ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS 159 (1983).
383. William M. Lafferty, Democratic Parameters for Regional Sustainable Development: The
Need for a New Demos with a New Rationality 18-19 (University of Oslo, Program for Research and
Documentation for a Sustainable Society, Working Paper No. 1/00, 2000).
384. Id. at 22-23.
385. Id. at 23.
386. Id. at 25-28, 30.
387. Nils Petter Gleditsch and Bjorn Otto Sverdrup, DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Paper
presented to the 36th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, Feb. 21-
25, 1995 at 21.
388. Michael Crichton, Environmentalism as Religion, Remarks to the Commonwealth Club, San
Francisco, California, Sep. 15, 2003 http://www.crichton-official.com/speeches/speechesquote05.html
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1. Autocracy and Environmental Catastrophe
As a rule, autocratic regimes treat the environment with the same
purposeful recklessness and brutality that they treat their people.
389 Autocratic
states that make the transition states toward democratic governance also make
progress toward environmental conservation. This fact was evident to keen
observers more than twenty years ago, when the philosopher and ethicist H.J.
McCloskey argued it was the democracies that were implementing measures to
protect ecology, and it was China and the dictatorships of Africa and the Arab
world, that were the worst environmental offenders.
390
Even more moderate autocratic states show little ecological awareness or
sensitivity. The milder flavor of South American dictators in Chile and Argentina
in the early 1980s, for example, came to power under the guise of safeguarding
human values and the protecting the environment. 391 It quickly became apparent,
however, that the regimes constituted greater threats to both than did the
governments they replaced.392 Unfortunately, the dictatorships traded on
legitimacy endowed upon them at the time from Malthusian luminaries like
Stanford University biologist Paul R. Ehrlich 393 and economist Robert L.
Heilbroner. 394 Both men argued that freedom inherent to market democracies was
promoting ecological disaster.
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). See also, Gleditsch and Sverdrup, supra note 357, at 21 (environmentalism
in its quasi-religious form threatens democracy as much as other forms of fanaticism), and referencing
Harald Liebich, Naturvern som religion [Environmentalism as Religion], HUMANIST no. 3, 22-25.
389. Alexander H. Joffe, The Environmental Legacy of Saddam Husayn: The Archeology of
Totalitarianism in Modern Iraq, 33 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 313 (2000).
390. McCloskey, supra note 349, at 157.
391. Id. at 158.
392. Id.
393. Dr. Ehrlich's work helped ignite and propel the environmental movement. He is well-known
for his notoriously inaccurate prediction of a world population explosion, THE POPULATION BOMB
(1968). His most recent work, ONE WITH NINEVAH: POLITICS, CONSUMPTION AND THE HUMAN FUTURE
(2004), is a dire warning of looming environmental catastrophe that threatens to make the world into a
new fallen Ninevah. (In the Old Testament, the prophet Jonah prophesies the destruction of Ninevah,
the capital of the Assyrian Empire). Ehrlich is perhaps best known for the 1980 bet he made with Dr.
Julian Simon, an economist at the University of Maryland. Simon maintained that human ingenuity
would solve problems associated with population growth. He contended that if Ehrlich were correct that
the world would experience greater scarcity, then the price of natural resources would tend to increase
over time. Instead, Simon predicted that commodity prices would fall, and he challenged Ehrlich to a
wager. He let Ehrlich pick any commodity and any future date to illustrate his point that commodities
would fall over time. Ehrlich accepted, and in October 1980, he purchased $1,000.00 worth of metals,
evenly divided among tungsten, copper, tin, nickel and chrome. If the total value of the metals was
higher in 1990, Simon would have to pay him the difference. If the metals fell in price, Ehrlich would
have to pay Simon the difference. In 1990, Ehrlich sent Simon a check for $576; all five metals had
declined in value. John Tierney, The Big City; Optimism by the Numbers, N. Y. TIMES, Jan.3, 1999,
Section 6, at 10.
394. See, e.g., HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT (1974). In the spirit of
Heilbroner, a recent scholar has argued that global civilization is on the verge of collapse and can only
be saved by a massive decrease in the human population and resource use. See Geoffrey P. Glasby,
Sustainable Development: The Need for a New Paradigm, 4 ENV'T, DEV. AND SUSTAINABILITY 333,
339-42 (2002).
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Unlike the extensive studies that have established powerful correlations
between democracy and economic development, there is a paucity of empirical
analysis on democracies and ecology. Although there is a great need for such
research, one area of difficulty has been in reducing assessed environmental
conditions into measurable metrics, particularly outside North America and
Western Europe. 95 Because of the lack of extensive empirical data, one of the best
ways to approach a study of the impact of regime type on the environment is the
case study.
One case immediately leaps to mind-the environmental calamity of the
former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. The well-known economic failures of
the USSR have a parallel story in the astounding environmental devastation
wrought by the Soviet regime. 396 Moscow's abject disregard for the natural
environment is astonishing, revealed only after the opening of the country in 1989.
In 1992, Murray Freshbach, at the time a research professor of demography at
Georgetown University, teamed up with Alfred Friendly, Jr., the Moscow
correspondent for Newsweek, to analyze the impact of decades of environmental
abuse. Their panoramic study coined the term "ecocide:"
When historians finally conduct an autopsy of the Soviet Union and
Soviet Communism, they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide....
No other great industrial civilization so systematically and so long
poisoned its land, air, water and people. None so loudly proclaiming its
efforts to improve public health and protect nature so degraded both.
And no advanced society faced such a bleak political and economic
reckoning with so few resources to invest toward recovery.397
The Soviet Union was mired in shocking environmental catastrophe at every level
of society. The effects of the Chernobyl debacle and the Aral Sea tragedy are still
unfolding, and serve as powerful iconography for the cornucopia of pollution,
disease and environmental degradation that is a hallmark of autocratic regimes.
One of the critical factors energizing these ruinous policies is a lack of
transparency-autocratic governments are notoriously poor in monitoring
environmental pollution, collecting information about polluters, tabulating the data
and releasing it to the public. 398 Decade after decade, problems persist, exacerbated
by government inattention. Moreover, government data that is not subject to
probing challenge to its veracity and dissent from independent groups is one-
dimensional, and therefore of limited utility.
The Soviet experience was repeated throughout communist
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. In those countries,
environmental decision-making was considered a secretive process, without public
participation or critique by outside experts. 399 Important environmental decisions
395. ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDEX supra note 188, at 24; Rodger A. Payne, Freedom
and the Environment, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 41, 42 (1995).
396. See generally P. CRAIG ROBERTS & KAREN LAFOLLETTE, MELTDOWN: INSIDE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY (1990).
397. Murray Feshbach & Alfred Friendly, Jr., Facing Facts, in ECOCIDE OF THE USSR: HEALTH
AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE 1 (1992).
398. Cynthia B. Schultz & Tamara Raye Crockett, Economic Development, Democratization and
Environmental Protection in Eastern Europe, 18 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53, 62 (1990).
399. Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, Environmental Reforms in Post-Communist Central
Europe: From High Hopes to Hard Reality, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 921, 962 (1992).
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were made, much like judicial decisions, through "telephone law." 4°° Communist
party officials would telephone their counterparts in state agencies or in judicial
proceedings to inform them of the expected outcome to a particular dispute.
40 1
Environmental protection under communism was considered the
privileged domain of the state. The secrecy rendered outside voices bare "trace
elements" in comparison with official policy.40 2 Consequently, governments
operated within an incomplete model of decision-making in which a preference
was placed on political and economic decisions at the expense of environmental
considerations.403
2. Democratic Action and Environmental Protection
After more than forty years of decision-making behind closed doors,
dismantling the Eastern European system posed immense challenge. Yet the
emerging democracies have done remarkably well, a credit to the flexibility and
resilience of the new regimes in coming to terms with the poisoned environmental
legacy of communism. 4°4 By the late 1990s, the constitutions of Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia were among the most
advanced charters in the world for environmental protection.
40 5
While the problem of managing contemporary environmental problems
exists in all states, many developing countries face a special challenge of cascading
environmental degradation. 40 6 For these nations particularly, liberal democracy and
freedom will be essential to protecting the ecosystem. Like the development
economists, however, many environmentalists have fallen into the "world systems"
trap, suggesting that a decline in the global environment is attributable to an
imbalance in the North-South dynamic.40 7 The theory is the environmental
corollary to dependency theory in economics. Environmental stress tends to flow
from the point of most environmental resistance to the least. 4°8 The most resistance
is in the North, composed of democratic countries with strong environmental
regulations, active environmental groups and more responsive governments. 409 The
400. Kathryn Hendley, Demand for Law; Rewriting the Rules of the Game in Russia: The
Neglected Issue of the Demand for Law, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 2 (1999),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num4/feature/rewriting.html.
401. Bowman & Hunter, supra note 366, at 962.
402. Id. at 962 n.196 (citing Jan Drgonec, State of Environmental Law in Czecho-Slovakia (Mar.
1999)(unpublished manuscript)).
403. Id. at 962.
404. For example, in the Czech Republic, the government balanced critical environmental needs
requiring immediate remedies with a responsible comprehensive and long-term approach in the area of
air pollution. David Lu, Note, Air Pollution Regulation in the Czech Republic: Environmental
Protection in the Context of Political and Economic Transition, 13 WIS. INT'L L. J. 565, 583-84 (1995).
405. Mark N. Salvo, Comment, Constitutional Law and Sustainable Development in Central
Europe: Are We There Yet?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 141, 150 (1997).
406. GLOBAL TRENDS 2015, supra note 191, at 34-35.
407. Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling the Local
Global Institution Spectrum, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 1-3 (2000); Gaetan Verhoosel,
Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development: Transferring Environmentally Sound
Technologies, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 49 (1998).
408. See Richardson, supra note 374, at 2-3.
409. Gregory F. Maggio, Inter/intra-generational Equity: Current Applications Under
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points of least resistance are in the South, where many countries are governed by
insular regimes that do not reflect the will of the people. 410 Poor nations become
havens of environmental waste and hazardous substances, and additionally suffer
from the North's appetite for natural resources. 411 Typically, the purported solution
is to turn toward responses at the global level. A more effective approach,
however, is found at the state level. Unrepresentative regimes barter their state's
ecology for private gain.412 One those regimes lose power to democracy, the trend
can begin to reverse.
One contemporary criticism of democracies and the environment is that
their strong national stake in economic growth, generally propelled by business
interests, runs counter to environmental protection. 413 On the contrary, open
societies are far more likely to produce effective political counterweights to
polluting commercial enterprise. Field research by the World Wildlife Fund in
Africa shows a strong correlation between decentralized political control and
environmental conservation.4 14 This is because the transparency and the
widespread distribution of information in a free society encourage better
environmental practices and speed technological advance. Even in the absence of
technological breakthrough, distributed information empowers locals to more
effectively address environmental issues. Democratic regimes tend to distribute
information about the environment, around which popular expressions of concern
can collect. In a free society, people may gather unhindered to form interest groups
and to lobby for stricter regulations. Principles of open debate permit
environmentalists to distribute educational materials and promote new ideas. The
flow of information in a democracy also informs a free media, making it more
likely that the government will be challenged on environmental issues. Of course,
International Law for Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources, 4 BUFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 161, 177 (1997) (quoting David A. Sarokin and Jason Schulkin, Environmental Justice:
Coevolution of Environmental Concerns and Social Justice, 14 THE EVIRONMENTALIST 121, 128
(1994)).
410. See Bowman & Hunter, supra note 366, at 962-63.
411. Marguerite M. Cusack, International Law and the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous
Waste to the Third World: Will the Basel Convention Make a Difference?, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 393 (1990) (noting that three million tons of hazardous waste were shipped to Third World
nations between 1986 and 1988).
412. Speaking at Georgetown University in December, 1991, then presidential candidate Bill
Clinton launched what he called a "new covenant" for national security that would serve as the
centerpiece of his foreign policy. Clinton supported President George H. W. Bush on an array of foreign
policy decisions, calling his formation and leadership of an international coalition to eject Saddam
Hussein's army from Kuwait a "masterful job." Taking exception to other policies, however, Clinton
called for a sweeping rearrangement of U.S. foreign policy toward "engagement and enlargement" that
would be grounded in the promotion of freedom and democracy around the world. Citing the
advantages and benefits of democracies over their non-democratic peers, Clinton argued, among other
things, democracies are more likely to protect the global environment. Governor William J. Clinton, A
New Covenant for American Security, Remarks to Students at Georgetown University (Dec. 12, 1991),
available at http://www.ndol.org/ndolci.cfm?kaid= 128&subid=174&contentid=250537.
413. JOHN S. DRYZEK, RATIONAL ECOLOGY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 120-31 (1987).
414. Jesse Ribot, The Experiences of the World Resources Institute in Africa: An Initiative for
Environmental Accountability in Africa-Decentralization, i n GREENING DEMOCRACY AND
G OVERNING THE ENVIRONMENT (2000), available at
http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/publications/asia/greening/greening.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2004).
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industrial interests also have these rights, but the historical record of widely
publicized environmental crises-from Love Canal to Three-Mile
Island-suggests that democratic governments are responsive to environmental
concerns.41 Environmental causes do not gather power only through impending
crisis, either. When Rachel Carson released her classic, Silent Spring, she triggered
a nationwide debate on the use of pesticides.4 6
Since the human rights records of democracies generally are better than
autocracies, environmentalists are much less likely to be muzzled, harassed,
beaten, detained, imprisoned, raped, tortured or murdered for their work.417 In
order for an individual to be an effective advocate for the environment, protection
of their civil and political rights is paramount.4 18
Human rights abuses are not restricted absolutely to non-democratic
states, but their prevalence and severity are far greater in non-democratic countries.
For example, in September, 1999, in the Narmada Valley of India, peaceful
demonstrators protesting the construction of the Narmada Dam were intimidated,
beaten and arrested by police.4 19 They were held for thirteen days, but then
-. 420
released by order of an independent judge. In contrast, abuse by the Burmese
Army paints a far more dangerous scenario. In Burma, there is no independent
judiciary to monitor the repugnant conduct of the army in its collaboration with
industry to construct the Yadana pipeline.421 Evidence indicates the Burmese Army
has forced relocations, impressed citizens into slave labor to work on the project
and carried out extra-judicial killings of local activists in association with the
pipeline.422
Even in former communist countries like Bulgaria that had decent
environmental laws, those laws were not enforced effectively. 4 2  Effective
environmental enforcement requires more than a powerful and coherent state-the
state must have the authority to establish and enforce a culture of legal
compliance.424 There must be political legitimacy. Under communist rule, Bulgaria
placed undue emphasis on a production-driven public industry. The country had a
415. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements and Law Reform: Social Movements, Law, and Society:
The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 110-12 (2001).
416. Payne, supra note 362, at 44.
417. Id. at 43. "Today, in too many countries, it is dangerous business to be an environmentalist."
AMNESTY INT'L & SIERRA CLUB, DEFENDING THOSE WHO GIVE THE EARTH A VOICE:
ENVIRONMENTALISTS UNDER FIRE--10 URGENT CASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE at 3 (2d ed. 2000),
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/amnesty/report.pdf [hereinafter DEFENDING
THOSE WHO GIVE THE EARTH A VOICE].
418. See, Michael J. Kane, Promoting Political Rights to Protect the Environment, 18 YALE. J.
INT'L L. 389, 411 (1993).
419. DEFENDING THOSE WHO GIVE THE EARTH A VOICE, supra note 384, at 14.
420. Id.
421. See id. at 5 (noting that the Burma victims needed to resort to the U.S. federal courts for
recourse).
422. Id. at 4-5.
423. James Friedberg & Branimir Zaimov, Politics, Environment and the Rule of Law in Bulgaria,
4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 225, 263 (1994).
424. Abram Chayes & Antonio Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 193 (1993),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION READER, at 265-66
(Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons eds., MIT Press 2001).
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corrupt and unresponsive bureaucracy, a lack of respect for neutral legal norms
embodied in the rule of law, and the state was governed by ruling communist elites
with immense and unchecked discretionary power.425 It is somewhat counter-
intuitive that autocratic states are less effective at enforcing their own laws, but
their governments tend to be neither responsive nor accountable. In the Czech
Republic, the transition from a communist government to a democratic
government and free market economy yielded a dramatic improvement in the state
of the natural environment. One critical factor was the increased emphasis of the
426new government on environmental enforcement. Markets and the rule of law
generate useful legal and quasi-legal principles that promote environmental
regulation, such as "polluter pays," and create mechanisms such as direct
bargaining that shift the cost of externalities onto the polluter.
427
One of the few empirical studies to approach the question of whether
democracy is correlated with environmental protection was conducted by Nils
Petter Gleditsch and Bjorn Otto Sverdrup of the International Peace Research
Institute in Oslo, Norway, and the University of Trondheim. Their seminal work
considered how states performed on some of the most important environmental
indicators.428 They then compared environmental performance against levels of
democratization and freedom in the state, as derived from the highly-regarded
Polity database. Their results are mixed, but generally supportive of democracy.
Democracies have fewer endangered mammal species than autocracies, but more
endangered bird species. 429 This is probably because mammals such as whales and
panda bears have become important symbols of the environmental debate in
democracies. Developed states tended to emit a higher level of green house gases,
but their economic production is associated with less deforestation, increased
sanitary and public health conditions and a list of other positive environmental
indicators. 430 Moreover, democracies have lower overall CO2 emissions than non-
democracies, after controlling for the size of the economy and oil production. 431 As
developing states achieve higher levels of development, emission levels taper
off.
4 3 2
425. Id. at 259-63.
426. J. Cameron Thurber, Will Retrocession to a Communist Sovereign Have a Detrimental Effect
on the Emphasis and Enforcement of Laws Protecting Hong Kong's Environment? The Czech
Experience as Contraposition, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 39, 46 (2001). Under Czech democracy,
the communist era preferential treatment for waiving or reducing environmental penalties for foreign or
military entities diminished. Dietrich Earnhart, Enforcement of Environmental Protection Laws Under
Communism and Democracy, 40 J.L. & ECON. 377, 399-400 (1997).
427. See, e.g., Robert Repetto, Economic Incentives for Sustainable Production, in
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 69, 71, 77-78 (Gunter Schramm &
Jeremy J. Warford eds., 1989).
428. Nils Petter Gleditsch & Bjorn Otto Sverdrup, Democracy and the Environment, in HUMAN
SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45, 56-65 (Edward A. Page & Michael Redclif eds., 2002). These
included per capita emissions of climate gases, emissions of CO 2 per capita, deforestation, threats to
biodiversity, lack of safe drinking water, lack of sanitary services and population growth.
429. Id. at 61.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 62.
432. Id.
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The empirical study also confirms that democracies have much greater
participation in environmental treaties and environmental organizations,
confirming that free societies are more involved with other countries to solve
environmental issues.433 In sum, development, irrespective of regime type, tends to
introduce some environmental problems, while alleviating others. Democracy,
however, tends to mobilize societal counter forces that ameliorate and reduce
environmental pollution. The authors concluded that democratic polities do a better
job of addressing the environment. 434
D. Peace and Security-Prerequisites for Development
So far, we have seen that democracy and free markets better promote
ecologically sustainable development. The final piece of sustainable development
is regional peace and security. Without peace, sustainable development is doomed.
One cannot approach the question of sustainable development seriously without
taking some measure of the impact of threats to human security and war on
sustainable development. The UN General Assembly has declared that "Warfare is
inherently destructive of sustainable development. '" 435 Although the General
Assembly has recognized that "[d]evelopment cannot be attained in the absence of
peace and security,''436 it has not integrated this fact into its approach to
development.
Because democracies are accustomed to achieving political goals through
the rule of law rather than fiat, they are better suited to the process of negotiating
and then implementing international agreements and institutions.437 Their openness
and transparency encourages the spread of information and promotes verification,
generating confidence among parties to an agreement. 438 Democratic governance is
slow and complicated, and this assures neighbors that change would come slowly
in a democracy, lowering the risk of abrupt change.439
1. Human Security and Development
A prerequisite for sustainable development is a general condition of
human security and regional peace. The sustainable development orthodoxy has
ignored this fact, setting aside one of the most powerful and interesting schools of
thought in international relations-the democratic peace. In 1953, Quincy Wright
made the prescient observation that absolutism has an undeniable historic
association with "international tensions, military destruction, the impoverishment
of peoples, [and] the persecution of minorities.... 440 Despite a vast literature
433. Id. at 59.
434. Id at 63.
435. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Principal 24, 31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26. See generally JUDY
OGLETHORPE, ET AL., Overview C: Conservation in Times of War, in CONSERVING THE PEACE:
RESOURCES, LIVELIHOODS AND SECURITY 361, 361-83 (Richard Matthew et al. eds., 2002).
436. G.A .Res. 51/240, 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/240(Oct. 15, 1997).
437. Ikenberry, supra note 155, at 82.
438. Id.
439. Id
440. Quincy Wright, Economic and Political Conditions of World Stability, 13 J. ECON. HIST. 363,
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supporting Wright's wisdom, confusion still reigns in thinking about the
consequences of dictatorship and the causes of war. It is impossible, therefore, to
talk about human security and sustainable development, without making a short
detour to look at autocratic government. The World Economic Forum reported in
2004 that, "For most of the past 200 years interstate wars have been the major
killers, with the first and second world wars responsible for most combat-related
deaths." 41 Over the last hundred years, wars have flared in virtually every comer
of the Earth, introducing untold misery and destruction. War easily seems the most
tragic experience in the milieu of the human condition.
In fact, while the consequences of war are indeed dreadful, far more
deaths result from autocratic governments murdering their own people. The 170
million genocidal and mass murders committed in cold blood by totalitarian and
authoritarian rulers against their own people account for more than four times the
battle deaths in all the international and civil wars of the twentieth century. 442 The
Soviet Union, China under both communist and Kuomintang rule, Nazi Germany,
Imperial Japan, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and communist Poland and Vietnam lead
the pack as the most horrendous mass murdering regimes of the last 100 years.
44 3
Autocratic government, not war, is the world's major violent killer.
In recent years, leaders and policy-makers have introduced the concept of
"human security" into the global security lexicon. National security focuses on the
security of the state, and interstate warfare is the subject of analysis. Human
security adds a dimension of "thick description" to the security concept by
focusing on the social security and welfare needs of individual people, regardless
of whether they are involved in an interstate war.44 Since far more people were
murdered by their own government than were killed in all the wars over the last
hundred years, the notion of human security introduces a particularly apt concept
into contemporary thought on security.
The concept of human security complements state-centered security
considerations with people-centered security considerations, recognizing the fact
that states often neglect the physical and social needs of their populations. In 1993,
the UNDP declared that security should be reinterpreted as security for people, not
366 (1953), available at http://www.jstor.org/journals/00220507.html.
441. WORLD ECON FORUM, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 3.
442. This popular misconception was exposed by nearly fifty years of empirical research
conducted by R.J. RUMMEL, a professor of political science at the University of Hawaii. His book,
POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE 92 (1997), is the culmination of a life's
work. See also R. J. Rummel, War Isn't This Century's Biggest Killer, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1986, at 1;
R. J. RUMMEL, POWER KILLS: ABSOLUTE POWER KILLS ABSOLUTELY 2-4 (2001) (copy on file with
author). For detail on the genocide conducted by communist regimes in the Soviet Union, and the
forty-five million murders that have marked the last hundred years in Chinese history, see R. J.
RUMMEL, LETHAL POLITICS: SOVIET GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1917 (1990); R. J.
RUMMEL, CHINA'S BLOODY CENTURY: GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1900, at 15 (1991).
Much of Professor Rummel's groundbreaking work on governmental genocide may be found on his
Internet website, Freedom, Democide, War, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/welcome.html (last
visited Sept. 11, 2004).
443. POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE, supra note 409, at 92, 94.
444. See Human Security Network, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php (last
visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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security for nations. 445 Human security should be embraced as complementary to
national security, and it should recognize autocratic government as the greatest
threat to personal security on the planet.
Canada" 6 and Norway 4 7 have been the leading proponents of the
concept, successfully forming the Human Security Network (HSN) in 1999. The
HSN coalition is comprised of thirteen nations and one observer nation.44 8 There is
no doubt that the term "human security" is amorphous. At the first Ministerial
meeting of the HSN in Lysoen, Norway, in May, 1999, the network committed
itself to principles of "human rights and humanitarian law [as] the foundation for
building human security."
449
The principles recognized, "[h]uman security is advanced.., by protecting
and promoting human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and
democratic structures, a culture of peace and the peaceful resolution of
conflicts. '450 The principles also recognized that sustainable human development is
essential for building human security.
Canada defines human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to
people's rights, safety or lives.''451 It is fair to scrutinize these definitions and much
of the policy research on human security is obscure. 452 Still, the term is an advance
because it highlights the incomplete scope of "national security." Its strength lies
in its inclusiveness, forming a distinct branch of security studies that explores the
particular conditions that affect the survival and prosperity of individuals, groups
and societies, rather than states.453 It also helps to dispel the false comfort and
complacency we sometimes have in assuming that autocratic regimes reflect the
preferences of their populations, and that their military and police forces are used
to safeguard civilian populations.
445. PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION, supra note 311, at 2, 3.
446. See CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FREEDOM
FROM FEAR: CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR HUMAN SECURITY 15 (2002), available at
http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/pdf/freedomfrom fear-en.pdf. Canada's human security program is
described at Foreign Affairs Canada, http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/menu-en.asp (last visited Oct. 24,
2004).
447. See Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa. Norway: the Official Site In Canada: Human
Security Network, http://www.emb-norway.ca/policy/humansecurity/humansecurity.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2004).
448. The Human Security Network is comprised of the following states: Austria, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand
and South Africa as an observer. "The Network emerged from [Canadian-Norwegian cooperation on]
the landmines campaign and was formally launched at a Ministerial meeting in Norway in 1999.
Conferences at Foreign Ministers level were held in Bergen, in Norway (1999), in Lucerne,
Switzerland (2000), Petra, Jordan (2001), Santiago de Chile (2002), Graz, Austria (2003) and Bamako,
Mali (2004) and Ottawa, Canada (2005)." Human Security Network, supra note 411.
449. Human Security Network: Principles, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/principles-e.php
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
450. Id.
451. CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 413,
at 2, 3.
452. Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, 26 INT'L SECURITY 87, 90-91
(2001), available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec 26 02 87_0.pdf.
453. Id. at 102.
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2. Democracy and Regional Security
Much like threats to human security, threats to regional state security and
interstate wars undermine the pursuit of sustainable development. In attempting to
unravel the key source of war, modem scholars have proposed a variety of causes,
including character and personality, 45 4 imbalances in power relationships among
states,455 deterministic world system models, 456 nationalism, 457 natural aggressive
tendencies inherent in human nature,458 economic theories of imperialism, 459 and
environmental stress.4 ° We now know that war is caused by non-democratic
regimes that impose negative externalities of regime behavior onto the regional
security system.
46 1
Democracies manage their foreign affairs with more predictability and are
less prone to create crisis than authoritarian states. Democracies trade with other
nations; autocracies tend not to do So. 462 In democracies, the legislative authority to
ratify trade bargains struck by the executive leads to the search for lower mutually
acceptable trade barriers, producing freer trade outcomes than otherwise would
occur.
463 International trade tends to generate positive economic externalities
outside of the trading relationship, increasing the stability of the entire region. Free
trade and international investment help democracies to socialize non-democratic
nations into an interdependent and liberal world system.46
454. See, e.g., JOHN G. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR (2nd ed. 2000).
455. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 6th ed. 1985).
456. See, e.g., GEORGE MODELSKI, LONG CYCLES IN WORLD POLITICS (1987); GEORGE
MODELSKI WORLD SYSTEM HISTORY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF LONG-TERM CHANGE (Robert Allen
Denmark et al. eds., 2000).
457. See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, supra note 14, at 174-79.
458. See, e.g., KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., 1966); Peter A.
Coming, The Biological Basis of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science, WORLD POL.
321, 342-44 (1971).
459. See generally, V. I. LENIN, IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1939); J. A.
HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1965).
460. See, e.g., Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence
from the Cases, INT'L SEC., Summer 1994, at 5, 35-36; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold:
Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, INT'L SEC., Fall 1991, at 76, 106-13. For
electronic versions of both International Security articles, along with other research by Homer-Dixon,
see http://www.homerdixon.com/academic.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2004).
461. See John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett, The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy,
Interdependence and International Organizations, 1885-1992, WORLD POL., Oct. 1999, at 1, 34-37.
462. See Edward D. Mansfield et al., Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International
Trade, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 318 (2000).
463. See generally id. (Analyzing international trading relationships from 1960-1990.
Interestingly, the authors found that regardless of the legislature's trading preferences and irrespective
of whether the legislature and executive were from the same or different political parties, freer trade
was still the result. They attribute this to an institutional-structural phenomenon and predict that trade
barriers are lowest between a dyad composed of two democracies. Dyads composed of one democracy
and one autocracy engage in 15-20% less commerce than those composed of two democracies.)
464. See President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President in Address on China and the
National Interest, Voice of America (Oct. 24, 1997), available at
http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/uscn/jiang97/1024a.htm. "China's economic growth has made it more
dependent on the outside world for investments, markets and energy." Id.
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The findings are robust and extend beyond international trade.
Democratic regimes tend to behave more cooperatively in the international system,
and non-democracies produce less international cooperation 
and more conflict.4 65
Moreover, non-democratic states are more likely to behave like democratic states,
adopting more democratic norms, as the percentage of democratic states in a
regional system increases. 466 Democratic and democratizing states are more
proactive internationally and more likely than non-democratic states to cooperate
with neighbors to build regional security.46 7 Moreover, there is a strong connection
between regime type and peaceful foreign policy behavior generally. Democratic
states create a positive ripple effect throughout the international system,
implementing norms of peaceful national behavior and influencing the spread of
these norms to other states, even to non-democratic states.468 In sum, the positive,
peaceful externalities that democracies generate for the international system
include confidence-building, war prevention and increased international
cooperation in trade and foreign relations.
469
III. REALIZING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
Free political and economic institutions work in a concerted and
reinforcing manner to achieve sustainable development. Liberal democracies and
free market economies produce greater wealth, a more sustainable environment,
and greater human and national security. A development approach centered on
freedom and democracy holds promise of enriching countless lives throughout the
globe. Free societies, even when those societies are very poor, have proved to be
remarkably dynamic engines of economic growth. It is disconcerting that
development aspirations in many nations remain unfulfilled, captive to the
development orthodoxy.
Over the last fifty years, there persisted an egregious gap between
development aspiration and actual achievement. Speaking in Davos, Switzerland in
2001 at the World Economic Forum, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan offered a
compelling narrative for thinking about world poverty: "Try to imagine what
globalisation can possibly mean to the half of humanity that has never made or
465. Brett Ashley Leeds &David R. Davis, Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International
Interaction, 1953-78, 36 J. PEACE REs. 5, 15 (1999).
466. Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, A Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Dispute
Resolution, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749, 757 (2002).
467. John Norton Moore, Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations
Peacekeeping, Collective Security and War Avoidance, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 811, 823-25 (1997).
468. Mitchell, supra note 433, at 757 (democracies externalize their peaceful norms of
cooperation); see id. (analyzing various ways states attempt to resolve international disputes using
conflicting territorial claims from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project to obtain data on
disputed international territorial claims and the Polity III dataset to measure the annual proportion of
democracies in the international system. She found that third party dispute settlement is sixteen times
more likely among state dyads when the number of democracies in the regional system is 50% or
greater.); see id. at 751 (highlighting that democratic states, such as the United Kingdom and the United
States, have tended to served as norm entrepreneurs, generating a pull effect on creating norms such as
third party international dispute settlement, such as mediation.).
469. Leeds &Davis, supra note 432, at 17.
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received a phone call. 47 ° More critically, basic needs are not being met for
hundreds of millions of people. "Half the world's people [still] live on less than $2
a day.''471 "For billions, especially in Africa and the Islamic world, poverty is
spreading and per capita income is falling., 472 Many of the poorest areas cannot
hope to improve without a change of direction. Over the next decade, world
population will increase to 7.1 billion people, creating problems of food
distribution and availability in areas governed by authoritarian regimes.473 By then
nearly half of the world's population could live in areas stressed by water
shortage. 474 The explosive population growth and symphony of development in the
global South is expected to drive a nearly 50 percent increase in the demand for
energy according to some estimates.475
Few doubt that new thinking is needed on sustainable development.
Frustration and a sense of failure permeate the environmental movement, inparticular. James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, laments: "[t]wo decades of talk and treaties have not
stemmed environmental degradation., 476 These wounds are largely self-inflicted.
From the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, to the World Summit in
Johannesburg, the world's body politic has fed on a steady diet of monumental
documents. For the most part, they remain trophies, relics unable to overcome the
ennui that permeates the global environment. Sustainable development has fallen
victim to one of the foremost errors of global policy-making, which is to equate
general goals with specific policies without assessing the effectiveness of those
policies in actually achieving the goals. 477
The panache of globalism and the penchant for global solutions ignores
the dominating influence of the state and second image solutions to issues of
development, security and the environment. From the ancient world to the present,
societies have struggled to be set free from the rule of insular elites. 478 We are on
the cusp of resolving this debate, and to do so in favor of freedom and liberal
democracy could set in motion sustainable development for the world's poorest
470. Orla Ryan, UN Chief Warns Business, BBC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2000, available at
http://news.bbe.co.uk/l/hi/business/I 141623.stm (last visited Sep. 11, 2004).
471. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Global Development, Inter-
American Development Bank (Mar. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/O3/print/20020314-7.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
472. Id.
473. GLOBAL TRENDS 2015, supra note 191, at 26-27.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 28.
476. James Gustave Speth, Recycling Environmentalism, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jul.-Aug. 2002, at 74.
477. John Norton Moore, The Legal Tradition and the Management of National Security, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYREs S. McDOUGAL 321, at
343 (W. Michael Reisman & Bums H. Weston eds., 1976).
478. Two thousand years ago, Plato wrote in The Republic, "There is no end to suffering ... for
our cities, and none, I suspect, for the human race, unless either philosophers become kings in our
cities, or the people who are now called kings and rulers become, in the truest and most complete sense
of the word, philosophers-unless there is this amalgamation of political power and philosophy, with
all those people whose inclination is to pursue one or other exclusively being forcibly prevented from
doing so." PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book 5, 473d at 175 (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith, trans.,
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 2000).
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nations. For many of these states, realizing development will only come if they
embrace the new democratic development norm.
A. The Democratic Development Norm
In the last few years, the attractive power of liberal democracy and
peaceful democracy promotion has experienced promising growth. The year 2000
ushered in the inaugural meeting of the Community of Democracies in Warsaw,
Poland. Over 100 nations met, agreeing upon a text that encompassed core
democratic norms. The gathering expressed a commitment to strengthen
democracy at the national and international levels.
479 Arising directly from the
influence of Warsaw, the UN General Assembly adopted without dissent
Resolution 55/96, Promoting and Consolidating Democracy. 480
By the end of the Cold War, pursuing democracy-not just among friends
and allies, but opponents as well-had become a bipartisan goal in American
foreign policy. 48 1 The United States and other countries have been remarkably
effective over the last twenty years in shaping the terms of debate within the UN,
bringing the rest of the world closer to realizing the noble principles of freedom
contained in the UN Charter.482 Rather than capitalizing on and leveraging these
efforts, the UN sometimes eschewed bold and productive steps toward democracy.
Now there is tremendous untapped opportunity for the UN Secretary-General to
expend the substantial authority resident in his office for the democratization of
development. More than any other world figure, the Secretary-General is able to
leverage the norms embodied in the UN Charter as an instrument of effective
483persuasion.
Clinging to the development orthodoxy threatens progress in sustainable
development, and it unnecessarily alienates decision-makers in the United States
479. Community of Democracies, First Ministerial Conference, Final Warsaw Declaration (June
27, 2000) available at http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/warsaw english.pdf.
480. G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000).
481. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has pursued a consistent and bipartisan goal
of promoting and nurturing democracy throughout the globe. In 1991, United States interests and
objectives were to expand democracy in the former Soviet Union and to, "strengthen and enlarge the
commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights." National
Security Strategy of the United States (Aug. 1991), http://www.fas.org/man/docs/
9 18015-nss.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2004). During the Clinton Presidency, promotion of democracy abroad was a central
goal of U.S. national security. See, Preface to A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement 1996 (Feb. 1996), available at
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1
9 9 6
stra.htm. More than a decade after the end of the
Cold War, American goals and beliefs had become even more explicit and unapologetic, calling
"freedom, democracy and free enterprise" the "single sustainable model for national success." Preface
to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 17, 2002), at iii, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
482. "Reasserting the Charter's commitment to free democratic principles and institutions will
require a determined willingness to insist that the standards articulated in the Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights be respected and applied consistently to all." Alan L. Keyes, Fixing the
United Nations, in THE NATIONAL INTEREST ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 131, 139 (R. James
Woolsey, ed. 2003).
483. lan Johnstone, The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on
Law, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 441,452 (2003).
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
and elsewhere who are doubtful of its effectiveness. A decade has passed since
Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ) criticized UN-sponsored conferences as
"mischief-making" by non-governmental activists who "dictate what the purported
solutions are to the world's problems.,4 84 In the meantime, the opportunity cost of
the orthodoxy to the poorest nations climbs higher. The quantifiable and non-
quantifiable costs imposed on the world's peoples and environment by autocratic
alternatives to democracy are enormous, representing mankind's unrealized human
security. 4s5 For example, Dr. Gyimah-Boadi, a Ghanaian political scientist,
describes how the advent of constitutional and democratic rule in Ghana in 1993
has served to bring progress to Ghana.486 After democracy, the country began to
dismantle the Trokosi system, which is rooted in traditional culture and has been
practiced over centuries:
Under the Trokosi system... prepubescent girls are sent into servitude to
atone for sins committed by members of their families. These girls, who
are consigned to this form of ritual slavery.., serve hand and foot and
minister to the needs of a shrine and its priest. They engage in farm
work and invariably have sexual intercourse with the priest. Moreover,
they are solely responsible for their upkeep and for that of the children
begotten out of the sexual relationships between themselves and the
priests.487
This vignette illustrates that the promotion of liberal democratic norms
faces the challenge of overcoming some of the most recalcitrant cultural practices.
In order to be accepted, the new norms must be peacefully projected and woven
into development programs. Principled education is part of the answer to
dismantling each facet of the development orthodoxy. Professor Steve Finkel at the
University of Virginia has shown that civic education can dramatically expand
citizens' participation in the democratic process in developing countries across a
variety of cultural traditions. 488 Just as tribal cultures are evolving, so too should
the academics approaches that support the orthodoxy through neo-Marxist
dependency theory, anti-Americanism, world systems analysis and relativistic
models of development.
Several countries and international organizations have begun to
emphasize democracy in their development assistance. The United States, for
example, has been especially active in gradually increasing the role of democracy
promotion in international development. Building on President Carter's more
limited concern with human rights, President Reagan launched "Project
Democracy," "The Democracy Program," and the "National Endowment for
484. Republican Congress to Scrutinize Funds Spent on International Conferences, GLOBAL
WARMING NETWORK ONLINE TODAY, Mar. 17, 1995 (1995 WL 2265596).
485. E. Gyimah Boadi, The Cost of Doing Nothing, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 119, (1999).
486. Id. at 120.
487. Id. at 123.
488. Steven E. Finkel, Can Democracy Be Taught? 14 J. DEMOCRACY 137, 140-42 (2003). Finkel
tested education and participation in the Dominican Republic, Poland and South Africa. See also Steve
E. Finkel, Christopher A. Sabatini & Gwendolyn G. Bevis, Civic Education, Civil Society and Political
Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic, 28 WORLD DEV. 1851-74
(2000) (exploring the effect of donor-supported civic education programs on levels of citizen trust in
institutions in the Dominican Republic).
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Democracy' '489 to promote democratic institutions in other countries. By the end of
Reagan's second term there was a "worldwide democratic revolution"
underway.490 The Reagan-era organizations have been followed by the creation of
counterpart institutions in other states, particularly the Westminster Foundation in
the United Kingdom and the International Centre for Human Rights and
Development in Canada. Together, these institutions are creating a World
Movement for Democracy, a network of democracy worldwide.
491 In its founding
statement adopted at the Inaugural World Assembly in India in 1999, the World
Movement for Democracy sought to engage autocratic societies in dialogue about
democracy, as well as aid emerging democratic societies to move from electoral
democracy to liberal democracy, with extended political and civil systems based
on the rule of law and values rooted in human security and individual rights.
492
The U.S. Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is another leading
example of peaceful and effective democracy promotion. The MCA, which was
announced by President Bush in Monterey, Mexico, at a meeting of the Inter-
American Development Bank in March, 2002, seeks a new compact in global
development. 49 The program hinges on a new accountability for both rich and
poor nations alike. President Bush also increased U.S. development aid by $5
billion over three years, with more money expected to be tied to MCA criteria.
494
By making development assistance contingent on progress in broadening economic
and political freedom, the program builds capacity while strengthening
democracy.495 MCA assistance is available to national, regional and local
governments and NGOs in lower and lower-middle income countries that
demonstrate a commitment to democratic governance and market reforms.
496 The
democratic criteria for eligibility include expanded political pluralism, equality and
the rule of law, respect for human and civil rights, protection of private property
rights, the encouragement of transparent and accountable government, and
489. See The National Endowment for Democracy Homepage, http://www.ned.org (last visited
Nov. 11, 2005).
490. Carothers, supra note 178, at 6.
491. See World Movement for Democracy Homepage, http://www.wmd.org (last visited
November 11, 2005).
492. World Movement for Democracy, Building the World Movement for Democracy: Founding
Statement adopted at the Inaugural World Assembly, New Delhi, India, Feb. 17, 1999
http://www.wmd.org/conference/founding.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
493. Press Release, The White House, The Millennium Challenge Account (Mar. 14, 2002)
(quoting President Bush's address to the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, D.C.),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2004).
494. President's Remarks, The White House, supra note 439.
495. For fiscal year 2005, sixteen countries were eligible and invited to submit proposals:
Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali,
Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP.,
FY 2005 Budget Justification at 2-3 available at
http://www.mca.gov/about us/key_documents/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2004). Of these
countries, 63% are in Africa. Id. at 3. The Millennium Challenge Corporation which manages the
program requested full funding of $2.5 billion, up from $1 billion in FY 2004. Id. at 6.
496. Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. §770let seq. (2000).
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
effective efforts to combat corruption.497 Promotion of market economic solutions
includes encouraging citizens to participate in global trade and capital markets, the
promotion of private sector growth coupled with sustainable management of
natural resources, respect for employee rights, including collective bargaining and
unions, and investment in people through education and quality healthcare.498
The MCA is a radical and pragmatic departure from the global sustainable
development orthodoxy. In emphasizing the dispositive role of good governance in
achieving progress on sustainable development, the MCA incorporates the best of
empirical second image analysis. The program is among the most progressive
development ideas of our time, representing an effective post-orthodoxy model for
499erasing poverty and protecting the environment. Millennium Challenge is a
model for sustainable development; it should be replicated by international
organizations and particularly by the United Nations. The most effective UN
measure would be to move democracy and the rule of law from the periphery to
the center of UNDP activities and programs.
It is difficult to underestimate the importance of the interrelationship
between liberal democracy and development. 500 Liberal democracy is correlated
with economic development, environmental protection, human rights and human
security and international peace and security.501
B. From Prescription to Process
Policy-oriented studies, which the Lasswell-McDougal team pioneered at
Yale, have been instrumental in helping international lawyers to understand that
law is not a prescription, but a process. 50 2 Perhaps in no place is this clearer today
than in the realm of sustainable development, where international law attorneys
have an opportunity to engage in transforming the orthodoxy. A global vision of
sustainable development must be able to come to terms with the reality of the
power of democracy and markets, or it risks being marginalized and disregarded,
particularly in the United States. 50 3 Such an occurrence would be a misfortune,
seriously damaging the prospects for real global progress and diminishing the
benefit of immense American resource, ingenuity and influence in solving
497. 22 U.S.C. § 7706(b)(1) (2005).
498. 22 U.S.C. § 7706(b)(2)-(3) (2005).
499. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Dept. of the Treasury, John W. Snow, Prepared
Remarks before the New York Economic Club (Sep. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1918.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
500. Pritchett & Kaufmann, supra note 346, at 29.
501. By making development assistance (as opposed to humanitarian aid) contingent upon
progress toward democracy, we begin to realize genuine sustainable development. Applicants for aid
should have to make a showing that their programs are developed and executed through democratic
institutions. Recipient nations should have to submit facts and justification reports to articulate how
development projects promote democracy, and those reports should be audited by detailed statements to
ensure that the proposals promote democracy. Siegle et al., supra note 171, at 272-73.
502. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC WORLD
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961) reissued in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER xix -xxii
(1994).
503. Bolton, supra note 267, at 206-7.
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sustainable development problems. Forty years ago, esteemed international lawyer
Louis Henkin penned advice for self-examination for the liberal internationalist
who strongly supports the vital work of the UN. In describing his subject, Henkin
wrote:
Being far-seeing, he tends to be romantic and sometimes spills over into
sentimentalism. Seeing the other fellow's point of view, and having to
defend it to the chauvinist, he sometimes identifies with it. Concerned
with assuring that others do not reduce moral questions to differences of
taste or judgment, he sometimes elevates his own opinion or preference
to principle. Pressing for decency, fairness and rationality in
international affairs, he is reluctant to recognize the lack of these in
others. Concerned with recognizing the interests and the views of others,
he may give them more than their due....504
Compounding naivet6, internationalists are prone to make the mistake in thinking
that the nation-state serves the interest of the United Nations; rather it is the United
Nations that serves the interests of its member states.
50 5 The lack in clarity on this
point has caused some to doubt the efficacy of the United Nations and has
encouraged criticism of the world body. 50 6 In thinking about the UN and its proper
role in world affairs, Henkin encouraged the internationalists to understand both
faces of the world body. Although the UN is an international legal organization
governed by the UN Charter-a treaty-it is also a political 
organization. 50 7
The General Assembly and the Security Council are political as well as
legal bodies.50 8 For international lawyers, the struggle for democracy and
development is more a political struggle than a legal effort. Henkin warns that we
cannot turn over issues to the UN and expect that something good will happen.
Taking an issue to the UN is not a policy-it is part of the political process. What
will emerge from the UN depends not only on what goes into it, but also on how it
is influenced and managed once it gets there. 50
9 This sober advice should gives us
pause when we work with the United Nations to achieve sustainable development.
As Henkin said, "to be persuasive, we must be accurate."
510
As Huntington's third wave of democratic development unfolds, it is easy
to forget the fragility of the process to democratization. Of the 100 or so countries
that can be considered transitioning to democracy, only a small number-about
twenty-are clearly en route to becoming successful and 
well-functioning. 511
These few states generally are found in the Baltic region and 
in Latin America. 51 2
The vast majority of third wave countries do not seem to be expanding or
deepening their democracy.
504. Louis Henkin, The United Nations and Its Supporters: A Self-Examination, 78 POL. SC. Q.
504, 507 (1963).
505. Id. at 513-14.
506. Id. at 506, 536.
507. Id. at 516-19.
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510. Id. at 536.
51I. Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, at 9, supra, note 178.
512. Id.
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Many transitional countries are precariously positioned at what Thomas
Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace characterizes as the
"gray zone. 513 Countries in the gray zone are often no longer emerging
democracies, but rather have congealed into a state of partial-, qualified-, or
pseudo-democracy, stubbornly stuck in the consolidation phase of the democratic
sequence.5t4 This is the most common form of government on Earth today. The
outcome for these states is unclear. In many, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan
and Togo, autocracy is re-solidifying. 515 In fact, the process is so difficult for many
of these states that it has caused some to speculate we have reached the end of the
third wave of democracy. 516 Their pace of their journey toward sustainable
development is slowed by the ambivalence over democracy in international
development institutions.517
Through both Republican and Democratic administrations, the United
States has placed democracy at the cornerstone of American security. 1 8 Many
democratic nations and international organizations, however, still fail to regard
democracy promotion as in their vital national interest.5 19 In looking at the decade
from 1992 to 2002, the Democracy Coalition Project completed the first systemic
attempt to document democratic governments' willingness to defend and promote
democracy abroad. The findings of that study suggest that too often parochial
security and local economic interests trump global democracy promotion.5 20
Ironically enough, it is the newest democracies that are especially eager to enter
into mutually binding commitments to defend democracy. They correctly view
521those efforts as enhancing systemic stability and deterrence. It is clear that
democracies become bolder and more assured in promoting democracy when they
act in conjunction with other democracies through multilateral institutions.5 22
If findings from key disciplines, including political science, comparative
politics, ecology, international relations and economics, are so compelling, then
why is it so difficult to effectively focus effort on achieving sustainable
development? The compelling link between democracy and development opens up
what one World Bank economist describes as a "sensitive and difficult area of
discourse" between donors and the developing states.52 3 Too many decision-
makers have bought into deductive theories that lack application in the real world.
It is hard to look an international official or an NGO colleague in the eye and tell
513. Id.
514. Id. at 10.
515. Id. at 9.
516. See generally, Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over? 7 J. DEMOCRACY 20, 20-37 (1996).
517. Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and Morton H. Halperin, DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE,
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518. "The great struggles of the twentieth century [ended] ... with a single sustainable model for
national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise." Preamble, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i (Sep. 2002).
519. Robert G. Herman and Theodore J. Piccone, eds., DEFENDING DEMOCRACY: A GLOBAL
SURVEY OF FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS 1992-2002 11 (Democracy Coalition Project, Inc., Oct. 11, 2002).
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them that under-development stems from adherence to faulty deductive models
rooted in world systems and state authoritarianism. It is analogous to the difficulty,
and indeed embarrassment, one might incur by having to sit down with a friend
and tell him he has a drinking problem.
C. Using the Right Tool-Of Case-knives and Pickaxes
Roscoe Pound relates the story about how Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn
freed Jim, the runaway slave.524 Tom and Huck discovered that Jim was locked in
a cabin, and they were determined to rescue him.525 Although the door of the cabin
was securely locked, the structure had a dirt floor.526 The boys could dig a hole
large enough for Jim to escape. 527 It seemed to Huck Finn that some old pickaxes
the boys had found were the proper implements to use for digging the hole that
would set Jim free. 5 28 Tom Sawyer knew better. From reading, Tom knew that case
knives were the right course in such situations:
'It don't make no difference,' said Tom, 'how foolish it is, it's the right
way-and it's the regular way....y.' 'I've read all the books that gives
any information about these things. They always dig out with a case-
knife.' So in deference to the books and the properties, the boys set to
work with case-knives. But after they had dug till nearly midnight and
they were tired and their hands were blistered, and they had made little
progress, a light came to Tom's legal mind. He dropped his knife and
turning to Huck, said firmly, 'Gimme a case-knife.' Let Huck tell the
rest:
'He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He flung it
down and says, gimme a case-knife.'
'I didn't know just what to do-but then I thought. I scratched
around amongst the old tools and got a pickaxe and give it to him, and
he took it and went to work and never said a word.' 'He was always
just that particular. Full ofprinciple.52
524. Pound, at 12, supra, note 2.
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